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Preface
In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 
140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was 
at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant 
retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years earlier it had 
converted from a mutual building society whose activities were limited by 
regulation largely to retail deposits and mortgages. Graphic television news 
pictures showed very long queues outside the bank as depositors rushed 
to withdraw their deposits. There was always a fear that this could spark 
a systemic run on bank deposits. After failed attempts to secure a buyer in the 
private sector, the government nationalised the bank and, for the first time, in 
effect socialised the credit risk of the bank. It is now a fully state-owned bank. 
Since then, another British bank (Bradford and Bingley – which was also 
a converted building society) has also been nationalised. Furthermore, the 
government has since taken substantial equity stakes in several other British 
banks as part of a general re-capitalisation programme.
Of course, since Northern Rock failed the world has experienced what is 
arguably its most serious financial crisis ever and in the US much larger and 
more significant banks have failed. On the face of it, therefore, the Northern 
Rock crisis pales into insignificance within the global context. Nevertheless, 
the Northern Rock is particularly significant because it represents in a single 
case study virtually everything that can go wrong with a bank. As we argue in 
the first essay in this compendium, it was a multi-dimensional problem. For 
this, and other reasons, it will surely become a much-analysed case study in 
bank failure.
It is also for this reason that the Editorial Board of SUERF decided to invite 
a selected group of eminent scholars to write short essays on what they judge 
to be some of the significant issues raised in the Northern Rock case study. 
We were anxious to ensure that the authors would not be exclusively from 
the United Kingdom and of the thirteen contributors, six are from outside the 
country including perspectives from the United States and Italy. All of the 
authors were given a completely free hand to select their own focus and no 
attempt has been made to coordinate or edit the contributions.
In the first contribution, David T. Llewellyn offers an overview of the 
multi-dimensional nature of the Northern Rock case study in order to set the 8 Preface
perspective for those who may not be fully familiar with the many different 
strands of the episode. We also consider the business model of the bank and 
how, in particular, it exposed the bank to a low-probability-high-impact risk. 
This contribution also briefly considers some of the reform measures that 
have subsequently been initiated by the government as a result of the Northern 
Rock failure. In particular, the crisis revealed a number of fault-lines in the 
institutional architecture in the United Kingdom and most especially with 
regard to insolvency arrangements for banks and the resolution arrangements 
for failed banks.
In their overview of the Northern Rock crisis, Mayes and Wood argue 
that it provides an “almost ideal test” of the effectiveness of safety-net 
arrangements in a wide range of countries. They suggest that the crisis should 
induce governments and regulatory authorities to consider the lessons from 
this particular crisis. They indicate their own interpretation of the lessons to 
be learned. In particular, they focus on six key issues: (i) deposit insurance, 
(ii) the “too-big-to-fail” concept, (iii) the role of the lender-of-last-resort 
facility, (iv) the need for early intervention and the merits of Structured Early 
Intervention and Resolution and the Prompt Corrective Action models, (v) 
the need for a special resolution regime for banks, and (vi) responsibility and 
coordination between agencies. They also consider the potential information 
value of movements in a bank’s share price.
Paul Hamalainen considers the important issue of the implications of the 
Northern Rock episode for the role of market discipline and, in the process, 
reviews two key requirements for market discipline to work effectively: 
incentive structures and bank transparency. He emphasises the importance of 
market discipline in giving market signals that emanate from risk monitors.
In the following contribution, Eisenbeis and Kaufman give a powerful 
perspective from the United States by comparing the failure of Northern 
Rock with that of Countrywide and IndyMac in the US. They argue that 
there are three common features: serious weaknesses in the structure of 
deposit guarantee arrangements, supervisory failures, and weaknesses in the 
legal structure governing bank failures. They argue that the main lessons 
from the three failures focus on the design of deposit insurance, the need 
for an institutional architecture that reduces the negative externalities of 
bank failures and, in particular, a special bankruptcy procedure for handling 
troubled financial institutions, the importance of timely and accurate 
accounting and reporting, and the necessity of improving the incentives and 9 Preface
accountability for bank regulators. They also point to the weak role played by 
market discipline in the case of Northern Rock.
There is a danger of regarding the Northern Rock crisis as one exclusive to the 
United Kingdom. Marco Onado rightly moves us away from this focus and 
argues that the problems revealed in the Northern Rock case study are far from 
temporary and that at the core was the business model of the bank and that 
this model was common to many other banks in many other countries. This 
provides a useful link to the global financial crisis. In particular, he argues that 
“while there is no doubt that Northern Rock’s business model was extreme, 
one can argue that its underlying philosophy was shared by many other banks.” 
He emphasises the combination of aggressive asset growth, minimisation of 
capital, and funding risks designed to maximise rates of return on equity as 
a common denominator. He also argues that the business model of Northern 
Rock “stretched to the maximum extent the opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage induced by Basel 1 and which led to dramatically overlooking the 
fundamental role of capital in banking”. The central conclusion is that the 
Northern Rock crisis was a crisis of securitisation and capital.
Michael Taylor offers a different perspective by focussing upon institutional 
structure of regulation and supervision and in particular on the role of the 
central bank. He sets the context by explaining that, at the time reforms 
were made in the United Kingdom to the institutional structure of financial 
regulation and supervision about a decade before the Northern Rock crisis, 
little attention was given to crisis management arrangements. In particular, 
an attempt was made to draw a sharp boundary between bank regulation and 
supervision on the one hand, and the Bank of England’s role in promoting 
financial stability on the other. He argues in particular that the Northern 
Rock episode illustrated that “the new boundary that was erected under the 
post-1997 arrangements is sub-optimal in crisis management”. He further 
argues that the Northern Rock case illustrates that monetary stability and 
financial stability are deeply intertwined and that the conduct of monetary 
policy must be informed by the central bank’s analysis of financial stability 
and the information flows it receives through its regular contact with financial 
markets and institutions.
The issue of banking law reform following what was revealed through 
the Northern Rock crisis is considered in Rosa Lastra’s contribution. Her 
starting point is that the crisis exposed major deficiencies in the United 
Kingdom regime to deal with banks in distress. In particular, and in line with 
the contribution of Eisenbeis and Kaufman, she stresses the problems linked 10 Preface
to deposit insurance arrangements and those for the insolvency of financial 
institutions. She also detects weaknesses in the workings of the emergency 
liquidity assistance arrangements. The main focus of the contribution is 
on bank insolvency and bank crisis management, and the reforms (most 
especially the Special Resolution Regime) that have been proposed by the 
government in the wake of the Northern Rock crisis. She also points out 
that there are international dimensions to many of these issues and discusses 
various issues related to cross-border bank insolvency.
Charles Goodhart offers a tour d’horizon of the regulatory responses to 
the financial crisis albeit with a particular focus on the UK experience. The 
point is made that the retail depositors’ run was specific to the UK which is 
another reason why the Northern Rock episode is an important case study. 
He considers seven key issues: the role and operation of deposit insurance, 
bank insolvency regimes and the PCA model, money market operations of 
the central bank, liquidity risk management, the procyclicality of capital 
requirements, the boundaries of regulation in the context of conduits and 
SIVs, and crisis management both with respect to individual countries and 
the cross-border dimension. With respect to the first-mentioned, Goodhart 
poses the question of what deposit insurance is designed to achieve and 
highlights the dilemma (raised in some of the other contributions) that 
there may be a conflict between the requirements of protecting individual 
depositors and the interests of systemic stability and preventing bank runs. 
Although, in the UK context, it was never intended to focus on systemic 
stability, the recent reform in the UK has focussed on this issue. He raises 
the issue of whether this might be premature in an increasingly cross-border 
banking system. He further argues that the moral hazard implication of the 
absence of co-insurance needs to be alleviated by a PCA policy. Regarding 
the insolvency regime, Goodhart argues that “any bank insolvency regime 
must involve some expropriation of shareholder rights”. Regarding liquidity, 
Goodhart argues that we need incentives for banks to hold more liquid assets 
in good times so that they can be run down in bad times and argues that the 
current Basel 2 regime does not provide us with a contra-cyclical instrument 
for offsetting major fluctuations in liquidity conditions. More generally, he 
argues that “the combination of more risk-sensitive methods of applying 
capital adequacy requirements and mark-to-market valuations are imparting 
a strong upwards ratchet to the procyclicality of our system”.
At the time of the Northern Rock crisis there was discussion about the moral 
hazard implications of various forms of intervention, and controversy arose 
over the role adopted by the Bank of England. This issue is addressed in the 11 Preface
contribution by Alistair Milne. A distinction is to be made between loans 
and support for individual institutions and the system as a whole. The scope 
of the essay is on the provision of liquidity to the market as a whole during 
a financial crisis and whether this has potential moral hazard implications. 
Milne argues that any moral hazard dangers arising from central bank 
liquidity assistance to individual institutions can be addressed by the central 
bank charging a penalty interest rate. On the other hand, such penalty rates 
are not required for central bank provision of system-wide liquidity because 
the potential moral hazard does not apply.
In the final contribution, Tim Congdon addresses an entirely different issue 
and focuses upon how banks’ loan margins are determined and the implications 
of what is termed a “teaser rate” strategy given that Northern Rock’s margins 
were low by industry standards. The purpose of the essay is to set out an 
analytical framework for the determination of banks’ interest margins. This 
framework encompasses cash and capital ratios. His model suggests that, the 
lower are the cash-assets and capital-assets ratios, the riskier are the banks’ 
operations. On the other hand, the lower are these ratios the narrower are 
interest margins and hence the lower is the cost of finance to industry and 
household borrowers. Congdon argues that, because of this, banking “suffers 
from an inevitable tension”. There may, he argues, be a conflict between the 
“competitive, low-margin, and customer-orientated banking practiced by 
Northern Rock” and the interests of depositor safety. 
Two dominant themes emerge from these essays: that there are many strands 
to the Northern Rock crisis, and that many of the issues raised have relevance 
to all countries. The lessons to be learned are far from being exclusive to the 
United Kingdom. This is why the Editorial Board of SUERF has devoted this 
SUERF Study to this important episode in the history of bank failures.
Franco Bruni and David T. Llewellyn
Milan and Loughborough13
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1. Introduction
In August 2007, the UK experienced its first bank-run since Overend and 
Gurney in 1866. In three days around £  3 billion of deposits were withdrawn 
(around 11  percent of the bank’s total retail deposits) from a medium sized 
bank – Northern Rock. The unedifying spectacle of widely-publicised long 
queues outside the bank’s branches testified to the bank’s serious problems. 
The Northern Rock crisis was the first time the Bank of England had operated 
its new money market regime in conditions of acute stress in financial markets, 
and it was the first time it had acted as a lender-of-last-resort for many years. 
The run of deposits began immediately after it was announced that the bank had 
sought liquidity assistance from the Bank of England and that the regulatory 
authorities had declared that the bank was solvent.
In two major respects, the crisis that hit Northern Rock was both predictable 
and, to some extent, predicted even though this was not related specifically 
to this bank in particular. Firstly, for well over a year the Bank of England, 
and to a lesser extent the Financial Services Authority (FSA), had been 
warning about evolving trends in the markets: sharp asset growth, systemic 
under-pricing of risk, and some warning signals were given that some of the 
risk-shifting characteristics of new financial instruments (most especially 
credit derivatives such as Collateralised Debt Obligations and Credit Default 14 Introduction
Swaps) might not be as water-tight as they might seem. There were also 
warnings that the bank’s strategy of relying heavily on wholesale market 
funding made it particularly susceptible to liquidity risks. Secondly, and 
more fundamentally, there were certain institutional weaknesses in the 
UK’s regulatory regime that made it susceptible to problems such as those 
that arose with Northern Rock:
1.   A fundamental flaw in the deposit protection scheme,
2.    No established special bankruptcy regime for banks, 
3.   No well-established or predictable Resolution regime for handling 
troubled banks, and 
4.    An institutional structure of financial supervision that separated 
responsibility for systemic stability and lender-of-last-resort (in the Bank 
of England) from prudential supervision of individual banks (located 
within the Financial Services Authority). This was always likely to be 
potentially hazardous in crisis conditions.
1
In particular, there were fundamental fault-lines in the UK’s institutional 
arrangements for handling distressed banks. 
Northern Rock (a previous mutual building society) converted to bank 
status in 1997. On conversion, and stripped of the previous constraints on its 
business powers under the Building Societies Act, it acquired legal powers 
to conduct the full range of banking business. However, it opted to remain 
focussed predominantly on the residential mortgage market. From the outset, 
it adopted a securitisation and funding strategy which was increasingly 
based on secured wholesale money (by issuing mortgage-backed securities) 
and other capital market funding. At its peak, Northern Rock had assets of 
over £ 100 billion and a growth rate of around 20 percent for over a decade. 
Although it was only the seventh largest UK mortgage lender, in the first 
half of 2007 its new mortgage lending accounted for around one-quarter of 
the total in the UK. The pace of mortgage lending substantially exceeded the 
growth of retail deposits with the “funding gap” met through securitisation 
and other wholesale market funding.
Two particular problems emerged during the summer months of 2007: 
a generalised lack of confidence in a particular asset class (mortgage bank 
securities) associated in large part with developments in the sub-prime 
mortgage market in the United Sates, and doubts emerged about the viability 
1  See Llewellyn (2004)15 Introduction
of the Northern Rock business model in particular. In September 2007, 
Northern Rock was forced to seek substantial assistance from a reluctant 
Bank of England even after the regulatory authorities had given assurances 
that the bank was solvent. This announcement sparked a run on the bank until 
the government moved to offer a guarantee to all deposits and that this would 
not be restricted to the normal limit of the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme. Although rumours developed about some other banks, the problem 
was focussed only on Northern Rock. As the problem was contained, in this 
respect a true systemic bank run was avoided although what might have 
happened had the government not announced its full guarantee of deposits at 
all banks in similar circumstances is open to question.
2
2  For a detailed time-line on the crisis see Hamalainen et. al. (2008) and Treasury Committee 
(2008).16
2.  A multi-dimensional Case Study
The Northern Rock episode will become a major case study in the origin and 
management of bank crises. Our purpose here is to offer an assessment by 
focussing on the multi-dimensional nature of the episode. The central thesis 
is summarised as follows:
1. Northern Rock had a unique business model in that securitisation 
(originate-and-distribute) was a central part of the bank’s overall business 
strategy. While many banks securitized assets at the margin, the uniqueness 
of Northern Rock was that securitisation, and a reliance on short-term 
market funding, was the central feature of its business model.
2.  An inherent property of this business model was that it exposed the bank 
to a low-probability-high-impact (LPHI) risk. The bank became heavily 
dependent on short-term funding in the money and capital markets, while 
no-one predicted that liquidity in the markets would suddenly evaporate 
on a large scale. This was the nature of the LPHI risk.
3. While the business model was successful for some years, the LPHI risk 
eventually emerged in the context of global financial turbulence focussed 
initially on sub-prime mortgage lending in the US. As the Northern Rock 
had no part in this it might be claimed that it became an innocent victim 
of this turbulence. However, the chosen business model exposed the bank 
to a LPHI risk associated with a drying-up of liquidity in the London 
financial markets.
4. The Northern Rock crisis was multi-dimensional and revealed several 
fault-lines with respect to:
•  The implications of securitisation and a consequent over-reliance on 
short-term market instruments,
•  The management of LPHI risks in banks,
•  The deposit protection regime in the UK,
•  Money market operations of the Bank of England,
•  The institutional structure of financial regulation and supervision,
•  Corporate governance arrangements in the bank,
•  The arrangements for defining insolvency in banks,
•  Resolution arrangements for failing banks.
5.  A key issue is whether the post-2000 regime (which allocated responsibility 
for prudential regulation of banks, oversight of systemic stability, and the 17 A multi-dimensional Case Study
operation of the lender-of-last-resort function to different agencies) needs 
to be changed, or whether it is the operation of the current model that 
needs to be improved within the existing structure. Two central issues 
arise with respect to supervision: (1) whether the supervision of Northern 
Rock was adequate, and (2) whether there is a fault-line in the separation 
of powers as noted above.
6.  The Northern Rock episode revealed a unique new role of the government 
in effectively over-ruling the established Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS) by intervening to guarantee all deposits at a troubled 
bank.
7.  Attempts were made to find a private sector solution (Resolution) of the 
Northern Rock failure. In the end, this proved not to be possible and the 
bank was taken into temporary public ownership which in turn raises 
issues regarding competitive neutrality, etc.
8. The Northern Rock episode revealed that reform of a structural nature 
is needed in five main areas with respect to: insolvency arrangements 
for banks, Resolution arrangements in the case of failed banks, deposit 
protection arrangements, a Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) regime, and 
crisis management arrangements. The government has since addressed 
four of these in proposed new legislation most especially with respect to 
Resolution arrangements.
9. If a holistic approach to reform of institutional structure were to be 
adopted along the lines of the government’s consultation paper issued 
early in 2008, this would represent one of the biggest reform programmes 
in the institutional arrangements for bank supervision ever adopted by any 
country in one move.18
3.  The Context of Financial Market Turmoil
The Northern Rock episode is set in the context of the global financial market 
turbulence experienced during the summer of 2007. Recent years have 
experienced an unprecedented wave of complex financial innovation with the 
creation of new financial instruments and vehicles most especially with respect 
to the shifting of credit risk (Llewellyn, (2009a)). In the words of the Bank 
of England, this financial innovation had the effect of “creating often opaque 
and complex financial instruments with high embedded leverage” (Bank of 
England, (2007)). Two major instruments at the centre of the financial market 
turmoil were Securitisation and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs): in 
both cases issue volumes rose sharply in the years prior to the crisis. 
The financial market turbulence during the middle months of 2007 was 
a particular problem for all banks that had securitisation as a major part of 
their business strategy. In particular, there was a sharp decline in the appetite 
for major asset classes, uncertainty increased with regard to counterparty 
risk in the inter-bank market and other wholesale funding markets, banks 
became uncertain about their own potential exposure to their off-balance-
sheet vehicles and the extent to which they might need to absorb securitized 
assets on to their own balance sheets, some markets (such as the commercial 
paper market) closed altogether, and liquidity evaporated in all asset-backed 
securities markets. Furthermore, while some new financial instruments had 
the purpose of shifting credit risk, two limitations became apparent during the 
financial market turbulence during 2007: credit risk was not always shifted 
as much as had been envisaged, and to some extent the shifting of credit risk 
came at the expense of enhanced counterparty risk and liquidity risk which 
can ultimately transform into a funding and even solvency risk.
Above all, both the primary and secondary markets in SPM securities 
effectively closed and concern developed over the exposure of some banks 
in the market. There was uncertainty, for instance, about which banks were 
holding MBSs and CDOs. The Governor of the Bank of England has likened 
the drying up of wholesale funding opportunities to the equivalent of a bank 
run. In particular, some banks which were dependent on securitisation 
programmes encountered serious funding problems because of all these 
uncertainties. Issuing banks and their conduits faced both a liquidity constraint 
and a rise in the cost of funding as it became increasingly difficult to roll-over 
short-term debt issues. Liquidity in the inter-bank markets also weakened 19 The Context of Financial Market Turmoil
and a tiering of interest rates emerged during the summer. At one time, for 
instance, the LIBOR in sterling rose to 6.74 percent compared with the Bank 
of England’s Bank Rate of 5.75 percent. 
All of this created considerable market uncertainty in the summer months 
of 2007 which lead to sharp price falls in many asset classes, considerable 
uncertainty as to the risk exposure of banks, credit markets dried up and most 
especially those focussed on asset backed securities, and liquidity dried up in 
the markets for MBSs and CDOs. Overall, there was considerable uncertainty 
regarding the true value of credit instruments (partly because the market 
had virtually ceased to function effectively) and the risk exposure of banks. 
As a result, a loss of confidence developed in the value of all asset-backed 
securities on a global basis. This was the general context of some banks (and 
notably Northern Rock) facing funding problems.
The liquidity problem became serious because securitisation vehicles such 
as conduits and SIVs were funding the acquisition of long-term mortgages 
(and other loans) by issuing short-term debt instruments such as asset-backed 
commercial paper. As liquidity dried up, banks could not finance their 
off-balance-sheet vehicles and were forced to take assets back on to the 
balance sheet or hold on to assets they were planning to securitize. For a time, 
the London inter-bank market effectively froze as banks began to hoard 
liquidity. This developed for three main reasons: banks became increasingly 
concerned about potential counterparty risks, they were uncertain about 
their own potential liquidity requirements given the lines-of-credit offered to 
their own off-balance sheet securitisation vehicles, and concerned developed 
about potential reputation risks in the event that their own subsidiaries would 
become either insolvent or subject to severe funding problems in the wholesale 
markets. All this effectively amounted to a process of re-intermediation.20
4.  A multi-dimensional Problem
The Northern Rock episode will prove to be a major case study in many 
aspects of financial regulation and supervision and the viability of particular 
business models. The particularly significant aspect of this episode is that 
it was multi-dimensional in that several issues at the centre of financial 
regulation and supervision came together in a single case study. Furthermore, 
it revealed major fault-lines in each of the dimensions. Several key dimensions 
are identified:
The low-probability-high-impact (LPHI) risk. As has been argued, Northern 
Rock had a particular business model that exposed it to a low-probability risk 
(that liquidity would dry-up in the inter-bank and commercial paper market) 
but one that would have a high-impact (inability to continue to fund its 
business operations). Northern Rock had a particularly hazardous business 
model which seems not to have been sufficiently monitored by the supervisory 
authority. This model proved to be viable for several years as short-term 
funding could be rolled-over on normal terms. However, the overall LPHI 
risk in this strategy was a combination of three micro risks: (1)  the bank or its 
conduits would be unable to roll-over maturing funding, (2) the cost of such 
funding would rise relative to the yield on mortgage loans that it kept on the 
balance sheet, and (3) that it would be unable to securitize those mortgage 
assets that it intended to. In the last-mentioned case, the bank would be 
forced to maintain the assets on the balance sheet and seek non-securitisation 
funding. The LPHI risk was, therefore, that it would be either unable to 
roll-over its short-term funding in the event of a serious liquidity squeeze or 
that the necessary roll-over funding could be secured only at high interest 
rates. In the event, all three major wholesale funding markets for Northern 
Rock collapsed and became effectively closed to it.
Incomplete credit risk shifting. Over the previous few years, various 
new instruments had developed to enable banks to shift credit risk off their 
balance sheet and on to others. However, in the financial market turmoil of 
the summer of 2007, it became apparent that the risk-shifting characteristics 
of these instruments were less than complete (Llewellyn (2009b)). Allegedly 
bankruptcy-remote vehicles (Special Purpose Vehicles, Conduits, etc) seemed 
not to protect securitising banks from the credit risk of securitized assets. 
This was partly because banks became concerned about the reputation risk 
associated with allowing such vehicles to default. Furthermore, the potential 21 A multi-dimensional Problem
liquidity problems attached to such vehicles were under-estimated or not 
considered at all.
Solvency vs. Liquidity. A distinction is conventionally made between the 
solvency and liquidity of a bank. This distinction is more difficult to make 
in practice than in theory. Northern Rock remained legally solvent and yet 
was dependent on Bank of England funding because it could not fund its 
operations in the markets. However, there is a question about this concept of 
solvency when applied to a bank which: (1) has serious funding problems in 
the open market, (2) where the cost of funding exceeds the average rate of 
interest on the bank’s assets, and (3) when it is dependent on support from 
the Bank of England. The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is, 
therefore, not always clear cut and, under some circumstances, illiquidity can 
force a solvent institution to become insolvent. Furthermore, if depositors 
know that the bank is illiquid they may be induced to withdraw deposits, 
which, in turn, forces the bank to sell assets at a discount in order to pay 
out depositors. Given that banks operate with a relatively low equity capital 
ratio, the fire-sale discount does not need to be very large to exhaust the 
bank’s capital and force it into legal insolvency.
Deposit Protection. Major fault-lines were revealed in the British deposit 
protection scheme which is part of the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS). The co-insurance principle (whereby protection was less than 
complete: at the time, only the first £ 2000 of a deposit was fully protected and 
then only 90 percent of the value of deposits up to a limit of £ 33,000) meant 
that the FSCS would not prevent what it was designed to prevent, namely the 
withdrawal of deposits when doubts emerged about the safety of a particular 
bank. This proved to be the central fault line in the system.
Structural weaknesses. In addition to the inconsistency in deposit protection 
arrangements, the UK suffered from two other major structural weaknesses: 
(i) it was almost alone amongst G7 countries in not having a special bank 
insolvency regime, and (ii) there was no clearly-defined ex ante Resolution 
model in the case of failing banks. A particular problem with the latter is 
that uncertainty is created, and in the event that bids are invited to “rescue” 
a failed bank, potential bidders are prone to bid for economic rents against the 
interests of the tax-payer. This became evident in the case of Northern Rock 
and the drawn-out procedure the government instigated which eventually led 
to the rejection of all the bids that were made and the temporary nationalisation 
of the bank.22 A multi-dimensional Problem
Institutional structure of supervision. In 1997, the in-coming Labour 
government announced a major overhaul of the institutional arrangements 
for financial regulation and supervision. Since the 2000 Financial Services 
and Markets Act, the UK has adopted a unified supervisory model (Llewellyn 
(2004)). In particular, the supervision of banks was taken away from the Bank 
of England and all regulation and supervision of financial institutions and 
markets was vested in the newly-created Financial Services Authority. Many 
analysts at the time argued that this could prove to be problematic in times 
of crisis as, while responsibility for systemic stability and the provision of 
market liquidity remained with the Bank of England, it was no longer to be 
responsible for supervising the institutions that made up the system. Although 
a crisis management structure was put in place (the Tripartite Committee), 
this clearly did not work well in the first crisis to emerge in the new regime.
The Stigma effect. As the crisis unfolded, it became evident that banks were 
reluctant to seek liquidity support from the Bank of England because of a fear 
that this would be interpreted as a bank being in trouble. It was evidently the 
case that banks could not rely on any such assistance being kept confidential. 
This Stigma Effect undermined the role of the Bank of England in the 
performance of one of its basic functions to provide liquidity to the system. 
Role of Government. The government intervened in an ad hoc manner by 
guaranteeing all deposits held at Northern Rock (and, by implication, all 
banks in similar circumstances) which was contrary to the well-established 
deposit protection scheme. 
The significance of the Northern Rock affair is, therefore, that it is 
multi-dimensional in nature and involves many significant issues related to 
the regulation and supervision of banks in the interests of financial stability 
and the protection of depositors. Virtually everything that could go wrong did 
go wrong. This is the ultimate significance of the Northern Rock case and 
why it is such an important case study. 23
5.  Institutional Structure of Supervision
A central issue revealed in the Northern Rock episode, and one that needed 
to be addressed in its various dimensions, was the adequacy of supervisory 
arrangements and crisis management. This has three main dimensions:
(1) the institutional structure of agencies and their responsibilities as between 
the Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, (2) the actual conduct of supervision 
in the case of Northern Rock, and (3) the effectiveness and efficiency of crisis 
management. Serious weaknesses were revealed at each level and reform is 
needed.
5.1. Institutional structure
With respect to institutional structure, in any regulatory/supervisory regime 
four areas need to be addressed: prudential regulation of financial firms, 
systemic stability, the lender-of-last-resort role, and conduct of business 
regulation and supervision. Always and everywhere the central bank is 
charged with oversight of systemic stability. It is usually the case that it is 
responsible for the lender-of-last-resort role though this depends upon the 
nature of any intervention and specifically whether a failing bank is to be 
rescued in which case responsibility would be shared with the Ministry of 
Finance because tax-payer money would be involved. 
A key question is the location of prudential supervision, and in particularly 
whether or not the central bank is to be the prudential supervisor of banks and, 
if so, whether this should also encompass all other financial institutions such 
as in the case of the Netherlands and Ireland. For reasons outlined elsewhere 
(Llewellyn (2004)), there is an overwhelming case for having prudential 
regulation and supervision of all financial firms located in a single agency. 
A key issue is whether this should, or should not, be the central bank. Virtually 
all logical options can be found somewhere in the world which suggests there 
is no obvious single correct model. It has been argued elsewhere (Llewellyn 
(2004)) that institutional structure (who is responsible for what) is very much 
of second-order importance in stable market conditions. The key issue is what 
institutional structure is likely to be optimal in a financial crisis, and most 
effectively able to undertake crisis management.24 Institutional Structure of Supervision
The current structure in the UK was established as one of the early initiatives 
of the in-coming Labour government in 1997. In terms of distress and crisis 
management, the new model revealed major weaknesses at the first time it 
was tested in this crucial area. It would appear that the Tripartite arrangement 
was slow to be activated. It is also clear from some public statements and 
evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee in October 2007, 
that differences had emerged between the FSA and the Bank of England 
particularly with respect to the Bank’s money market operations: the in 
particular, FSA seemed to take a different view from the Bank with respect to 
the moral hazard problem.
One of the central issues is whether the current institutional structure is 
fundamentally flawed, or whether its operation needs to be refined and 
streamlined most especially in the area of crisis management. In particular:
•  Whether it is optimal to have the central bank responsible for systemic 
stability while not at the same time being responsible for prudential 
regulation and supervision of the institutions that make up the system.
•  Equally, whether it can act as an effective lender-of-last-resort without 
having prudential oversight of banks. 
In practice, there will be no major changes to the current institutional structure 
(unified agency where the FSA is responsible for both an integrated prudential 
regulation and conduct of business regulation) because there is too much 
political capital invested in it. Indeed, in evidence to the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee on October 25
th, 2007, the Chancellor virtually ruled 
this out. Nevertheless, the role of the Bank of England needs to be considered 
and the possibility of an alternative structure could be an issue for the longer 
term. What in practice is likely to emerge is a streamlining of the work of 
the different agencies, a refinement of the crisis-management function, more 
effective information-sharing, and more clearly-defined procedures, but all 
within the current overall institutional structure. 
5.2. Crisis Management
When the FSA was created, and banking supervision was taken from the Bank 
of England, it was recognised that there would need to be a formal set of 
arrangements and procedures for handling failing banks. This was formalised 
in a MoU between the Treasury, Bank of England and FSA. This Tripartite 
agreement was based on five main principles: there was to be clear division 25 Institutional Structure of Supervision
of responsibilities, appropriate accountability arrangements, the avoidance 
of duplication of responsibilities, exchanges of relevant information, and 
mechanisms for crisis management. In the event, the first crisis to emerge in 
the new regime revealed weaknesses and flaws in each of these areas. In some 
areas, there was some uncertainty about the legal position, e.g. intervention 
powers; whether, in the event that the Bank of England undertook covert 
intervention in support of the bank, this would need to be made public, and 
whether such intervention might also infringe EU competition law. 
There were several ways in which the crisis was managed badly: there were 
public disputes between the three agencies, communication arrangements 
were clearly problematic, there was no clear definition about which agency 
was responsible for initiating action, and the government delayed announcing 
its guarantee of Northern Rock deposits until after it was announced that the 
bank would receive Bank of England support.26
6.  The Resolution of the Crisis
Initially, the government attempted to find a private market solution and bids 
were invited. Four particular conditions were set by the government: (1) the 
government (tax-payer) should share in any upside gain to the buyer, (2) new 
capital was to be injected, (3) repayment of Bank of England loans was to be 
made within three years, and (4) bidders needed to present a viable business 
plan.
Fairly late in the process, the government proposed as an option for 
consideration that Northern Rock could securitize some of its remaining 
mortgage assets with the securities being guaranteed by the government. The 
funds would be used to repay the Bank of England’s loans (in the order of £ 55 
billion). In effect, the loans would be replaced by a government guarantee on 
the securities issued by the bank. In order to limit the risk to the tax-payer, 
the securitisation package would be “over-securitized”, and a fee would be 
charged for the guarantee.
After a protracted period during which bids were invited to purchase Northern 
Rock, and against the political instincts of the government, the bank was 
eventually taken into temporary public ownership. This was one of the 
biggest nationalisations ever undertaken in the UK and, as argued below, this 
amounted to an ad hoc Bridge Bank mechanism. An independent commission 
would decide upon an appropriate price to be paid to shareholders though 
this was required to be made on the basis of excluding the valuation effect 
of government guarantees and Bank of England support. Clearly, this raises 
a problem in that, while the bank’s assets might have considerable value, 
the value of the equity could be effectively zero given that the bank could 
survive only on the basis of the government guarantee of deposits and Bank 
of England funding.
There are several reasons why, in the final analysis, none of the private bids 
was deemed to be acceptable: market conditions generally were uncertain 
and volatile and the demand to buy a mortgage bank was limited; market 
uncertainty at the time made it difficult to price the bank; the housing market 
in the UK was becoming considerably weaker than in the past and there 
were market expectations that house prices could fall quite sharply thereby 
increasing the probability that some mortgagees would default on their loans; 
one of the government’s conditions (that the loans and support the bank had 27 The Resolution of the Crisis
received) needed to be repaid within a reasonable period was clearly a serious 
legacy problem for potential bidders; any successful bidder would be required 
to inject new capital, and there was some uncertainty over the legal status of 
Granite (Northern Rock’s off-balance sheet vehicle for the securitisation of 
the banks loans).
There was also public disquiet in that the very small number of bidders 
were tending to make low bids which meant that tax-payers retained the risk 
that their own loans would not be repaid (perhaps because of the risks in 
the housing market that might reduce the true value of the bank’s mortgage 
assets), while at the same time there was a potential (though by no means 
certain) upside gain to any successful bidder. The concern was that the risks 
would be socialised while the potential profits would accrue to the successful 
private sector bidder.
While the tax-payer remained exposed to the risks in the mortgage market, 
this would also have been the case had one of the private bids (including one 
from the existing management team) been successful.28
7.  Structural Flaws in the UK Regime
Four major and long-standing structural weaknesses in the UK regime made 
a Northern Rock problem inevitable at some stage:
1.  The deposit protection scheme was fundamentally flawed.
2.  The UK had no special insolvency arrangements for banks but applied the 
long drawn-out normal insolvency arrangements for other companies.
3.  There were no clearly-defined ex ante Resolution procedures in the event 
of failing banks.
4.  The institutional structure of regulation (and the split between the Treasury, 
FSA and Bank of England) proved to be an uncertain arrangement in time 
of crisis.
The arrangements were fundamentally flawed for several reasons: Firstly, 
the FSCS would not prevent bank runs because of its co-insurance principle. 
Secondly, there was no arrangement to ensure that, in the event of a bank 
failure, there would be arrangements to ensure there was only minimal 
disruption to customers in the conduct of their normal banking business. 
Thirdly, and partly because of the lack of a clearly-defined bank insolvency 
model, the arrangements for deposit protection could not guarantee that 
payments would be made promptly thus expositing bank deposits to a liquidity 
risk. In particular, the legal position was that a bank could not been put into 
administration without freezing deposits.
These were recognised by the government which in January 2008 issued 
a comprehensive consultation process jointly with the Bank of England and 
the FSA (Financial stability and depositor protection: strengthening the 
framework) outlining its proposed reforms in each of the flawed areas: see 
HM Treasury (2008a)
After the Northern Rock crisis, the British government initiated a wide-ranging 
consultation process on structural reform. Its document (HM Treasury, 
(2008a)) offered a comprehensive review of various options focussed on 
the structural weaknesses outlined above. A clear theme has been the need 
for a clear, smooth and predictable Resolution regime, reform of deposit 
protection arrangements, a special insolvency arrangements for banks, and 
a revamped crisis management procedure. It is also recognised that, in any 
Resolution procedures, depositors needed to be protected which inter alia 29 Structural Flaws in the UK Regime
implies quick action and no disruption of normal banking services. It has 
come to be recognised that a holistic approach to reform is needed.
After the two substantial consultation documents (HM Treasury (2007) and 
(2008a)), the final comprehensive reform programme was outlined in July 
2008 which also indicated in some detail the specific proposals to be put to 
Parliament in the Autumn of that year (HM Treasury, 2008b). It specifically 
addressed two of the fault-lines in supervisory architecture outlined above: 
1. The issue of whether there should be a special insolvency regime for 
banks, and 
2. The planned resolution regime to replace the ad hoc arrangements that 
previously applied including in the case of Northern Rock. 
The so-called Special Resolution Regime (SRR) implies new powers and 
tools, and institutional structures and insolvency arrangements for banks, 
and is designed to produce a more orderly resolution of failing banks. The 
SRR also gives power to intervene before insolvency is reached. More 
immediately, the arrangements are designed to maintain the continuity of 
a failing bank’s business for the benefit of customers, and to facilitate (where 
necessary) a fast payout from the FSCS. 
The arrangements outlined for the SRR specify the “tools” available to the 
authorities with respect to how resolution is to be achieved:
1.  a private sector purchase of a failing bank (the first-best option because it 
is the least disruptive in all respects, and is a standard market solution),
2.  transfer of the bank to a Bridge Bank (similar to the model already applied 
in the US),
3.  a partial transfer of some parts of a bank’s business by splitting the bank 
which would have the effect of disturbing property rights and creditor 
rankings, and
4.  Temporary public ownership (à la Northern Rock model).
Each of these is to be applied before a bank is technically insolvent. It is 
stressed that these instruments will be used only when certain basic criteria 
are met, and after intensive consultation has taken place between the three 
main agencies (Treasury, Bank of England and FSA).30
8. Assessment
Our central theme has been that the Northern Rock episode was 
a multi-dimensional problem and reflected a complex set of inter-related 
problems. A second central theme has been that it revealed several fault-lines 
in several areas. If there is a positive outcome to the episode it is that attention 
has been drawn to these serious fault-lines. Crises (whether major of minor) 
often automatically call forth regulatory responses. However, this is often 
not the optimal response as not all problems can be solved by regulation or 
without imposing substantial costs. It is not likely that, in the case of Northern 
Rock, there is any need for more detailed prescriptive regulation. The problem 
was largely one of institutional architecture, crisis management, and on-going 
supervision rather than regulation.31
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Although those who made losses will not view it this way, the Northern Rock 
crisis has thus far proven an almost ideal test of the effectiveness of safety 
nets in a wide range of countries. The bank was large enough that the UK 
authorities felt compelled to act to avoid contagion and also to set in place 
a sweeping review that seems likely to result in major changes to the way 
banking problems are to be handled in the future. Yet at the same time it was 
small enough that the losses thus far involved are not significant from the 
point of view of society as a whole. It is not possible to conduct effective 
simulations of how the safety net might actually operate, except perhaps for 
small cases; the tests have to be real. However, everyone hopes that the safety 
net and the system of prudential banking regulation are such that such real 
tests will not occur.36 Introduction
The UK authorities no doubt thought they had an excellent system, with 
a unified financial system supervisor, the FSA, that has been a pioneer in 
risk-based supervision, focusing attention where it is most important, one of 
the world’s most experienced central banks in the home of Walter Bagehot, 
the authority on the Lender of Last Resort, one of the more generous deposit 
insurance schemes with a coverage well in excess of the minimum required 
by the EU and an explicit agreement between the central bank the supervisory 
authority and the ministry of finance on how problems were to be handled. Yet 
problems emerged in most aspects of the system, many of them fundamental, 
and the UK has experienced the first open bank run, with depositors queuing 
in the streets, since Overend Gurney in 1866. Supervisory intervention was 
neither early enough nor firm enough; a private sector solution could not be 
engineered; the agreement to use Lender of Last Resort intervention helped 
trigger rather than avoid the run; the deposit insurance scheme has had to 
be heavily revised; and the authorities are well on the way to putting a new 
Special Resolution Regime for banks in place.
Other authorities round the world will no doubt quietly be giving thanks that 
this problem did not occur in their own country and wondering what would 
have gone wrong if the problem had been in their own jurisdiction. Shocks 
have to be close to home for people to react. The much more expensive savings 
and loan debacle in the US prompted major changes there including FDICIA 
(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991) but 
both that and the horrifically expensive Nordic crises – exceeding the impact 
of the Great Depression in the case of Finland – around the beginning of the 
1990s seem to have had limited impact elsewhere.
The primary purpose of this short paper is therefore to encourage other 
countries to consider the lessons from the Northern Rock experience and to 
act on them so that their supervisory and safety net systems are stronger and 
that the mistakes that they make if they are unlucky enough to experience 
such an adverse shock are at least different. In what follows therefore we offer 
our own appraisal of the lessons to be learned. However, it is important not to 
over-dramatise. The safety net did not fail. The authorities were able to work 
out a solution, ordinary depositors have not lost, contagion has largely been 
avoided, the major losses have fallen on those who voluntary took the risk, the 
shareholders, and many of those responsible have lost their jobs or had their 
reputation tarnished. Although taxpayers have taken on some of the risk, they 
too may not lose if the bank is successfully re-privatised.37
2. The  implications
2.1. Deposit Insurance
According to the established literature (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) deposit 
insurance should stop a run by retail depositors on a bank as they are running 
no risk. If the bank fails they will still get their money back. The Northern 
Rock episode reveals some very important provisos that must exist for this to 
apply in practice.
First of all, the depositors need to get the entire deposit back otherwise they 
will withdraw at least the uninsured portion and possibly the whole sum as 
this involves no extra effort. This does not mean that all deposits need to be 
fully insured but that simply enough of them need to be fully insured that 
the withdrawal of or loss of the uninsured portions neither leads to a general 
loss of confidence or other threat to financial stability. As is illustrated by the 
Northern Rock episode, the ‘smart’ money leaves first and it is only when 
the less informed find out that the bank cannot raise finance on wholesale 
markets that the overt run starts.
1 
The UK’s prevailing limit of £  35,000 is thought to cover 100% of at least 
90% of bank deposits and more than that in the case of Northern Rock. 
This is rather more generous than in most of the EU countries (Cariboni 
et al. (2008)). Hence other countries with similar income levels might find 
themselves more susceptible to a run than the UK. However, the UK had 
a particular feature to its deposit insurance that most other EU countries do 
not – namely, co-insurance. After the first £ 2,000 only 90% of the deposit up 
to £ 35,000 was insured. Thus most depositors had something at risk and the 
only sensible strategy would be to run down the deposit immediately to below 
£ 2,000. Insuring only 90% does not prevent 90% of the run, it prevents none 
of it. The Northern Rock experience is thus likely to end co-insurance in other 
countries as well.
2
1   Kane (2008) describes this withdrawal by the informed as a ‘silent run’.
2  Co-insurance was intended to help provide incentives for depositors to monitor the banks 
and in turn therefore to put prudential pressure on the banks, who would know depositors were 
likely to exit. Like all deterrents they only work if they deter. Once the bank is in trouble their 
effectiveness has gone.38 The implications
Secondly, it is clear that depositors require continuing access to their deposits. 
While a short break may not matter to them, not receiving their pay, having 
standing orders and direct debits collapse and running out of cash will not 
be acceptable. The amount of inconvenience does not need to be large to 
exceeding the switching costs.
3 In the United States the aim is to restore access 
inside a week. In New Zealand, where there is no insurance, the intention is 
within the value day. In any event the break needs to be sufficiently short such 
that it is not material to the customer (materiality may vary from one society 
to another – some countries hold far more cash than others and hence have 
a larger cushion against shocks).
The UK like the rest of the EU only has an obligation to pay out depositors 
within three months (extendable twice by a further three months in the case 
of difficulty). The result in many countries is that they do not know how long 
it would take to pay out depositors in the event of a substantial failure. But, 
however long it is, it will not be short. The system therefore has to change; it 
has to be credible to the ordinary depositor that they will get access to their 
funds swiftly. If the deposit insurer is not funded or does not have ready 
access to temporary government funding while new funds are collected from 
the industry people will not believe that it will work. Similarly if the deposit 
insurer has virtually no staff (the Finnish insurer has one part time employee 
and the Swedish insurer two) then a swift payout will not be credible. The 
insurer has to have detailed knowledge of the structure of the banks’ computer 
systems and it needs to be possible to identify all insured deposits overnight.
4 
This will apply whether the deposits are maintained in some evolution of the 
existing entity or transferred to another bank.
2.2. Redefining ‘too big to fail’.
There is no clearly defined boundary between banks that can be allowed to 
fail in the sense of being closed and placed in receivership and those that 
have to be kept operating (even if they are terminated in legal personality 
and the shareholders wiped out). The Northern Rock episode tells us that 
the size to be kept operating is smaller than many people thought. In the 
US perhaps something of the order of 10 banks were thought to be in this 
3 In the Northern Rock case depositors did not withdraw from the banking system, they 
merely switched to stronger banks.
4 The UK system has a further element that damages its credibility in that it pays out on the 
net claim on the bank – thus offsetting any loans against the deposit – thus the other claims have 
to be identified and matched, again a time consuming process.39 The implications
category (Stern and Feldman (2004)). In New Zealand the Reserve Bank 
has made it clear that all of the main banks are categorised in this way and 
they are forced to organise themselves in such a way that they can operate 
on their own as viable entities on the following day if they have to be taken 
into statutory management (the NZ equivalent of receivership).
5 However, 
in most countries how big is “how big to fail” is the subject of guesswork. 
Corporate spreads will give an idea of the market’s judgement on the issue 
but in general it is clear that in most European countries people do not expect 
any other than minor banks to fail. This would explain the structure of the 
deposit insurance system and the lack of special resolution regimes as in the 
US, Canada, Mexico and elsewhere.
However, there are some grounds for thinking that the Northern Rock case was 
unusual. It was unexpected and the first test of the new regulatory and money 
market regimes. It came at a time when there was a new Prime Minister, 
who was contemplating holding a general election to strengthen his mandate
– a bank failure and protesting depositors would not have helped re-election. 
It would have reflected badly on the new Tripartite arrangements that the 
Prime Minister himself had put in place as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Northern Rock was headquartered in Newcastle upon Tyne an area of strong 
Labour Party support and of above average unemployment. It is, however, 
likely that many looming bank failures in other countries will have ‘special 
features’ in terms of location, timing and relationships that make them 
politically sensitive.
2.3. Standing facilities and emergency lending.
Several features of the support by the Bank of England for Northern Rock 
did not function as might have been hoped but the major problem was that 
an expression of support and confidence helped precipitate a retail run rather 
than stop it. The FSA’s determination that the bank was solvent and the Bank 
of England’s willingness to lend extensively against eligible collateral, albeit 
at a penalty rate of interest, should have been sufficient. Instead, needing to 
go to the Bank of England was treated as sign of failure. 
This is part of a wider problem. Even use of the standing facilities (for 
borrowing overnight) has been treated as a sign of serious problems. Earlier 
in 2007 Barclays twice had to resort to the standing facilities when large 
5  This concept of a special resolution regime for banks is the subject of subsection 5 below.40 The implications
transactions failed just before the overnight market closed, and this attracted 
a very adverse press. (The result is that they and other of the major banks 
now hold more liquidity overnight than they used, thus making it harder for 
others to adjust to shocks.) The penalty interest rate is enough to dissuade 
banks from using the standing facilities as a matter of course before seeking 
a market solution but it was not intended to offer an adverse signal. Other 
countries have had the same problem. The Federal Reserve attempted to 
remove the stigma of using the discount window by asking several of the 
well-capitalised banks to use it voluntarily – unfortunately an act that the 
market saw through.
Anonymity in the use of the facility might help. But Northern Rock required 
greater help than standing facilities could provide or indeed are designed to 
provide, as the range of acceptable collateral needed to be widened, and such 
collateral, even with haircuts, needs to be appraised on a case by case basis 
as it lacks a market price. The Eurosystem eases this problem somewhat by 
having a much longer list of acceptable collateral, as does the Federal Reserve. 
Nevertheless it does appear that there are a number of ways in which the 
stigma can be reduced so that solvent banks in limited difficulty with liquidity 
can address their problems without triggering a major loss of reputation and 
effective downgrade. The making of emergency assistance against acceptable 
collateral an easier and faster process might have helped Northern Rock even 
if the same interest rate premium and haircuts used subsequently had been 
applied and the repayment period was short.
2.4. Early intervention
The major lesson the US learnt from the savings and loan debacle was the 
importance of ‘Structured Early Intervention and Resolution’ (SEIR) and of 
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). The authorities need to be compelled to 
act early as signs of distress emerge and act under a short timetable, with 
increasing harshness, as the problems worsen – ultimately stepping in before 
all capital is eroded so as to stop losses mounting.
6 Having the ability and 
the requirement to step in is crucial if the earlier stages are to work. The 
ultimate threat has to be credible not simply to get the bank itself to strive 
for a private sector solution but for potential purchasers and funders to prefer 
this as well. If they know that delay will result in the public sector stepping 
6 The point at which the US authorities can step in and close the bank is when the leverage 
ratio falls below 2%. Some find the use of leverage ratios controversial but other positive capital 
triggers could work.41 The implications
in, shareholders being wiped out, management losing their jobs and the public 
sector getting all the advantage of the temporary fall in asset values in the rush 
(the so called ‘fire sale’) then their incentive to act first is increased. When 
the authorities ‘reprivatise’ the failed bank they are likely be able to achieve 
much better terms as they are not in a hurry.
What Northern Rock added to this realisation is that the capital triggers for 
action built into the US system cut in too late. In practice the US has tended 
to act before the capital triggers bite (Peek and Rosengren (1997)) and have 
acted on other signals, including those generated in the course of the CAMEL 
rating system. In the Northern Rock case it would have been possible to do this 
from the decline in the share price, for example. The share price fell by more 
than 25% between February and June 2007. In Norway, if a bank’s share price 
declines by more than 25% between annual general meetings it is required 
to call an extraordinary general meeting in which the supervisory authority 
is involved to discuss the circumstances and decide how to act.
7 While early 
triggers of this form may be pulled too often they force an explicit appraisal 
by the supervisor.
There are thus two obvious sources of information to be used in addition to 
the capital triggers (Basel 2, Pillar 1), namely Pillars 2 and 3, the supervisory 
review of risks and the information that is publicly disclosed. The exposure of 
Northern Rock to potential liquidity problems was known by the supervisor 
and the FSA has (rightly) been self-critical over its failure to act more 
promptly (FSA (2008)). As problems were encountered with the originate and 
distribute model in the US so they could have been anticipated in the UK.
2.5. A special resolution regime for banks.
The major conclusion of the tripartite authorities following the Northern 
Rock experience is that the UK needs a special resolution regime for banks 
(Bank of England et al.(2008)). At present the UK uses normal insolvency 
provisions in company law for banks. Thus a bank has to reach insolvency 
before a receiver can be appointed. Although the courts have both acted 
swiftly and followed the authorities’ advice (Hadjiemmanuil (2003)), this 
nevertheless is too late from a practical point of view if the authorities want to 
keep the bank operating. Thus at present the authorities, if they are unable to 
engineer or obtain any solution involving private sector recapitalisation, can 
7  A second EGM has to be called if the share price falls more than 75% where the presumption 
is that the meeting should arrange closure of the bank unless a credible alternative can be found.42 The implications
only choose between letting a bank fail and go into insolvency, or buying the 
bank themselves (nationalisation), which is what they had to do in the case 
of Northern Rock. It is not clear in the UK whether there is even the option 
for a Bear Stearns style assisted rescue, without it breaking the EU rules for 
state aid.
The special resolution regime thus has to be able to handle two 
eventualities:
•  An orderly closure before losses mount if no market solution can be 
found
•  A rapid transfer of the bank as a whole or its key operations into the 
authorities control without a break in business.
And, of course it needs to enable the authorities to decide which of these two 
courses should be followed.
The UK proposals make heavy reference to the US arrangements, where just 
such provisions apply. However, in the US there is a prime objective governing 
how these decisions should be taken, namely, minimising the losses to the 
FDIC. There are two steps to this argument. The first is to establish what the 
welfare objectives of public sector intervention are. 
In the event of a non-bank insolvency the objectives are to maximise the 
value of the insolvency estate, respect the ranking of creditors, and treat 
creditors with any given ranking equally. Indeed in the US, where insolvency 
law is relatively ‘debtor friendly’ it is common for a firm to seek temporary 
protection from its creditors (under Chapter 11) and keep the firm operating 
while it tries to see if it can get agreement on a reorganisation of the claims, 
say, by postponing them or writing them down. Thus it is normal to try to 
decide whether it is in the creditors’ best interests to allow the firm to keep 
operating under closely restricted terms or to simply close it or dismember it 
and sell the various assets, including viable subsidiaries, at the best price that 
can be obtained. 
Since the FDIC succeeds to the claims of the insured depositors in the event 
of a failure managing the resolution in such a way that it minimises the 
losses to the FDIC would be exactly the same as maximising the value of 
the insolvency estate – provided that the depositors were in the most junior 
class of creditors and all members of that class were treated equally. That neat 43 The implications
symmetry does not apply if there is depositor preference or the deposit insurer 
has a higher priority among the claimants.
The advantage of this scheme is that it preserves as much as possible of the 
symmetry in treatment of banks and non-banks. The only difference is that the 
intervention point in the case of banks is likely to be earlier – a disadvantage 
to the debtors that is matched by the services the authorities provide in 
assisting prudential management and liquidity assistance.
However, this assumes that there are no spillovers that are thought important, 
i.e., no threat to financial stability. The US has an explicit ‘Systemic 
Risk Exemption’ whereby, with the support of the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Treasury (effectively the President) the 
FDIC can take wider concerns into account. This has never been used. Since 
the case of Continental Illinois no bank failure in the US has been thought 
large enough to require special action. Both LTCM and Bear Stearns, where 
there were such concerns, were dealt with by the Federal Reserve. One might 
argue the same about the operations to assist Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
earlier this year. However, in none of these cases is there an explicit objective 
for minimisation or maximisation of something.
Northern Rock illustrates that these spill over concerns can occur with quite 
small institutions. Since much of the concern is over how people might perceive 
an event, as it tends to be much less expensive to head off a loss of confidence 
in these circumstances than try to reverse such a loss should it occur, it is very 
difficult to provide any hard and fast rules. The costs of financial instability 
can be huge (Hoggarth and Saporta (2001)), so minimising expected losses 
to society would involve assigning very soft probabilities to large numbers. 
Nevertheless this is precisely the judgement that has to be made in deciding 
whether a bank should be allowed to fail or should enter the special resolution 
process, leading perhaps to the formation of a bridge bank. 
It therefore makes more sense to have a formal process, as in New Zealand, 
where any of the large banks will enter a prescribed resolution regime, 
irrespective of the circumstances. This gives certainty to all parties about the 
outcome and process. It reduces the need to make political decisions at the 
time. (It cannot remove them as it is always possible that the government will 
see the size of the losses that will occur and decide to use taxpayers’ money, 
whatever the prior commitment). Nevertheless acting early tends to minimise 
such losses.44 The implications
2.6. Responsibility and Coordination
The Tripartite arrangements in place at the time of the Northern Rock 
problems acknowledged the inherent difficulties of getting three agencies 
to act in concert. The difficulties that occurred emphasise how much worse 
it would be if this co-ordination had to be across borders and problems of 
conflict of national interests were added. The reaction of giving a stronger 
role to the central bank in times of stress makes sense as it is the organisation 
responsible for financial stability and in the main such actions can take place 
without access to taxpayer money, which would require ministerial consent. 
However, it is the fact some allocation of responsibility has been made which 
is essential. In the US responsibility seems to have been clear with the FDIC 
dealing with banking problems and the Federal Reserve handling other parts 
of the financial system. With much weaker deposit insurers in other countries, 
responsibility needs to lie elsewhere.
Both the supervisor and the central bank face conflicts of interest. For 
the supervisor there is the fear that bank failure might be equated with 
supervisory failure; this can lead to forbearance. For the central bank there 
could be a conflict with monetary policy. It is unlikely that in future such 
Memoranda of Understanding as existed among the three authorities will be 
thought adequate: something sharper is required. At the European level this 
implies a considerable rethink for the handling of problems with cross-border 
banks. Simulations may not reflect the harsh reality of crises and the tendency 
for instinctive action and inaction, which may not be optimal with the benefit 
of hindsight.45
3. Concluding  remarks
The upshot of this discussion suggests that the Northern Rock episode has 
revealed little that leads us to believe that economic analysis was particularly 
at fault in allowing the problem to emerge. According to House of Commons 
(2008) the problems emerged from an unfortunate combination of weaknesses 
in implementation and a major external shock. We therefore draw 5 main 
lessons from this experience that need to be considered in all countries and 
not just in the UK:
1.  Deposit insurance needs to be designed so that
a.  the large majority of all individuals’ balances are fully covered
b. depositors can all have access to their deposits without a material 
break
2. The activation of emergency liquidity assistance arrangements needs 
to give confidence that those being assisted will survive, and should 
be seen as the system working as it should, rather than signalling some 
breakdown
3. There needs to be a regime of prompt corrective action for supervisors 
whereby prescribed actions of increasing severity are required within short 
time periods according to a set of triggers based on capital adequacy and 
risks of failure
4.  There needs to be a legal framework such that the functions of systemic 
importance in banks that fail can be kept operating without a material 
break
a.  such ‘failure’ should occur before the bank becomes insolvent so that 
there is little chance of losses to the taxpayer
b.  this will normally involve a special insolvency regimes for banks
5.  Some designated institution needs to be in charge of intervention in failing 
banks to ensure rapid and concerted action.
(At a European level far greater coherence among the legislation and 
authorities of member states is required if these provisions for the handling 
of problems in domestic banks are to be equally successfully in handling the 
case of large cross-border banks.)
If these 5 provisions had been in place it is highly unlikely that there would 
have been a retail run on Northern Rock and the record of over 140 years 
without a significant bank run in the UK would have been maintained.46 Concluding remarks
Further, Northern Rock was a medium-sized domestic bank. If the problems 
had occurred in a larger cross-border bank the consequences would have been 
much more severe. Although it will not feel like it to those who have lost 
money or their jobs in the Northern Rock episode, it is fortunate that the wake 
up call to action has been so effective at such limited cost. What remains is to 
take the action before any such serious crisis could emerge.47
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The aim of this chapter is to explore the implications for the role of market 
discipline as a result of the Northern Rock crisis. Given the modern 
phenomenon for globalisation in financial institutions and financial markets, 
and the interconnectedness between the crisis at Northern Rock and the 
turmoil in global markets, the chapter also examines the market discipline 
issues surrounding the global credit crisis. In that way, the paper discusses 
the two key avenues in the market discipline debate - incentive structures 
and transparency - both of which are viewed as essential in encouraging 
successful market discipline. 
After a brief introduction as to the benefits of market discipline in banking 
regulatory design, the layout of the paper is as follows. The first section 
analyses the market discipline implications from the Northern Rock crisis, and, 
in particular the Tripartite Committee’s proposals to restructure UK banking 
regulation. The focus is on whether the new regulatory regime will enhance 
the incentive structures for bank stakeholders to monitor and discipline bank 
risk-taking. The second section explores the role that enhanced disclosures 52 Introduction
can provide in improving transparency and thus the potential for successful 
market discipline. The discussion covers both the existing Pillar 3 policies to 
enhance bank transparency and the recent disclosure policy initiatives that 
are in response to the credit crisis. Finally, the chapter will combine the two 
themes to provide some observations on how the market discipline debate can 
progress in light of the recent turmoil in both UK domestic, and international, 
banking and financial markets.
The academic literature has regularly espoused the benefits of enhancing 
incentive structures in bank regulatory design to encourage market discipline, 
and how this can support regulatory authority discipline to redress some of 
the moral hazard and efficiency problems in banking and improve financial 
stability (Berger (1991); Evanoff and Wall (2001); and Flannery (1998)). For 
example, market monitors can sanction banks whose financial condition or 
risk profile is considered, in some sense, unsatisfactory (Linsley and Shrives 
(2005)). This can be either through withdrawing, or failing to rollover, funding 
(termed as quantity based discipline) or through demanding increased interest 
rates or yields (termed as price-based discipline). Equally, the regulatory 
authorities can use these forward-looking market prices to assist in their 
identification of institutions that are most at risk of failing.
Hamalainen et al. (2005) emphasises that there are two aspects to the 
successful introduction of market discipline. First, investors must have 
incentives to monitor and signal increased bank risk taking. In other words 
bank stakeholders must consider that they are at risk in the event of bank 
default. Secondly, in order to successfully monitor bank risk-taking adequate 
bank disclosure structures must be introduced. These two elements for 
successful market discipline frame the subsequent discussion.53
2.  Tripartite Committee proposals and market discipline 
implications
This section examines the current proposals for a new banking regulatory 
framework in the UK and its implications for the role of market discipline 
within that framework. The market discipline literature suggests that three 
classes of bank stakeholder could impose market discipline: depositors, 
bondholders and equity holders, because they are all at risk of loss in the 
event of bank failure. The discussion on the current proposals, therefore, 
will be framed around the three different types of stakeholders. In addition, 
this section will examine the incentive structures that are proposed for the 
regulatory authorities and credit institutions within the current consultation 
stage and the market discipline implications thereof.
Following the run on Northern Rock, the UK regulatory authorities have 
conducted extensive consultations with all financial market stakeholders to 
address the numerous weaknesses in the current banking regulatory regime. 
In written form, these consultations have resulted in one discussion paper 
issued in October 2007
1 and two further periods of consultation (in January 
2008 and July 2008)
2. The second consultation stage is due to end on the 
15th September 2008. Following this, the Government intends to present 
legislation to parliament in late 2008. The proposals, if implemented, would 
represent a substantial overhaul of the existing UK banking regulatory 
arrangements for resolving bank failures and compensating depositors.
2.1. Depositors
One of the most prominent features in the debate on reforming the 
UK’s banking supervisory framework, in no small part due to the pictures 
of queuing depositors outside Northern Rock branches, is that of the deposit 
insurance arrangements. Under the existing scheme, the UK was quite unique 
in having a co-insurance element. The aim was to incentivise depositors 
to undertake market discipline through monitoring bank risk-taking and 
reflecting this in their investment decision-making; in other words, sharing 
1  Tripartite Committee, (2007)
2  Tripartite Committee, (2008a, 2008b and 2008c)54 Tripartite Committee proposals and market discipline implications
the risk of excessive bank risk-taking through accepting higher deposit 
returns. Hamalainen (2008b) conducted interviews with queuing Northern 
Rock depositors during the first four-days of the crisis. One of the conclusions 
from his evidence is that depositors had invested in Northern Rock because 
of the extremely competitive interest rates on offer. Furthermore, his evidence 
highlights that the co-insurance element in the deposit insurance scheme 
meant that depositors were not willing to lose a penny of their hard-earned 
savings. His findings suggest that retail depositors cannot be relied upon as 
a source of market discipline, because they do not consider the risk-taking 
elements surrounding deposit interest rates.
In the aftermath of the run on Northern Rock, the Tripartite Committee’s swift 
decision to remove the co-insurance element was a welcome move. Looking 
ahead, the current suggestion to raise the deposit insurance coverage limit to 
100% of £ 50,000 is a sensible decision, but from a market discipline perspective 
the incentive for depositors to undertake any risk-sensitive monitoring of 
deposit interest rates is further removed. In addition, a by-product of this new 
and higher coverage limit is the increased moral-hazard potential for banks 
to “gamble for resurrection”. Furthermore, raising the deposit insurance limit 
and providing 100% coverage may reduce the market discipline behaviour of 
depositors, but, rather worryingly, it does not remove the potential for rapid 
bank runs. The evidence from Hamalainen (2008b) is that Northern Rock 
depositors wanted to obtain immediate control of their funds from the troubled 
bank and they were not willing to be without access to their funds for any time 
period. Any delay in receiving a payout represented a liquidity risk for these 
depositors. Therefore, in order to achieve credibility and prevent damaging 
bank runs the new UK deposit insurance scheme must be able to payout 
insured depositors within one day (Hamalainen (2008a)). For similar reasons, 
the revised scheme must also apply gross payments to insured depositors.
Uninsured depositors (i.e., those who have funds in excess of the deposit 
insurance coverage limit or those who are excluded from any compensation 
payments, such as wholesale depositors) carry a stronger incentive to exert 
market discipline compared to those whose funds are insured. The academic 
literature argues that in order for investors to have the incentive to impose market 
discipline, they must not only be at risk of loss in the event of bank failure, but 
they should also perceive that they could incur losses if the bank fails. In the 
case of depositors the current Tripartite Committee proposals for resolving bank 
failures create a potential anomaly that could affect market discipline behaviour. 
Under the proposed Special Resolution Regime (SRR), the private sector or 
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liabilities and sufficient assets to cover those liabilities. The proposals specifically 
state that Tier I, II and III regulatory capital instruments would be unlikely to 
be transferred; however there is no mention of uninsured deposits. In fact, the 
proposals do state: “if only a relatively small proportion of a bank’s balance sheet 
poses a risk to financial stability (such as the retail deposit book or, potentially, 
such deposits as are protected by the FSCS) it may only be necessary in order to 
stabilise the situation to transfer this portion of the bank
3. This suggests that retail 
depositors with sums above the 100% coverage limit have the likelihood of being 
transferred to the new (acquiring or bridge) bank.
4
This treatment should be contrasted with the proposals for a failed bank that is 
resolved under the SRR insolvency mechanism. In these circumstances retail 
depositors with funds in excess of the insured limit would find their uninsured 
portion being treated as general uninsured creditors and so the likelihood 
of receiving all of their funds is significantly diminished (especially given 
subordinated debt holders are included under the same category). The United 
States has overcome this problem by applying the depositor preference rule, 
whereby uninsured depositors rank in advance of general uninsured creditors 
in the event of bank insolvency proceedings. The UK regulatory authorities 
should consider introducing a similar concept so that the insolvency tool is 
consistent with the likely treatment of uninsured depositors under one of the 
other SRR tools. In this way, uninsured depositors would be left in no doubt 
as to their risk ranking in advance of bank failure and from a market discipline 
perspective can therefore price bank liabilities consistently. As things stand if 
depositors perceive that failing credit institutions may be treated under different 
SRR tools, for example based on the size of the institution, then uninsured 
depositors would be attracted to larger institutions where the likelihood of 
their deposits being transferred to an acquiring or bridge bank is heightened. 
The United States experience also shows that the introduction of a Least-Cost 
Resolution Policy, whereby the resolution agency must pursue the resolution 
method that produces the least cost to the deposit insurance fund, has alleviated 
the expectation that uninsured depositors at large credit institutions would 
not incur losses. The UK Tripartite SRR proposals do indicate that a code of 
conduct will be introduced, outlining, amongst other things, “how the choice 
between the different SRR tools will be made”
5. This introduces a degree of 
accountability into the future SRR arrangements and this must be welcomed.
3  Tripartite Committee, 2008c
4 The total transfer of a deposit book can be appealing to an acquiring bank because it 
provides a relatively cheap source of funds and provides access to a new set of customers for the 
marketing of banking products.
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2.2. Subordinated debt holders and equity holders
The market discipline literature argues that subordinated debt holders 
and equity holders provide the most appropriate channels for conducting 
effective market discipline. Comparing the two, subordinated debt holders 
have a natural aversion to banks that seek increased profits through greater 
risk-taking. From a regulatory authority perspective, SND provides the same 
cushioning effect to the deposit insurance scheme as equity, but without the 
risk-taking incentive of equity holders. Thus, the incentive of SND holders to 
monitor and limit bank risk-taking is accordingly more aligned with those of 
the regulatory authorities (and hence taxpayers). 
As previously mentioned, an important aspect in ensuring adequate market 
discipline by bank stakeholders is clearly outlining in advance their 
probability for incurring losses in the event of bank failure. In the case of debt 
holders and equity holders it is particularly important to dispel any suggestion 
that they will be bailed out under the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine. Only then will 
these investors be encouraged to monitor and price risk accordingly. Prior to 
the Northern Rock crisis, the UK regulatory authorities approach was one 
of “constructive ambiguity”. In other words no-one can rely on being bailed 
out, whatever the size of the credit institution. The Northern Rock crisis has 
highlighted the weaknesses in the existing UK banking regulatory regime with 
shareholders bargaining for economic rents and the final resolution being ad hoc 
and unpredictable in nature. Following the Northern Rock crisis, the Tripartite 
Committee has been consistent in their treatment of both equity holders and 
subordinated debt holders and thus their market discipline potential. The 
government’s announcement on September 17th 2007 of a guarantee for all 
Northern Rock depositors explicitly excluded subordinated debt instruments. 
In line with the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee’s (2008) 
recommendation that shareholders and subordinated creditors should bear the 
costs of bank failure and not the taxpayer, the Tripartite Committee’s proposals 
on the SRR clearly implement this philosophy. For example, concerning the 
transfer of liabilities of a failing bank to a Bridge Bank, the document states; 
“It is unlikely that the Bank of England would decide to transfer the failed 
bank’s capital instruments (that is, all debt instruments that qualify as Tier I, 
II or III capital)”. Equally, the SRR’s share transfer powers to either a private 
sector purchaser, or to take the bank into temporary public ownership state: 
“The powers would allow for the transfer of all, or specified classes, of the 
securities of a bank. Securities would be defined widely to reflect the diverse 
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debt instruments with equity characteristics potentially conferring control 
(for example, innovative Tier 1 capital resources).” In both instances the 
arrangements are so wide-ranging as to capture the vast array of capital 
bearing instruments currently available in the market place. The references to 
regulatory capital bearing instruments provide some insulation against future 
capital instrument developments. Therefore, the expected implementation 
of these ex ante risk-bearing philosophies on subordinated debt holders 
and equity holders should encourage these investors to undertake enhanced 
monitoring and disciplining of bank risk taking in the future. At the same 
time such philosophies emphasise the importance of implementing regulatory 
measures at both the pre-crisis and post-crisis stages that complement one 
another.
2.3. Regulatory authority and financial institution incentives 
Market monitors’ incentives to impose market discipline can be affected 
indirectly by the incentive structures imposed on the regulatory authorities 
and regulated institutions themselves. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
these aspects of the Tripartite Committee’s proposals as well. An especially 
important aspect is the possibility for regulatory authority forbearance. Modern 
regulatory theory argues that incentive mechanisms should be created that 
prevent the regulatory authorities from deciding too late if an institution should 
be allowed to fail, and by which time the institution has negative franchise 
value. A solution to the forbearance problem is some form of Structured Early 
Intervention and Resolution supervisory approach, a common derivative of 
which is the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) mechanism that is in operation 
in the United States. A PCA approach formalises specific ratio tripwires which 
when breached serve as the basis for mandatory intervention by the supervisory 
authorities.
6 The typical reluctance by regulatory authorities to move towards 
some form of PCA is that they wish to retain regulatory discretion. However, in 
contrast, a more structured approach to intervention can enhance the credibility 
of the supervisory authorities in that all market participants have a high degree 
of certainty that action will be taken and at what stage. At the same time, by 
removing any prospect that a bank in difficulties might be treated leniently, bank 
managers have every incentive to manage their banks prudently so as to reduce 
the probability of distress (Llewellyn and Mayes (2003)). Complementing 
this structured resolution approach with a clear uniform order for distributing 
6 Such prompt corrective actions include increased monitoring, raising additional capital, 
withholding interest and dividend payments to subordinated debt holders and equity holders 
respectively, requiring acceptance of an offer to be acquired, and closure of the institution.58 Tripartite Committee proposals and market discipline implications
the assets of failed credit institutions (as previously discussed in this section) 
ensures that, ex ante, all bank investors are fully aware of their risk position, 
that action will be taken and at what stage and, therefore, reduce opportunities 
for bargaining of residual economic rents.
A popular misconception with PCA mechanisms is that it exists to prevent 
banks from failing and therefore creates moral hazard behaviour. A suitably 
structured PCA tool aims to ensure that the functions of a failing bank are 
maintained, by identifying as early as possible that a bank is failing. The 
regulatory authorities can, therefore, begin to put in place mechanisms to deal 
with insured depositors in case the bank does eventually become classified 
as failed. Equally, PCA imposes actions on a failing bank that will not leave 
uninsured investors and bank management immune from financial losses, 
thereby further reducing the possibility of moral hazard behaviour.
The current proposals from the Tripartite Committee include the conditions 
for taking a bank into the SRR regime. They are: that a bank is failing, or is 
likely to fail to meet its Threshold Conditions; and that having regard to timing 
and other relevant circumstances it is not reasonably likely that (ignoring the 
stabilisation powers) action will be taken by or in respect of the bank that 
will enable the bank to satisfy the Threshold Conditions
7. Unfortunately, 
these so-called Threshold Conditions lack sufficient clarity and certainty in 
comparison with the trigger mechanisms under, say, the United States PCA 
model. The UK proposals, therefore, leave market participants with a high 
degree of uncertainty as to when action will be taken on a failing bank and at 
what stage. Equally, these conditions appear to have only one dimension to 
them before a failing institutions enters the SRR, whereas PCA has a set of 
increasingly stringent tripwires that only involve the instigation of resolution 
procedures once a bank has fallen through the last of the tripwires. The key 
concern is that the lack of clarity within the UK proposals may encourage 
investors to assume that the regulatory authorities will treat larger financial 
institution differently and so such institutions are less likely to enter the SRR 
regime. In turn, this will impact on investors’ risk perceptions across different 
credit institutions. Equally, these proposals do not appear to overcome the 
issue of eradicating regulatory forbearance, because there is still a wide 
degree of discretion as to when a bank would enter the SRR regime.
7 The Threshold Conditions are set out in Schedule 6 to the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000. The Threshold Conditions with greatest relevance to entry into the SRR are those of 
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To overcome potential uncertainties as to when the SRR mechanism would 
be invoked on a failing bank, the Tripartite Committee has promised a Code 
of Conduct for the operation of the SRR. Ironically, the Code of Conduct is 
attempting to deal with some of the gaps that have been created by not having 
a clear set of SRR condition triggers. For example, one of the areas that the 
Code will cover is how to determine that the second condition which the FSA 
will make an assessment against in determining that a bank enters the SRR is 
satisfied. Implementing a set of regulatory triggers, such as those in the US, 
would be a far simpler approach and leave all market participants clear as to the 
regulatory structure and pre- and post-resolution approaches from the outset.
Analysing the incentive structures for banks within the Tripartite 
Committee’s proposals, the FSA intend to publish a consultation paper 
setting out proposals on the provision of additional information by banks to 
demonstrate that they are meeting Threshold condition on an ongoing and 
forward basis. At this stage there is little clarity as to what these additional 
information requirements may be and, importantly from a market discipline 
perspective, whether they may be available publicly. An additional risk 
containing mechanism would be to fund the deposit insurance scheme using 
risk-based premiums so that banks judged to be at higher risk of default would 
pay higher levies. The current proposal is to consult further on this issue in 
due course.
2.4. Conclusions to the Tripartite Committee’s proposals
The Committee’s proposals overcome some of the market discipline 
weaknesses in the existing regime. In particular, the position of the most 
appropriate sources of market discipline, equity holders and subordinated 
debt holders, is no longer uncertain. The new regime clearly explains that 
these two types of bank stakeholder should not expect to be protected in 
the event of any bank going into the SRR regime. Therefore, market signals 
from these investors should now provide a cleaner representation of market 
perceptions of the likelihood of bank default.
8 However, one outstanding area 
of weakness, and where the new proposals do not go far enough, is in clearly 
outlining the conditions that will lead to a failing institution being treated 
8 Hamalainen et al. (2008) analysed the predictive qualities of different financial instrument 
prices in advance of the failure at Northern Rock in September 2007. The paper found that 
Equity indicators illustrated a clear negative reaction for Northern Rock compared to peer banks 
following the profit warning in late June 2007. In contrast, SND spreads and CDS spreads began 
to indicate clear concerns, if at all, only once the credit crisis had begun, which was only a month 
before Northern Rock required liquidity assistance.60 Tripartite Committee proposals and market discipline implications
under the SRR. Therefore, ambiguities remain as to how credit institutions 
of different sizes may be dealt with prior to the imposition of the SRR. 
A stringent set of criteria in a similar vein to the US PCA regime would 
alleviate any such uncertainty and enable investors to signal bank-risk taking 
consistently across all types of credit institution. At the same time, failing to 
lay down a stringent set of criteria to initiate the SRR regime means that the 
potential for regulatory forbearance remains. 
In contrast to the clear stance on subordinated debt holders and equity holders 
in the event of a bank entering the SRR regime this paper has argued that the 
new proposals do not appear to clearly define the risk-position of uninsured 
depositors. This could lead to such investors anticipating differing treatment 
for large institutions, where there may be systemic risk concerns, compared 
to similar investments in smaller banks or building societies.
The Tripartite Committee’s position on enhancing bank transparency as 
a mechanism for improving market discipline has been to provide regular 
comment on international developments. This is because the UK government, 
along with other national governments, have been encouraging international 
action on this issue, both prior to the onset of the credit crisis and 
subsequently
9. The following section will explore in greater detail the current 
issues surrounding enhanced disclosure and its implications for market 
discipline.
9  Darling (2008) and G-8 Finance Ministers (2008)61
3.  The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape 
and implications for transparency
The financial system and its constituent financial institutions have witnessed 
a rapidly evolving environment in the past 30 years. This section examines 
how this is impacting on the transparency of financial institutions and discusses 
the current challenges concerning credit institution’s public disclosures and 
the market discipline implications thereof. Furthermore, this section explains 
how the events of the past year have served to highlight the importance of 
further reducing information asymmetries. 
Essentially two environmental aspects have manifest themselves in the 
financial system to make the market monitoring of financial institutions 
increasingly challenging. First, financial risks have become increasingly 
complex and thus difficult to understand. The deconstruction process, through 
derivative instruments and securitisations, enables financial institutions to 
buy or sell specific forms or tranches of risk to match their risk appetite. 
However, deconstructing risks does not eliminate them; they are simply 
transformed and transferred
10. Although from a risk perspective, individual 
financial transactions may be easily understood, outside investors are faced 
with the perspective of negotiating financial institution’s Annual Report and 
Accounts in which a myriad of complex financial transactions are housed. 
Information opacity, in the form of limited public disclosures, means that it 
is extremely difficult for market monitors’ to accurately assess a financial 
institution’s overall underlying risks. 
The second environmental aspect concerns the modern day phenomenon of 
the interconnectedness of financial institutions and financial markets. Knight 
(2004) neatly encapsulates the issue: “On the one hand, financial institutions 
rely more and more on markets for their funding, for their investments and, 
crucially, for the management of risks ... On the other hand, markets rely 
more and more on institutions for their liquidity, drawing on market-making 
services and backstop credit lines ...Globally, the ongoing consolidation in 
the financial sector has created a smaller number of very large financial firms 
that are engaged in both types of intermediation ... [this] raises potential 
concentration risks for the financial system, despite apparent diversification 
of intermediation channels ... In these large, internationally active financial 
10 Knight  (2004)62 The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape and implications for transparency
institutions, a common capital base underpins on-balance sheet intermediation, 
capital market services and market-making functions ...[therefore] losses in 
one activity can put pressure on the entire firm, affecting its activities in 
other areas.” Market monitors are, therefore, faced with the daunting task 
of deciphering the vast array of operations within financial institutions to 
identify the latest high risk events that may damage financial condition and/
or performance. Like the first environmental issue information asymmetries 
make this an extremely challenging task.
On top of these two environmental developments, the combination of the 
interconnectedness of financial institutions and financial markets, and 
financial innovation has a further implication for financial institution’s risk 
profiles. The extent to which complex financial products have permeated 
around the world has enabled medium- and small-sized financial institutions 
to have exposures to complex risks that originate many thousands of miles 
from their base. This means that market monitors of any credit institution 
require an extensive knowledge toolkit in order to identify the latest global 
source of financial risk. The challenge for financial reporting is to create 
a framework whereby appropriate financial disclosures enables investors to 
decipher, and compare, the underlying financial condition and performance, 
and risk profile of credit institutions. 
3.1. Risk disclosures in a changed financial landscape
The international regulatory authorities identified the aforementioned 
environmental concerns and their affect on the transparency of credit 
institution’s risk-taking as early as 1998, when the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision issued the paper ‘Enhancing Bank Transparency’. As the 
foreword states: “Improved public disclosure strengthens market participants’ 
ability to encourage safe and sound banking practices.” The importance of 
adequate disclosure in empowering market discipline was recognised by the 
inclusion of Pillar 3 in the new Basel Capital Accord
11.
The objective of Pillar 3 is: “to encourage market discipline by developing a set 
of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess capital, 
risk exposures, risk-assessment processes and hence the capital adequacy of the 
institution.
12 As Linsley and Shrives (2005) state: “The overriding disclosure 
11  Basel Committee (2006)
12  Basel Committee (2006)63 The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape and implications for transparency
principle is that a bank’s disclosures need to be consistent with the approaches 
and methodologies that the directors use to assess and manage the bank’s risks.” 
They also note that the disclosure requirements are both quantitative and 
qualitative in nature and are highly detailed and prescriptive. The latter is 
desirable for a number of reasons. First, the contribution of international 
regulatory authorities has been to speed up the process of disclosure convergence, 
which, in the absence of external stimulus, may have been lengthy. Secondly, 
prescriptive requirements provide comparability on a global scale, which is 
consistent with today’s environmental challenges; and finally, credit institutions 
do not have a history of disclosing more than is legally necessary. For EU 
banks the Pillar 3 requirements come into force, via the Capital Requirements 
Directive, for reporting dates after 1st January 2008.
Although the introduction of a disclosure regime using a common language 
is very welcome and should improve transparency, there are a few market 
discipline implications in the requirements that will have to be closely 
monitored. First, the disclosures err towards being backward-looking or 
historical in nature and in this respect they may, therefore, be deficient
13. In 
addition, the frequency with which credit institutions have to present these 
disclosures is only on an annual basis, although certain capital disclosures 
are encouraged to be disclosed more frequently. Finally, as bank capital 
requirements move towards process-orientated capital allocation via the 
Internal Ratings Based approach to credit risk and the use of models to measure 
market risk, investors require information on internal risk management 
procedures in order to evaluate capital adequacy. Pillar 3 attempts to facilitate 
this through the introduction of qualitative disclosure requirements. However, 
such information is inherently less transparent for investors to analyse and 
harder for auditors to verify, undermining the markets ability to discipline 
bank risk-taking. 
Alongside the international banking regulatory authorities’ aims to enhance 
bank transparency, the International Accounting Standards Board issued 
IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures in 2005. This applies to credit 
institutions reporting after the 1st January 2007. The new standard brought 
together the existing standards on financial instrument disclosures and 
at the same time provided the opportunity to introduce some additional 
disclosure requirements. To this end, the Standard requires an entity to 
disclose: information on the significance of financial instruments to the 
entity’s financial position and performance; the nature and extent of risk 
13  Linsley and Shrives (2005)64 The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape and implications for transparency
exposures arising from financial instruments (quantitative disclosures); and 
the approach taken in managing those risks (qualitative disclosures).
14 There 
is overlap with Pillar 3 disclosures, most particularly concerning qualitative 
disclosures, but it must be remembered that Pillar 3 is focusing on prudential 
reporting whereas IFRS 7 is focusing on statutory reporting. However, 
compared to existing accounting regulations IFRS 7 is bringing accounting 
treatment further into line with the Basel Capital Accord.
15 Furthermore, the 
continual development of a common set of International Financial Reporting 
Standards in pursuit of financial convergence is a worthy market discipline 
goal.
3.2. Transparency developments in light of the credit crisis
In spite of the major initiatives to improve credit institution’s risk disclosures, 
opacity has been posited as a key reason for a lack of market confidence and 
the manner in which the recent crisis transmitted through global financial 
markets
16. Unfortunately, at the commencement of the credit crisis the new 
IFRS was in its infancy and the Pillar 3 disclosures were not yet mandatory. 
Nevertheless, the Bank of England (2007) identifies some weaknesses in the 
current Pillar 3 requirements that question whether its adoption would have 
prevented market-wide concerns over bank transparency. For example, the 
Basel Capital Accord stops short of requiring detail on exposures to specific 
off-balance sheet vehicles and whether or not the so-called first-loss piece 
on any specific securitisation has been retained, sold or hedged. Equally, the 
Capital Accord provides no additional disclosure requirements concerning the 
measurement and management of liquidity risk. Finally, and crucially from 
a market discipline perspective, the frequency of disclosures under the Capital 
Requirements Directive is on an annual basis (although the Basel framework 
does propose a minimum of semi-annual frequency).
Following the market turmoil, international developments on transparency 
have rapidly progressed on a number of fronts. The two most prominent reports 
are produced by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF)
17. The FSF were asked by the G7 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors to undertake an analysis of the causes and 
14 Koekkoek  (2007)
15 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005) provide a very useful diagram representing the 
commonalities and differences between the two disclosure regimes.
16  Financial Stability Forum (2008a)
17  Financial Stability Forum (2008a) and Institute of International Finance (2008)65 The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape and implications for transparency
weaknesses that have produced the turmoil and to set out recommendations. In 
contrast the IIF, which are an association of leading financial services firms, have 
proposed Principles of Conduct together with Best Practice Recommendations 
on a number of critical issues. In both cases enhancing transparency, through 
improved disclosures and valuation practices have featured prominently. 
Without going into technical detail, there is considerable overlap between 
the two reports in their coverage and recommendations for promoting 
transparency and improving valuation practices. Particular disclosure areas that 
have attracted attention in both reports are off-balance sheet risks, structured 
products, and valuation processes and methodologies. The FSF report also 
recommends that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issue further 
guidance to strengthen disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 in each of these 
areas.
18 Recently, the FSF have announced that work is in progress concerning 
the development of accounting and disclosure standards in these areas through 
the International Accounting Standards Board
19.
In addition to these topical areas, and just as crucially, both reports highlight 
the importance of fluidity in the transparency process, namely in providing 
risk disclosures that are most relevant to the market conditions at the time of 
disclosure. Whether this will continue once global market conditions improve 
one will have to wait and see. An area that is not covered in either report is 
the requirement for more timely disclosures. The FSF report does encourage 
international financial institutions to issue robust risk disclosure concerning 
instruments that the marketplace currently considers to be high-risk or involve 
more risk than previously thought (for example, Collaterised Debt Obligations 
and subprime exposures) in their mid-year 2008 reports. However, there is 
no mention of continuing this policy into 2009. Given the wide consensus 
on improving risk disclosures by all market participants, it is disappointing 
that a requirement to introduce Pillar 3 risk disclosures on a timelier basis 
(i.e. semi-annually) is not being pursued by statutory authorities. Both this 
measure and implementing quarterly bank capital disclosures would greatly 
enhance the potential for market discipline.
18  Separately, the Basel Committee has published a consultation paper on Principles for Sound 
Liquidity Risk Management in June 2008, which includes principles on regular public disclosures, 
both quantitative and qualitative, of a bank's liquidity risk profile and management.
19  Financial Stability Forum (2008b)66 The nature of risks in a changed financial landscape and implications for transparency
3.3. Conclusions on developments in enhancing bank transparency
Prior to the credit crisis the international accounting and banking regulatory 
bodies had been responding to concerns over opacity in credit institutions and 
a number of important policies were currently being phased in. The credit crisis 
has highlighted that the bank risk environment has moved on and, as ever, 
the regulatory authorities are now attempting to plug gaps in the disclosure 
regime. The current round of initiatives will not lead to the identification of 
tomorrow’s risks, but in some instances, such as the accounting treatment and 
disclosure of supposedly off-balance sheet entities, recent developments will 
have long lasting benefits for market discipline. Furthermore, these current 
initiatives should not detract from the fact that the international regulatory 
authorities are currently introducing a global disclosure policy for credit 
institutions. Although there are weaknesses in the agreement (some of which 
have been identified rather earlier than anticipated) its release represents 
a fundamental milestone in enhancing the market’s ability to monitor and 
discipline bank risk-taking. This is particularly pertinent at a time when the 
conduct of credit ratings agencies, as designated market monitors, has again 
come into question.67
4. Conclusion
Recent developments on two fronts are encouraging a significantly enhanced 
role for market discipline in UK banking. First, in response to the Northern 
Rock crisis the regulatory authorities are introducing clearer incentive 
structures for most of the key bank stakeholders that should be encouraged 
to impose discipline. Secondly, the international regulatory authorities 
are currently phasing in an international disclosure agreement for credit 
institutions, which will enhance the other key facet for effective market 
discipline; bank transparency. However, the UK regulatory authorities have 
passed on the opportunity to follow some of their international partners 
and introduce additional incentive structures at this time, and which have 
considerable market discipline appeal. A notable example is some form of 
PCA-style regime. Such a policy could have clearly outlined to all market 
participants ex ante the pre-SRR stages as well as the resolution regime. In 
addition PCA could have imposed greater incentives on bank management to 
operate the bank prudently and restrict regulatory forbearance. Concerning 
bank transparency, the long-overdue international developments should 
be given some time to settle into the regular reporting regime. Thereafter, 
one area where the UK financial marketplace could significantly improve 
its disclosure policies and enhance market discipline is through requiring 
credit institutions to produce more detailed interim and, especially, quarterly 
reports. In addition, the US model of bank’s producing quarterly ‘call reports’, 
which are publicly available after a short delay should be encouraged. From 
an international perspective, a growing market consensus in improving 
accounting and regulatory disclosure is welcomed. Hopefully, the turmoil of 
the past year will encourage all market participants to mandate Pillar 3 level 
disclosures for both interim and annual financial reports.68
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In September 2007, the UK experienced its first visible bank run in over 
100 years. Lines of depositors formed outside the Northern Rock Bank, 
a large mortgage lending institution. The run followed news of the bank 
experiencing funding problems in rolling over its short term debt and ended 
when the authorities pledged 100% guarantees for deposits at Northern Rock 
and other possibly troubled UK banks. This essentially meant that all UK 
banks temporarily had 100% deposit insurance. Many of the problems at 
Northern Rock appear similar to those that faced two large US mortgage 
lenders – Countrywide and IndyMac (Independent Mortgage Corporation) 
– at the same time and that were merged or closed in 2008 as a result of 
problems in the U.S. mortgage market.
2 These events all occurred before 
1  Chief Monetary Economist, Cumberland Advisors
2 This paper does not consider a number of smaller depository institutions that have also 
failed in recent months in the US.74 Introduction
many other insolvency problems were recognized in other large international 
commercial and investment banks and exploded in a global financial crisis.
The problems leading to the ultimate demise of these three institutions in large 
measure were similar and resulted from serious weaknesses in the structure 
of deposit insurance guarantees, in regulatory oversight, and in the legal 
structure governing banking failures. This is true in the UK as well as in the 
US, where the reforms enacted following the S&L debacle of the 1980s were 
supposed to have insulated the US financial system from undue risk taking 
and costly failures. To some extent, the reforms enacted by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 have worked as 
designed. But the current experience also exposes weaknesses long pointed 
to by critics that weakened the provisions and need correction as additional 
reforms are evaluated. When considered together with the UK’s experience 
with Northern Rock, the three episodes provide valuable insights as to how 
deposit guarantee systems and the monitoring and regulatory structures that 
support them failed and should be restructured for a non-crisis or “normal” 
period in which many large banks are not simultaneously endangered.
3
The main lessons concern the design of the deposit insurance contract, the 
need for a legal structure that reduces the negative externalities associated 
with banking failures, the importance of accurate and timely accounting and 
reporting, and the necessity to improve the incentives and accountability for 
regulators to act as intended by the legislation. We begin by providing some 
factual background and comparisons of the failure experience of the three 
institutions and then turn to the lessons learned and need for further reforms. 
3 We exclude from consideration here extraordinary measures to deal with systemically 
important institutions, such as those that have been put in place in essentially an ad hoc way as 
the global crisis of 2007–09 has unfolded.75
2. Background
In the last years before their demise, all three institutions – Northern Rock 
(NR) in the UK and Countrywide and IndyMac in the US – largely pursued the 
recently popular “originate and distribute” business model. They originated 
mortgage loans, securitized and sold most of them to other parties collecting 
fees for these services. Until sale, they funded the warehousing of their longer 
term mortgage assets with shorter term liabilities obtained primarily on the 
wholesale market. As interest rates began to rise and mortgage markets began 
to weaken, all three institutions were subject to significant market chatter 
about their deteriorating financial condition.
4
Northern Rock began as a mutual building society but converted into 
a stock bank in 1997. Two years later it changed its business strategy from 
a traditional thrift and mortgage lender that “originated and held” mortgages 
to one that relied upon mortgage origination, servicing, and re-packaging 
through securitisation. Thereafter, it grew rapidly. Its assets doubled from 
$  16 billion in mid 2005 to $  32 billion at year end 2007 and it more than 
tripled its share of the UK mortgage market between 1999 and 2007 from 6% 
to 19% (Bank of England, 2007). At the same time, the bank increased both 
its capital leverage and its dependence upon short term wholesale funding 
as part of its mortgage warehousing process until the individual mortgages 
could be packaged and sold. Funding was diversified in domestic and foreign 
capital markets. But liquidity (in this case, the need to constantly roll over its 
maturing short-term debt) became a problem, as was the fact that its growth 
was accompanied by narrowing spreads. Despite this, the institution was well 
regarded by rating agencies.
5
Its regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), saw it as being well-run 
and well-capitalized in early 2007. It was not seen as being exposed to the 
sub-prime mortgage problems that had surfaced in the US and were affecting 
Countrywide, in particular. However, the Bank of England’s Financial Stability 
Report of 2007 painted a different picture when it summed up the Northern 
Rock’s financial condition succinctly as follows. “By mid-September it had 
become apparent to Northern Rock that longer-term funding markets were 
closed to it. Rollovers were largely continuing but at shorter and shorter 
4 Details of Northern Rock’s condition are explored in the other papers in this volume. For 
a detailed description of the securitization process see Gorton (2008).
5  See Shin (2009, pg. 113).76 Background
maturities. Unlike Countrywide, NR lacked the option to draw on sufficient 
prearranged contingency liquidity lines of credit and did not benefit from 
a third-party injection of capital. Instead, the Northern Rock board sought an 
assurance of liquidity support from the Bank of England (BOE).”
6 Northern 
Rock issued a warning about its profits on September 14, 2007. This was 
reinforced by a joint statement by the Bank of England, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), and Chancellor of the Exchequer (Treasury) that the Bank 
of England would provide liquidity support to Northern Rock and any other 
UK bank that needed funds.
7 Far from calming concerns, the announcement 
confirmed the public’s worst fears and triggered a retail run on the NR. The 
government responded by extending deposit guarantees to all deposits at NR, 
putting the taxpayers at greater risk. When no private buyer could be found, 
the bank was finally nationalized in February 2008. 
Countrywide and IndyMac shared many common features with Northern 
Rock. Countrywide was a conglomerate holding company with four main 
activities conducted in largely separate subsidiaries – mortgage banking, 
general banking, institutional broker-dealer activities that specialized primarily 
in trading and underwriting mortgage-backed securities, and mortgage 
servicing. Until 2005, Countrywide was a designated “financial services 
holding company” and its bank was a chartered national bank. The bank was 
also a primary dealer with the Federal Reserve Open Market Desk. However, 
in December 2006 it converted the commercial bank to a federal savings bank 
and it became a savings and loan holding company. The change switched the 
primary regulator from the Comptroller of the Currency for the bank and the 
Federal Reserve for the holding company to the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) for both. This move is a clear example of regulatory arbitrage since the 
OTS was widely perceived to be a less stringent supervisor.
8
Countrywide was the largest home mortgage originator in the U.S. and had 
originated about 17% of all the mortgage loans in the country in 2007. The 
freezing up of the short-term asset-backed commercial paper market in 
August of 2007 made it extremely difficult for Countrywide to finance its 
mortgage warehousing business. This, combined with growing delinquency 
and default problems in its non-prime mortgages, resulted in a downgrade in 
its credit ratings and increased its costs of funds sharply. Its stock price took 
a substantial hit, falling more than 50% during the first three quarters of 2007 
to $  21 per share as investors began to price in a significant probability of 
6  Bank of England (2007)
7  HM Treasury, Bank of England and Financial Services Authority (2007).
8  See Financial Week (2007).77 Background
default. The firm’s funding problems intensified and in mid-August it began 
drawing on its outstanding bank credit lines to replace its lost funding in the 
commercial paper market.
The Federal Reserve, responding to the broader disruption in the commercial 
paper market and in capital markets more generally, lowered the discount rate 
50 basis points in August 2007 to a spread of 50 basis above the target Fed 
funds rate and lengthened the term of discount loans from primarily overnight 
to up to 30 days.
9 But more importantly from Countrywide’s perspective, the 
Federal Reserve began accepting mortgage backed securities as collateral for 
repurchase agreements from primary dealers one of which was Countrywide. 
At the same time, Countrywide also increased its collateralized advances 
from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta from approximately $ 30 billion 
to over $ 50 billion at the end of September 2007. These advances accounted 
for nearly a quarter of its total liabilities and were over collateralized. The 
Home Loan Bank claims stood ahead of the claims of both the uninsured 
depositors and the FDIC.
10 When it finally became apparent to the federal 
regulators that the institution might not be viable, a sale was encouraged by 
the Federal Reserve to Bank of America, which assumed all the assets and 
liabilities of the holding company without government assistance at a price of 
approximately $ 4 billion in January 2008.
Ironically, IndyMac was initially organized as a subsidiary of Countrywide 
and spun off as an independent entity in 1997. Its original purpose had 
been to securitize jumbo residential mortgage loans that were too large to 
be sold to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. In 2000, it became a thrift holding 
company with a Federal savings bank subsidiary. The institution specialized 
in the origination, servicing and securitisation of Alt-A (low documentation) 
mortgage loans. Similar to Countrywide, IndyMac grew rapidly and nearly 
doubled its size from $  16.8 billion to $  32.5 billion between March 2005 
and December 2007.
11 Its funding depended heavily on Home Loan Bank 
advances, which accounted for from 32% to 45% of its total liabilities in any 
one quarter.
12
Like Countrywide and Northern Rock, IndyMac’s critical problems began 
to surface in a June of 2007. Reported book value capital declined over the 
period from its peak of $  2.7 billion in June of 2007 to $  1.8 billion at the 
9  The spread was subsequently lowered to 25 basis points.
10  The FDIC has the same priority as the uninsured depositors.
11  Data from FDIC Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income.
12  Data from FDIC Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income.78 Background
end of March 2008. Uninsured deposits began to run off in mid 2007 , and 
earnings turned negative in the fall of 2007. The bank replaced these funds by 
actively bidding for fully insured brokered deposits. At about the same time 
the bank’s stock price began to plummet, dropping from a high of about $ 35 
per share to about $ 3 per share in June 2008.
OTS’s January 2008 examination indicated IndyMac was in financial 
difficulty.  Despite remedial actions taken by the institution to change its 
business strategy, its capital position continued to decline and the bank’s 
negative earnings continued. Despite this deteriorating situation, the OTS 
maintained that the institution was adequately capitalized. Indeed, the OTS 
went so far as to even permit the institution to backdate to March 31, 2008 
$ 18 million of a $ 50 million capital contribution from the parent holding 
company in May so as to enable it to meet OTS criteria for being “well 
capitalized.”
13 IndyMac touted its capital position in its SEC filing.  In fact, in 
the bank’s March 31, 2008 10Q filing, it stated that its Tier 1 capital leverage 
ratio stood at 5.74%, above the minimum 5% regulatory requirements for 
the bank to be classified as “well capitalized”.  Risk-based Tier 1 capital was 
9% and total risk-based capital was 10.26%, compared to minimum required 
ratios of 6 and 10 percent respectively for “well-capitalized”. Had IndyMac’s 
capital position on March 31, 2008 declined below 5%, the OTS would have 
been required to impose sanctions limiting its ability to accept brokered 
deposits, which made up a significant proportion of its deposit base.
On June 30, US Senator Charles Schumer released a letter to the press that 
he had sent to the Office of Thrift Supervision dated June 26th questioning 
the viability of IndyMac. An outflow of an estimated $  1.3 billion in funds 
followed. As a result, the OTS concluded that Indy was experiencing 
a liquidity problem and would be unable to meet its obligations in full 
and on time. It closed the bank on July 11, 2008 and turned it over to the 
FDIC as conservator. An accompanying release by the OTS intimated that 
its efforts to remedy IndyMac’s problems through a sale were frustrated by 
the release of the Senator’s letter and caused the demise of the institution. 
The FDIC’s estimated that it could stand to lose between $ 4 and $ 8 billion 
in the resolution process. This estimate was quickly raised to $ 8.9 billion and 
even higher.
14 Given that IndyMac was supposedly adequately capitalized and 
13 See Thorson(2008 and appendix A.). Thorson is the Inspector General in the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury and is required by FDICIA to review all resolutions which incur 
a material loss to the OTS, which is housed in the Treasury. In his report, Thorson notes that the 
backdating of capital injections with OCC approval for IndyMac may not have been an isolated 
case. Thorson's letter to Senator Schummer is included in the Appendix.
14  See Paletta and Holzier (2008) and App (2008)79 Background
was done in by a relatively small $ 1.3 billion of deposits run off, it stretches 
credibility that the bank’s closure on a more timely basis would have lead to 
losses in excess of $ 8 billion.
15
Although there are many similarities among these three episodes, there are 
also important differences in terms of how they were resolved, the risks that 
have been assumed by the taxpayers both in terms of cleaning up the particular 
cases as well as how the systems will function prospectively. Furthermore, 
a number of weaknesses have been exposed in the legal and regulatory 
structure of the guarantees and how failing institutions are handled.
15  It is likely, given estimates of the amount of deposits in the institution in excess of $100K 
that most of this runoff was largely uninsured deposits80
3.  Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
At first, the most striking difference between the UK and US cases were the 
lines that formed outside the offices of Northern Rock, which resembled 
the scene from the Jimmy Stewart famous 1946 movie “It’s a Wonderful 
Life.” The evidence of public panic was widely publicized on national TV 
and demanded immediate attention by the authorities. It culminated in what 
proved to be a soap opera involving the Bank of England, the Financial 
Services Authority and Chancellor of the Exchequer over the management of 
the financial crisis that had surrounded the institution. In Countrywide’s case, 
there was no visible run. In IndyMac’s case, there was an outflow of funds, 
but it remains unclear whether this was evidence of retail depositor panic. 
The pictures of lines that appeared in the public media largely post-dated the 
legal closing of the bank and should be viewed more correctly as a run on 
the FDIC. The paucity of bank failures over the previous 15 years had likely 
reduced the public’s familiarity with the operation of the FDIC in failed bank 
cases the FDIC quickly initiated a publicity campaign to remind the public of 
the strength of its guarantee. As a percent of the institutions assets, both runs 
were quite small.
However, there were other differences that are also noteworthy. There was 
no extension of a blanket deposit insurance guarantee at IndyMac as was the 
case in the UK. Although this occurred in the U.S. later. The UK's response 
lies in part in the nature of the UK deposit insurance contact at the time. In 
addition, there were differences in the quality of the supervisory processes 
and in the misplaced reliance in the UK placed on the courts and general 
bankruptcy procedures to resolve problem institutions in a timely manner. 
These differences in measure reflect different legal and regulatory structures 
between the U.S. and UK and generally favor the U.S.’s reliance upon 
separate bankruptcy procedures for insured depository institutions. This is not 
to suggest, however, that the U.S. structure always fosters better outcomes. 
Indeed, the U.S. structure through the prompt corrective action (PCA) and 
least cost resolution (LCR) provisions of FDICIA frequently work better in 
theory (words) than in practice (application). But that is in part because  the 
provisions have been implemented using flawed accounting principles and in 
part the fault of the regulators practicing forbearance stemming from flawed 
regulatory incentives to make the regulators enforce the regulations rather 
than due to the legislation per se.81 Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
3.1. The Deposit Insurance Contract
At the time of the NR retail run, the UK deposit insurance contract only 
covered 100% of the first £   2,000 (about $  4,100) and 90% of the next 
£   33,000 (about $  67,500). This structure was based on the principle of 
co-insurance and reflects efforts to design a deposit protection scheme that 
would discourage moral hazard behavior and encourage market discipline. 
By forcing depositors with funds in excess of $  4,100 to bear part of the 
risk by covering only 90% of their insured claims, it was believed that 
those depositors would have an incentive to monitor the performance of the 
institutions in which they placed their funds and to serve as a source of market 
discipline by demanding higher deposit rates or withdrawing their funds if 
they perceived the bank to increase its risk exposure. This insurance contract 
contrasts sharply with that of the US, where there is no co-insurance for small 
depositors and at the time full coverage per account for the first $  100,000, 
which, was considerably larger.
Importantly, unlike the case with US institutions, UK depositors of NR also 
could not count on receiving their insured funds quickly if NR had been 
legally closed and placed in receivership and faced possible waits of many 
months in being fully compensated. For these reasons, even fully insured 
depositors in the UK had a significant incentive to run both to avoid credit 
losses (possible 10% loss from par value) and liquidity losses (delays in 
gaining full access to their fully insured funds).
In the U.S., Countrywide was sold to the Bank of America, and customers 
experienced no major disruption in their access to deposits or other banking 
services. IndyMac was closed on a Friday (July 11, 2008) and reopened on 
Monday (July 14) as a newly chartered, temporary FDIC operated bank. Again, 
most customers were only minimally inconvenienced, although large depositors 
received immediate access to only 50% of their uninsured funds and could 
expect to suffer large losses.
The Northern Rock experience suggests that it is unrealistic to believe that 
small depositors would be a significant source of market discipline. Retail 
depositors were late in perceiving the difficulties in Northern Rock, doing so 
only well after large depositors engaged in a less visible but larger and earlier 
electronic run.
16 In part, this reflects that they have neither the knowledge nor 
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the resources to adequately monitor a complex institution like Northern Rock. 
It is likely that the same was true in the cases of Countrywide and IndyMac, 
but the incentive to run on the part of insured depositors was far less.
Market discipline is more efficiently exercised in the money and capital 
markets by large, uninsured depositors, other creditors, and shareholders. For 
example, the stock prices of all three institutions declined significantly long 
before retail depositors began to be concerned about their funds.
17 Similarly, 
concern about the solvency of NR by uninsured creditors began long before 
small depositors began to line up in front of Northern Rock’s offices.
18 For 
several years, Northern Rock has increasingly financed its very rapid asset 
growth mostly in the short term wholesale money market. Milne and Wood 
(2008) report that retail deposits fell from 62.3% of total liabilities in 1997 to 
only 22.2% at year end 2006. A substantial portion of the wholesale funding 
was in maturities less than a year. That growth continued into 2007, despite 
the fact that real estate and mortgage markets in many countries had begun to 
slow in mid-2006. Similarly, as pointed out earlier, beginning in mid-2007, 
Countrywide and IndyMac experienced outflows of uninsured funds and 
restrictions on access to the short term commercial paper markets.
The problems, however, in Northern Rock extended far beyond the deposit 
insurance contract design and the failure of small depositors to provide 
effective market discipline. They include regulatory failures and accounting 
problems that also were endemic to the cases of Countrywide and IndyMac 
and problems in the failure resolution process. These latter difficulties were 
peculiar to Northern Rock. But interestingly, there are also parallels that 
have arisen in the U.S. when the need to deal with the investment banks 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the insurance company AIG and quasi 
government mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were thrust upon 
U. S. regulators.
17  The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) also highlighted the fall in the share price: During 
the course of 2007, the market had become increasingly aware that there were issues surrounding 
Northern Rock’s business model. In its profit warning of 27 June 2007, Northern Rock stated it was 
suffering from a “structural mismatch” between LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and bank 
base rates’ and its share price fell by 10% on that day. This was therefore a very clear signal both 
to the market and to the authorities that Northern Rock was experiencing increasing difficulties 
in respect of its funding as the ‘credit crunch’ speedily impacted interbank lending arrangements 
generally. By mid July the share price was some 30% lower than at the start of the year.
18  House of Commons (2008).83 Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
3.2. Failure Resolution Process
The relatively small amount of full insurance coverage and the existence 
of co-insurance were not the sole reasons for the run on Northern Rock. 
Should a UK depository financial institution get into financial difficulty, 
regulators lack appropriate authority either to legally close such troubled 
institutions, or put them in receivership before their net worth drops to zero 
or below. Instead, even if accounts were 100% insured, the resolution of 
insolvent institutions falls under the general corporate bankruptcy procedures 
administered by bankruptcy courts. The result is potential significant delays 
in terms of both when and under what terms depositors will gain access 
to their funds. UK law provides only that insured deposits are paid at par 
within three months, and additional stays are possible under both UK and EU 
protocols if the bankruptcy courts determine it is necessary. In the meanwhile, 
the bankruptcy process determines the rights of depositors and creditors as 
well as shareholders.
Because delays in gaining access to the their funds are potentially long and 
costly and the negative externalities in terms of loss of access not only to 
deposits but also to loans and lines of credit, are large, it was rational and 
understandable for UK depositors seek to withdraw their funds if there is 
a likely chance that a bank might fail, not withstanding the extant insurance 
coverage. Moreover, the high cost of freezing accounts not only risks incurring 
significant depositor anger and but also can engender possible disruptions to 
the payments system and gives regulators little choice but to guarantee all 
deposits fully and keep insolvent banks open and operating under government 
ownership.
In contrast, the US has a special bankruptcy procedure for chartered banks 
that empowers the chartering authority, the primary federal regulator, or the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to legally close a bank whenever 
its book value equity declines below 2% of its assets or other threats to its 
safe and sound operations arise. The FDIC has the authority to liquidate the 
failed institution, sell it to another bank, or fold it into a government-owned 
temporary bridge bank.
Because the prompt corrective actions provisions of FDICIA encourage bank 
regulators to monitor institutions more closely as they encounter difficulties 
and to intervene as the troubles intensify, the legal closing of a bank need not be 
a sudden, out-of-the-blue event for which a regulator is unprepared. The FDIC 84 Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
arranges for insured depositors at failed banks to have access to insured 
depositors at failed banks the par value of their insured deposits effectively 
he next business day after legal closure and is empowered to provide advance 
payments of the estimated recovery value of uninsured depositors’ funds to them. 
As a result, a troubled institution can typically be closed over the weekend and 
reopened the following Monday as another entity, minimizing any disruptions to 
customers. This is exactly what happened in the case of IndyMac.
As noted, IndyMac was closed on Friday afternoon, July 11, 2008 and 
reopened on Monday, July 14, 2008 as a newly chartered bridge bank (in 
this case technically a conservatorship federal savings bank) operated by the 
FDIC. Insured depositors were transferred in full to the new bank on Monday. 
At the same time, uninsured depositors were paid an additional advanced 
dividend of fifty cents on the dollar equal to the estimated recovery value of 
their uninsured deposits.
19 Any additional recovery amounts, if any, will be 
distributed later when received. The large loss, however, suggests that the 
regulators waited far too long to legally close the institution, contrary to the 
intent of FDICIA. 
These same options were not available to U.S. regulators in the case of Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG, when the Treasury and Federal Reserve 
believed it necessary to intervene to prevent its insolvency and reduce the 
systemic risk that its failure might have entailed. This was because these 
institutions were, not federally insured depository institutions and not subject 
to the bank bankruptcy regime. As a result, rather than being able to close 
them, wipe out the equity holders, have creditors share in the losses, and 
reopen them the next day with no or little interruption, exigent circumstances 
resulted in a primarily Federal Reserve-financed takeover of Bear Stearns by 
March 2008, the failure of Lehman Brothers and the injections of significant 
government funds into AIG in September 2008. At the same time, discount 
window access was granted to other primary dealer investment banks.
20 
A similar problem existed later when the two huge government sponsored 
mortgage financing giants, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, become insolvent. 
The US Treasury was forced in the midst’s of the financial turmoil to explicitly 
guarantee their liabilities and the Federal Reserve indicated a willingness to 
19 On July 17, 2008, the FDIC finalized requirements for large banking organizations to 
modify their computer and record keeping systems to provide deposit account information in 
a common format, to enable the FDIC to quickly identify insured deposits in the event of a failure 
and to place and remove holds on accounts. “Large-Bank Insurance Determination Modernization: 
Final Rule,” FIL-65-2008, July 17, 2008.
20  Primary dealers are large commercial banks and investment banks authorized by the Federal 
Reserve to engage in daily open market transactions with the System Open Market Account.85 Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
provide discount window access if needed. At the same time, the Treasury 
requested and received Congressional authority to purchase equity or lend 
directly to these entities to protect the creditors. The two institutions were 
placed in conservatorship. The taxpayers will be burdened with most of the 
cost of the institutions’ losses.
3.3. The Breakdown in Supervision
A number of problems surfaced as the events surrounding the demise of 
Countrywide, IndyMac and Northern Rock played out that have revealed 
serious, continuing weaknesses in banking supervision. In the case of 
Northern Rock, supervisory deficiencies led to UK taxpayer exposure to 
losses from Northern Rock. In the US, contrary to the intent of FDICIA, 
supervisory failures have exposed the FDIC to large losses from the failure 
of IndyMac. These problems include reliance upon seriously deficient 
accounting and capital adequacy standards; failure to monitor institutions in 
a timely, effective, and on-going fashion; failure to intervene appropriately 
when problems were identified; and promoting the welfare of the regulated 
institutions and the regulatory agency rather than the insurance fund or the 
taxpayer.
For example, hearings by a committee of the UK House of Commons on the 
problems surrounding Northern Rock have focused on the actions at that time 
of the BOE, the FSA and the Treasury, who collectively share responsibility 
for financial stability in the UK. The hearings clearly revealed that the FSA 
didn’t perform as it should have, failed to monitor the institution and, and 
even allowed Northern Rock to increase its dividends despite its troubled 
financial position. 
The UK politicians looked, with some justification, to blame regulators for 
their failure to identify Northern Rock’s problems and to deal promptly and 
adequately with the crippled institution. The FSA’s own internal audit of 
the experience and compilation of the lessons learned from the NR failure 
contained a broad litany of problems within the FSA. These included the lack 
rigor in the analyses conducted and failure to devote insufficient resources to 
monitoring what are regarded as high impact institutions.
21 The Report points 
to internal organizational problems, to skill gaps in its supervisors, and to 
problems in how the supervision of large institutions was conducted. It also 
21  See FSA Internal Audit Division (2008).86 Similarities and Differences Among the Three Cases
describes process problems and deficiencies in the flow of information from 
the NR to the FSA and within the FSA itself. The FSA supervisory reviews of 
Northern Rock paid too little attention to liquidity issues, were inconsistent in 
their application and coverage, and were spaced too far apart. 
The Report concluded that too little time and effort was devoted to stress 
testing Northern Rock’s financials and the testing that was done in connection 
with Basel Pillar 2 did not consider tail events appropriately. In addition, 
insufficient attention was give to challenging the Bank’s governance programs 
and risk mitigation processes. Finally, not only was it clear that the FSA 
ignored numerous early warning signs of troubles with Northern Rock, it 
apparently also ignored a breach of required minimum capital standards early 
in 2007. Nor did the bank notify its shareholders of this breach. Reportedly the 
bank was accorded “light touch” regulatory treatment by the FSA in 2007.
22
The parliamentary hearing also suggested that the regulators remained in 
a partial state of denial as far as the causes of the problems at Northern Rock. 
The Wall Street Journal quoted Chancellor Darling as saying that “The reason 
that Northern Rock got into this problem in the first place is because of 
problems in the U.S.”
23 However, as the FSA and Parliamentary reports both 
document, the problems principally were excessive institutional leverage and 
risk taking in highly leveraged UK mortgages. When excessive risk taking 
occurs, it sometimes happens that the risks are realized!
In the cases of Countrywide and IndyMac, both were supervised by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision. As mentioned previously, Countrywide engaged 
in regulatory arbitrage shortly before its demise when it converted its main 
institution from a commercial bank supervised by the Comptroller of the 
Currency to a federal savings bank and itself to a savings and loan holding 
company. Its switch of regulators may have extended its life. But it failed to 
recover and its acquisition by Bank of America before possible insolvency 
likely spared the FDIC and uninsured depositors from losses. Likewise, as 
noted earlier, the OTS permitted IndyMac to report higher than actual capital 
positions at times, which may have delayed the imposition of sanctions and 
enlarged its losses.
22 See  TimesOnline  (2008).
23  Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2008.87
4.  What the US and UK Should Have Learned from the 
US S & L Crisis and Subsequent Failures of Northern 
Rock, Countrywide and IndyMac
It is often the case in banking and elsewhere that changes in laws and 
regulations that are designed, correctly or not, to mitigate or even prevent 
future crises are adopted during or shortly after a crises. While it may be 
difficult in practice to change US or UK lawmaker and regulatory behavior, 
it would appear reasonable that they study and to learn from similar crises 
earlier or elsewhere.
The United States savings and loan and banking mess of the 1980s and early 
1990s should have served as an important laboratory from which both UK and 
US officials could have learned regulatory lessons in structuring a regime and 
methods both for reducing failures and their consequences and for resolving 
financial institution failures. Some 1,200 savings and loan associations failed 
at a cost to US taxpayers of about $ 150 billion. Out of fear that commercial 
banks would go the way of the S & Ls and the FDIC the way of the late 
Federal Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), Congress in 1991 
enacted the FDIC Improvement Act. This Act enacted over the opposition of 
most bankers and regulators, introduced provisions for regulatory actions to 
attempt to turn troubled banks around before insolvency and, if this failed, 
to legally close and recapitalize, sell, or liquidate a bank before its capital 
is fully depleted. The underlying theory was that, if successful, losses 
would be confined to shareholders; depositors and other creditors would 
remain  whole.  The structure of FDICIA reflected the experience that as 
they approach insolvency troubled banks tend to overstate their revenues, 
income and capital, understate their expenditures and loss reserves, and to 
blame their problems on lack of market liquidity. Thus, FDICIA assumed 
that both low levels of capital and so-called liquidity problems frequently 
masked underlying insolvency problems that required prompt regulatory 
actions, including resolution. Moreover, because regulators frequently delay 
taking necessary actions, FDICIA makes some of these actions mandatory 
rather than discretionary. But to be effective, FDICIA requires the willing 
cooperation of the regulatory agencies to comply with the provisions.
The United States also realized that insolvent banks needed to be legally 
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and to maintain uninterrupted operation of the payments systems, and that the 
closure decision should be made by regulators and not by the courts. Thus, 
Congress had earlier enacted a special bank bankruptcy code separate and 
different from the general corporate bankruptcy code (Bliss and Kaufman, 
2007). Legal closure powers to cancel a bank’s charter and place it in 
receivership were given to the bank regulators, not the courts. In addition, in 
the late 1980’s the FDIC also received authority to charter a temporary bridge 
bank to assume the activities of an insolvent large bank if a buyer could not 
be found sufficiently quickly. The UK had no such provisions in place in the 
first half of 2007. Nor had the regulators requested such powers. 
Were Northern Rock and IndyMac solvent at the time, at the time the 
regulators acted to resolve them, or were they victims of short-term liquidity 
crises and only suffering temporarily depressed asset values? The answer 
depends on the capital measures and accounting procedures applied. Clues 
can be gained from several pieces of evidence which ex post at least suggest 
the answers. For example, the inability of UK regulators to find a buyer 
for Northern Rock without the need for substantial governmental support 
implies that, at least in market value terms, NR was not solvent. On the 
other hand, in terms of Basel I risk-based book value capital, it was quite 
solvent. Because residential mortgages are assigned a low risk weight in this 
protocol, risk based capital measures showed home mortgage lender NR to be 
highly capitalized. However, at the end of June the NR reported a capital-to 
assets leverage ratio of only near 2%. This level is defined in the US law as 
“critically undercapitalized” and the level at which US regulators are required 
to invoke legal closure within 270 days. In addition, the bank’s assets grew 
by nearly 30% over the previous year at a time that the mortgage market 
was showing signs of stress, and this should have served as a read flag. Yet 
the UK regulators not only failed to take notice, but effectively rewarded 
Northern Rock by permitting it to compute its minimum capital requirement 
by the Basel II advanced internal rating approach rather than Basel I. This 
action further reduced its risk-weighted assets by over 40% and reduced its 
risk-based minimum capital requirement substantially. Much of the “excess” 
capital was scheduled to be paid out as dividends.
Similarly, IndyMac reported leverage and risk-based capital ratios well above 
the minimum requirements. Yet, like NR, the US OTS had a difficult time 
finding a buyer for IndyMac when it tried shopping the institution. This 
supports the argument made earlier that as a bank approaches insolvency it 
tends to overstate its revenues and understate its expenses, thereby overstating 
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enlarged the losses substantially. On the other hand, the successful sale of 
Countrywide to the Bank of America without financial assistance suggests 
that it was perceived to be market value solvent or close enough to it to make 
it attractive to at least one potential buyer.
24
The problems of reliance upon book value accounting and regulatory 
accounting standards, such as those contained in both the simple leverage 
ratio and the Basel I and Basel II standards, also plague effective US 
implementation of the PCA and FDICIA closure rules. Some proponents 
of the FDICIA PCA procedures argued that the capital tranche triggers for 
regulatory intervention and closure rules should be based upon fair market 
values rather than book values, which lag changes in market conditions.
25 
That OTS could claim that IndyMac was not only adequately capitalized, but 
well capitalized only a few days before its closure and yet the FDIC could 
estimate at closure that it would lose between $ 4 billion to $ 8 billion is res 
ipsa loquitur and points to the critical need for further evaluation of how 
FDICIA should be implemented.
26
Given the lines of UK depositors in the street and no feasible alternatives 
to promptly close or otherwise resolve Northern Rock’s problems, the 
government was forced to guarantee all deposits and then to attempt to broker 
a merger or acquisition of the troubled institution. However, uncertainty about 
the value of the bank’s assets reduced their value and made brokering a deal 
acceptable to current shareholders, who, unlike in the US, have a strong 
voice in the resolution process, doomed to failure. Nationalization with full 
guarantees is a heavy price to pay for the design of a faulty bank deposit 
insurance and regulatory system. Losses will surely also be visited upon 
taxpayers. These actions introduce potential serious moral hazard and time 
inconsistency problems that promise to increase the magnitude of problems 
in the future with higher costs of resolution.
24 However, recent mortgage losses imply that even Bank of America may have had an 
inflated sense of what the true quality of Countrywide’s assets was.
25  Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000).
26 With the final sale of IndyMac the actual reported loss experience by the FDIC was USD 
10.7 billion.90
5.  Proposals to Remedy the Problems and Reform the 
Regulatory System
In 2008, the UK Treasury put forward discussion proposals to, among other 
options, introduce a US style prompt corrective action and structured early 
intervention system, modify and extend the deposit insurance guarantee, and 
reform the UK bankruptcy procedures. Because the devil in all such programs 
is in details and, as the analysis above has suggested, significant flaws remain 
in the U.S. system that need to be recognized and addressed in any changes 
that the UK and also the US makes. We believe that to maximize their 
effectiveness, any proposals should consider several key features:
•  Full deposit insurance guarantee for retail deposits. The basic purpose of the 
guarantee is to take the small depositor out of the game. Small depositors 
provide little in the way of market discipline, but when they show up on 
television, the public response would likely reinforce any tendency for a crisis 
to develop. There is no magic amount of coverage that would accomplish this 
end. The objective should simply be to set the limit so as to cover a large 
percentage of the smaller depositors. After the run on NR, all insured deposits 
were guaranteed at par value and the coverage amount increased first to 
£35,000 and then to £50,000 (£100,000 for joint accounts).
•  A special bankruptcy procedure for handling troubled bank and bank-like 
financial institutions. This would permit legal closing an insolvent 
institution and placing it in receivership quickly and resolving it on the 
basis of an administrative rather than a judicial process.
•  Providing for legal closure at some low but positive capital ratio based 
upon fair market values. Concern is frequently expressed over the taking of 
investor property by government. This can be rationalized by establishing 
a system of prompt corrective action. Under such systems, shareholders 
have the ability to inject needed capital as an insured institution’s capital 
ratios and other measures of performance deteriorate. But, if they do not 
and capital is dissipated to the point where it becomes problematic that 
there is any accurately measured positive equity left, they have effectively 
decided to put their institution to the government for resolution. If there is 
any value left after higher priority claims are paid it is returned to the old 
shareholders. Deposit insurance agencies like other insurance companies 
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•  Criteria for triggering supervisory interventions and possible closure 
should be based to the extent feasible on fair market values of assets and 
liabilities and not book or regulatory accounting standards. 
•  The resolution process should include the option to establish a government 
capitalized bridge institution that can temporarily take over most of a large, 
hard-to-sell failing bank’s remaining assets and liabilities and continue its 
strategic operations seamlessly so as to ensure prompt access by depositors 
and borrowers to legally available funds. There should be rather short 
limits established to the life of such an institution, however, to ensure that 
the institution is privatized as quickly as is practicable. Reprivatization 
should be with sufficient capital to ensure its longer term viability.
•  Incentives to ensure supervisory/regulatory performance and accountability. 
A critical defect in the current US system is that insufficient incentives are 
in place to ensure adequately that regulators act promptly and properly 
when an institution experiences financial difficulty, that regulators not 
engage in forbearance, and that they attempt to avoid use of taxpayer 
funds to resolve problems. Such incentives might include a requirement 
for an outside post mortem and published forensic investigations of all 
costly failures, and appearance before appropriate government oversight 
committees before any public funds are employed.
•  Risk-based deposit insurance premiums. Because it is difficult to resolve 
a troubled institution without loss quickly even if it is legally closed at 
positive book value capital, as in the US system, the deposit insurance 
agency requires funds to make insured deposits whole in addition to 
meeting operating costs. These may be attained from the insured banks 
through insurance premiums either on an ex-ante or ex-post basis or from 
a combination of the two. A ready pool of funds is also useful in advancing 
funds to insured and uninsured depositors before proceeds are received from 
the sale of the assets of failed banks. The premiums may also be risk-based to 
reduce cross-subsidization and moral hazard behavior, but should be based 
upon estimates of loss given default as well as the probability of default. 
The probability of default is a function of the insured bank’s behavior and 
lending standards whereas the loss given default to the insurance agency 
is determined primarily by how promptly the bank is legally closed by the 
insurer after the closure capital ratio is breached. Thus, the premium should 
be scaled to the past performance of the insurer. The poorer the performance 
in terms of the more delayed the closure, the higher should the premiums 
be as the losses are likely to be greater. In addition, this will encourage the 
insured banks to exert pressure on the insurance agency to legally close 
troubled institutions more promptly after they breach the regulatory closure 
requirements to minimize its and their losses.92
6.  Summary and Conclusions
The combination of poorly designed deposit insurance, poor regulatory 
supervision, and a poor insolvency resolution regime for banks led to a very 
visible and disruptive run on the Northern Rock in the UK and larger-than 
necessary losses in the failure of IndyMac in the US. The run on Northern Rock 
has resulted in a broadly based reconsideration of the nature of the existing 
UK insurance contract, the supervisory structure, and the bank bankruptcy 
code. The recent failure and large losses at IndyMac and other insured banks 
in the US as well as the near failure of Countrywide, have also accelerated 
a reconsideration of its supervisory and regulatory systems. This paper has 
described the more important faults in the existing structure processes in 
both countries and the provisions that would enhance the efficiency of the 
structure so as to reduce both the number of bank failures and the cost to the 
taxpayers, if banks do fail. Inefficient or unlucky banks should be permitted 
to fail, as in any other industry, but at low cost to the economy. But regardless 
of how well any regulatory legislation is drafted, without the support of the 
regulators in implementing the required actions effectively, the promised 
favorable outcomes are unlikely to by fully achieved. Regulators have often 
been poor agents for healthy insured banks and taxpayers. It should, however, 
be noted that these recommendations work best in non-crisis periods when 
large number of banks are not simultaneously endangered. In crisis periods, 
game books are generally thrown out in favor of quick, intuitively appealing 
ad hoc actions.93
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The Northern Rock collapse has been a tremendous blow to the stability of the 
financial system and to the credibility of financial regulation and supervision. 
During the crisis and in its immediate aftermath, the case has been analysed 
mainly as a British problem, looking at the British regulatory model in 
general and the handling of the case in particular. From this perspective, the 
conclusions seemed rather reassuring: it was partly a mistake of national 
regulators, partly a failure of the national regulatory mechanisms. If only it 
were so simple. The spreading of the crisis ($ 500 billion of asset write-downs 
already accounted for by major banks and counting), and the worsening of 
the situation of Northern Rock after the nationalisation show two bitter truths 
about Northern Rock’s case: its difficulties were far from temporary; its risky 
business model was common to many other banks in all major countries.
From this point of view, it is true – as Tolstoy would put it – that every 
unhappy bank is unhappy in its own way, but there is a fil rouge connecting 
the appalling performance of so many financial institutions in the last twelve 
months: the lack of capital. Northern Rock overlooked the importance of bank 100 Foreword
capital both as a cushion against unexpected losses and as a funding source. 
Its business model was focused on irreproachable objectives: maximisation of 
the market value of the company and of the return on equity. However, having 
already reached very satisfactory results at the beginning of this decade, the 
bank felt itself “condemned” to maintain high growth rates for revenues 
and profits, while keeping capital close to the minimum level, i.e. the level 
sufficient to comply with Basel-1 ratios. The result was a dramatic increase of 
overall risks against an almost constant capital base. No wonder that Northern 
Rock has been judged as “an accident waiting to happen”
1. The point is that 
this accident was far from being unique.
This article aims to show that the rise and fall of Northern Rock epitomises 
an extreme business model adopted by many banks in the last years which 
has stretched to the maximum extent the opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage induced by Basel-1 and which led to dramatically overlooking the 
fundamental role of capital in banking. Next section will review the key data 
on Northern Rock’s performance over the past years and their relationship 
with the overall business model. Section 3 will show that similar trends can 
be observed in other banking systems and in most international banks. The 
final section draws a few conclusions on the overall efficiency of capital 
adequacy rules.
1 Martin  Wolf,  The big lessons from Northern Rock, “Financial Times”, 15 November, 2007101
2.  The rise and fall of Northern Rock
Almost all has been said about the fast growth of Northern Rock since its 
demutualisation in 1997 and in particular since 2001, when it entered the 
FTSE100 index (being one of only two companies based in North East 
England to be member of this élite). The only traditional feature that the 
“new” bank had retained was its absolute specialisation in the mortgage 
business: 90 per cent of its assets were residential mortgages.
Growth, profitability and market value have been the drivers of this golden 
period: total assets grew 30 per cent per year, significantly faster than the 
market; ROE; return on equity remained steadily above 20 per cent; market 
value grew from £ 2.7bn (end of 2002) to £ 4.9bn at the end of 2006. The bank 
was praised as a success story for the benefit of its shareholders and also the 
local community. The management proudly informed that its business model 
was hinged on the “virtuous” circle depicted in the following graph
2.
Figure 1: Northern Rock – the “virtuous” circle
2 Annual Report for 2002. With the benefit of hindsight the use of quote and unquote seem 
mandatory.102 The rise and fall of Northern Rock
It is important to stress the relationship between the outer circle (where asset 
growth appears to be the most important component) and the inner circle, 
focused on shareholders’ returns and in particular the growth of EPS (earnings 
per share). Given the high levels of shareholders’ profitability and market 
capitalisation already reached at the beginning of the decade, the growth of 
profits (which could be seen as a combination of growth of assets and control 
of credit losses and administrative expenses) were the only solution to the 
increase of the market value of the company. By the same token, keeping 
relatively constant the level of capital was the only solution to keep the return 
on equity well above 20 per cent.
As a matter of fact, the quality of Northern Rock assets can be questioned. In 
the Treasury Report
3, Willem Buiter was critical of this expansion and said 
(p. 12): “I like healthy growth but it is hard to believe that the quality of the 
asset portfolio and the ability to vet the credit-worthiness of your borrowers 
does not suffer when you take 20% of the net increase and 40% to 50% of 
the gross increase in activity in this half year period, so I think they were an 
organisation that was clearly engaged in high-risk behaviour”. As a matter of 
fact, in the summer of 2008 the quality of the bank’s loans began to decline, 
showing that Buiter had a point. But it is true that when depositors ran on the 
bank and when the bank was nationalised, the quality of the loan portfolio 
looked still unscathed. Both the FSA and the Bank of England were adamant 
on this point
4. Growth per se was the fundamental cause of the crisis.
The following graph summarises the key growth rates for the years
2001–2006. 
3 House of Commons - Treasury Committee, The run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 
2007–08 Volume I, January 2008
4  Run on the Rock, cit., p. 14: “Mr Sants said that Northern Rock ‘had high quality assets—
there is no suggestion here this is an organisation taking on poor quality assets’. The Governor 
of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, was also supportive of the quality of the asset book of 
Northern Rock, telling us that: [...]The lending side was handled extremely well”.103 The rise and fall of Northern Rock
Figure 2: Northern Rock – Average Annual Growth Rates 2001–2006
The only conclusion one can draw is that the level of capital was the “dependent 
variable” of the management’s equation. The huge gap between total assets and 
risk weighted assets makes crystal clear that this was made possible by an 
extensive regulatory arbitrage which widened the gap between total assets and 
risk-weighted assets, the only variable that counts from a Basel-1 perspective. 
Capital efficiency in the “virtuous” circle meant capital minimisation. A research 
analysis from Deutsche Bank
5 (after the crisis broke, alas) summarises the 
importance of extreme leverage in the Northern Rock’s strategy.
Figure 3: Northern Rock: Earnings per share, stock price and leverage.
5  Deutsche Bank, (John Sheridan - Jason Napier), Northern Rock. Between a rock and a hard 
place, 17 September 2007.104 The rise and fall of Northern Rock
The close relationship between earnings per share, stock price and leverage 
are more than evident. From this point of view, the picture echoes what Chuck 
Prince, former Citi’s CEO, said a few days before the crisis: “until the music 
stops, we have got to dance”. For the British bank this meant continuously 
increasing total earnings (therefore total assets) and leverage. But the latter, as 
is taught in basic financial courses is a double-edged sword. The aggressive 
Northern Rock’s policy ended up in a leverage judged in the research as “the 
highest in the European sector (58x assets:equity)”.
So capital, the main cushion against unexpected losses, was spread thinner 
and thinner to cover a growing area of activity and risks. But this is only half 
of the story. As the “virtuous” circle picture shows, the bank had to keep at the 
minimum level its funding costs: in a period of low interest rates and abundant 
liquidity, this meant not only disregarding capital as a source of permanent 
funds, but also relying more on wholesale markets than retail markets. As 
the following graph taken from another research analysis shows
6, at the eve 
of the crisis, retail deposits were only 23 per cent of total funds. In the last 
year they accounted for a bare 13 per cent. These figures are higher than the 
industry’s average, but all main peers had at that time a ratio of retail deposits 
to loans lower than 50 per cent
7.
Figure 4: Northern Rock Funding Sources
The bank had discovered the magic of securitisation and stretched that model 
to the maximum extent, both through the creation of special purpose vehicles 
6  Credit Suisse (Jonathan Pierce et al), Northern Rock. Funding, 6 August 2007.
7  Run on the Rock. cit. p.17.105 The rise and fall of Northern Rock
and the issuance of covered bonds.
8 The liquidity risks implied in this funding 
strategy was tremendous as the following graph shows.
9
Figure 5: Northern Rock Liquidity Gap at Various Maturities as
of September 2007
The liquidity gap within 3 months was more than £  25 billion. In less than one 
year, Northern Rock had to refund £  30 billion, with all the ensuing market 
risks involved. 
There are three important points about this risky funding policy that are 
worth stressing. First, it was perfectly compliant with the existing regulation. 
Capital, including Tier-1, was above the requested level. The securitisation 
technique was correct.
10 Second, the funding strategy implied an unlimited 
supply of liquidity in the wholesale markets to creditworthy banks. As long 
as the loan portfolio sounded good, Northern Rock was confident it would 
always get the funds needed to refinance its huge short-term gap at the same 
price. So much so that, it did not deem necessary to buy at least some form of 
8 Run on the Rock, cit. p. 16: “The main difference between securitisations through SPVs 
[special purpose vehicles] and LLPs [limited liability partnership] is that, in the latter structure, 
the banks themselves (rather than the SPVs) continue to hold the assets and issue the so-called 
covered bonds which are secured against them. The LLP effectively only comes into operation in 
case the issuing bank defaults, thereby providing additional security to investors in the bonds”.
9 Data are taken from UBS (Stephen Andrews et al.), Northern Rock. Fog on the Tyne 
thickens September 2007.
10 Run on the Rock, cit. p. 13: “The Financial Services Authority stated that ‘The structure 
of the Granite securitisation meets industry norms and there is nothing to suggest that the Granite 
structure is not functioning as intended’”106 The rise and fall of Northern Rock
insurance against this risk.
11 Third, the FSA had identified the risks implied 
in the bank’s financial position at least since April 2007
12. We will get back 
on this point in the final section.
11  Run on the Rock p. 16, “One aspect of Northern Rock’s financing raised by the Governor 
of the Bank of England in a speech was Northern Rock’s lack of insurance against the troubles it 
faced. [...] Mr Applegarth explained that Northern Rock had taken out insurance, but that he felt 
its wide funding base did not merit purchasing too much insurance”
12 Run on the Rock, cit. p. 14: “In its April 2007 Financial Stability Report, Sir John Gieve 
told us that the Bank of England had “identified the increasing wholesale funding of banks as 
a potential risk if markets became less liquid”107
3.  Northern Rock as a paradigm
While there is no doubt that Northern Rock’s business model was extreme, 
one can argue that its underlying philosophy was shared by many other banks. 
In particular, the dangerous combination of aggressive growth, minimisation 
of capital and significant funding risks as intermediate objectives to support 
very high levels of return of equity seem to be an important common 
denominator. The “virtuous” circle has been the driver of many banks’ 
strategy, not surprisingly those that deployed the most aggressive growth rates 
and/or the highest return on equity.
The research prompted by the crisis has shown that during boom periods 
banks tend to increase their total assets faster than their liabilities, because 
they feel to have a surplus capital (which can be considered the equivalent 
of the surplus capacity of a manufacturing firm) and look for profitable ways 
to employ it.
13 At the same time, borrowers are more willing to increase their 
debt, both in absolute terms and in proportion to their income. This makes 
bank credit highly procyclical, for reasons connected both to the supply and 
the demand side
14. Moreover, in the last long period of abundant liquidity, the 
wedge between the growth of assets and liabilities (in particular traditional 
deposits) has not been covered with capital, but with funds provided by central 
banks. As the authors point out, “a closer look at the fluctuations in balance 
sheets reveals that the chief tool used by institutions to adjust their leverage 
is collateralized borrowing and lending - in particular, repurchase agreements 
(repos) and reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos), transactions in 
which the borrower of funds provides securities as collateral”.
As a consequence, bank capital tends to be very procyclical, decreasing, as 
a percentage of total assets, during booms and increasing during recessions. 
The mechanism described in Adrian-Shin is focused on the demand and 
supply of credit, therefore to the assets and liabilities of banks’ balance sheet) 
is compounded by the willingness to maximise shareholders’ return and by 
the relationship between growth of revenues and Roe, which leads to find 
ways to “economise” capital.
13 Tobias Adrian - Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Cycles, in 
“ Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Current Issues in Economics and Finance” Volume 14, 
Number 1 January/February 2008.
14 Marco  Pagano,  The subprime lending crisis: lessons for policy and regulation, in “Unicredit 
Group Finance Monitor”, 2008, n. 2.108 Northern Rock as a paradigm
The long period of abundant liquidity and low interest rates allowed banks 
to reach levels of profitability, in particular in terms of return on equity, 
abnormally high by any historical standard. Since then, also because of the 
burst of the Internet bubble, banks felt somehow obliged to keep and even 
to improve their profitability. Aggressive growth and capital minimisation 
were the necessary ingredients to this otherwise unresolvable equation. To 
understand the importance of this driving force (the “motive” as they say in 
the mystery books) it is sufficient to look at the group of “large and complex 
financial institutions” analysed by the ECB
15. The following table shows data 
on profitability in the last years before the crisis. 
Table 1: European Banks: Return on Equity and Return on Risk-Weighted Assets
2004 2005 2006 2007 H1
ROE
Min 4.3 9 7.24 5.11
1
st quartile 10.39 14.88 16.7 17.9
Median 16.35 17.4 18.53 21
Average 16.78 18.74 18.75 20.19
3
rd quartile 20.48 23.13 21.2 22.5
Max 33.2 37 37.6 36
Return on 
RWA
Min 0.2 0.81 0.77 0.81
1
st quartile 0.92 1.06 1.11 1.51
Median 1.11 1.38 1.42 1.84
Average 1.13 1.4 1.48 1.86
3
rd quartile 1.49 1.73 1.84 2.2
Max 2.03 2.26 2.66 3.22
Not only the median and the average levels appear very high throughout 
the period, but also the minimum and first quartile figures are astonishing, 
implying in all categories abnormal premiums to the risk-free rate. As for the 
maximum, it is difficult to say whether these are levels bankers should be 
proud or ashamed of.
The ECB data do not give information on the underlying growth of banks’ 
assets and capital, However, another research from the same source regarding 
all Euroland banks has shown that during the period 2000–2004 the ratio of 
capital to total assets has remained fairly stable for both US and European 
15  European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December 2007, table S5. (2007 data 
annualised)109 Northern Rock as a paradigm
banks
16 but also found a “surprisingly large dispersion of banks’ capital 
ratios, warranting further investigation”. The high dispersion found by the 
ECB (which was not further investigated) seems to confirm that a significant 
number of banks allowed their capital to lag behind total assets even 
significantly, exactly as Northern Rock did. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
the last IMF Report
17 which shows that the 10 largest publicly listed banks 
from Europe and the United States, doubled in aggregate assets in the last 
five years to 15 trillion euros, while risk-weighted assets, which drive the 
capital requirement, grew more moderately to reach about 5 trillion euros. 
The average growth rate are significantly lower than Northern Rock’s but are 
all the way in the two-digit range and the gap to the growth of risk-weighted 
assets looks ominously similar.
The conclusion of the IMF is that (p. 31): “regulatory capital requirements 
did not constrain asset growth. The banks continued to meet the Basel 
I capital requirement with relative ease. The banks showed on average a Tier 
1 capital-to-risk-weighted-asset ratio of between 7 and 9 percent—well above 
the 4 percent minimum. With the high capital ratios, many of the large banks 
were able to engage in stock repurchases through the third quarter of 2007”. 
But “real” leverage is what matters when difficulties arise. Not surprisingly, 
the IMF report (fig. 1.17 p. 19) finds a close relationship in a sample of major 
banks between the fall of stock prices and the leverage ratio (measured by 
total assets and not by risk-weighted-assets).
Official data do not allow for a detailed analysis of the willingness of banks 
to exploit the gap between total assets and risk weighted assets. The findings 
mainly coming from analysts, can be summarised in the following way:
1. There was a high dispersion in the change of leverage among European 
banks;
2.  A few banks such as Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, RBS increased their 
leverage significantly;
3.  Generally French, Spanish and Italian banks have reduced their leverage 
over the last six years, while the UK, Swiss and Deutsche show significant 
increases
18;
16 See  Bank  Capital in Europe and the US, in “Ecb, Financial Stability Review”, cit, p. 155 and 
ff. Unfortunately the research published at the end of 2007 covers only the years 2000–2004.
17  International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2008, p. 31.
18 Merrill Lynch (Stuart Graham), Remaining cautious for 2008: Increased risks to business 
models, 20 December 2007.110 Northern Rock as a paradigm
4.  In the US, strong increases of leverage are to be found in the investment 
banking business, i.e. where difficulties such as Bear Stearns’ arose.
The following graph, based on data published in a recent research analysis
19, 
shows the combination of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and 
the Tier 1 ratio for a sample of 51 large European banks.
Figure 6: Ratio of Risk-weighted Assets to Total Assets in a sample 
of European Banks
The horizontal axis is a good proxy of the extent of regulatory arbitrage by 
individual banks, while Tier 1 is the target variable from a regulatory point of 
view. It is worth stressing the extreme dispersion of the values. If Northern 
Rock was allowed to minimise its capital base, it was not left alone.
Also as regards the funding strategy, Northern Rock’s policy was similar 
to many other cases, at least on two grounds: the decreasing reliance on 
customer deposits and the maturity mismatch.
In most major financial systems, banks’ deposit base grew at a slower pace 
than banks’ assets, as implied in the Adrian-Shin model. The Merrill Lynch 
research cited above, finds a “funding jaws” (gap between loan and customer 
deposits) for a sample of European banks in the range of 200–300bn per year 
19 Goldman Sachs (Christoffer Maimer), Capital and credit concerns stand in the way of 
a sustained recovery, July 3, 2008.111 Northern Rock as a paradigm
in the period before the crisis. But, like we have seen for capital, individual 
banks’ positions are even more interesting than aggregate figures. The ratio of 
loans to deposits, at the end of 2007 was significantly above 100 per cent for 
most British, Spanish and German banks (and a few French banks as well). 
Some banks showed ratios above 150 per cent.
The crisis has also shown tremendous maturity mismatches both in most 
banks’ trading portfolios (particularly large universal banks and American 
investment banks) and in the special purpose vehicles of the securitisation 
processes. As for the funding strategy of the financial system at large, it is 
sufficient to remember the case of the special investment vehicles As the ECB 
pointed out
20 when the crisis broke, the market began to look at the nature of 
the funding liabilities of these vehicles as well as the fact that some of these 
structures did not have their own equity capital. At the end of the day there is 
always a dramatic lack of capital.
20  ECB, Financial Stability Review, p. 87.112
4. Conclusions
The collapse of Northern Rock has been mainly examined as a failure of the 
British mechanisms of intervention (in particular, the lender of last resort 
facilities, the deposit insurance scheme and the division of responsibilities 
between the three main regulators). This perspective led to important policy 
conclusions, but risks to cast shadows on the many points that Northern 
Rock’s crisis shares with many other ailing banks: the lack of capital.
The simple data we have examined for Northern Rock and other banks, shows 
that capital did not grow at a pace proportion to the accumulation of credit 
and financial risks. In other words capital was not adequate both for Northern 
Rock and so many other banks of the international élite of large universal 
banks. There has been a failure of business models based on aggressive 
growth and maximisation of the return on equity.
If this is the crisis of securitisation, it is also the crisis of capital adequacy. No 
matter if we consider Basel-1 or Basel-2, the disturbing conclusion is that the 
overall prudential regulation failed to attain its fundamental objective. Most 
banks were allowed to increase their leverage beyond any reasonable capacity 
to absorb the increasing credit and liquidity risks. Of course, one can argue 
that the Basel framework allows individual regulators to force banks to have 
capital above the minimum level in special cases, i.e. in case of a very risky 
business model, such as Northern Rock’s. But the evidence seems to confirm 
that this special treatment was not applied by a few national regulators, 
including the UK’s. In other words, cases such as Northern Rock’s grew both 
in the UK and in other European countries. The asymmetry of regulatory 
approach within the European Union and even within Euroland is a problem 
of the utmost importance in the future debate on European issues. 
This raises the problem of competition through regulation. The UK authority, 
and in particular the FSA is universally praised for its legendary light touch
21. 
It is very hard to reconcile this merit with regulatory requests of increasing 
the capital base of individual banks, which eventually would depress 
shareholders’ returns. 
21  Soft-touch regulation, “The Economist”, 11 October 2007.113 4. Conclusions
The main policy implication of our analysis is that capital adequacy rules must 
be restored. This means applying Basel-2 fixing immediately the problem of 
procyclicality and understatement of liquidity risks. Second, a more uniform 
regulatory approach looks badly needed. In global markets, the dividing line 
between the competitiveness of a market place and a race to the bottom in 
regulation is thinner and thinner.117
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When the UK’s current regulatory arrangements were put in place a decade 
ago, their justification was the blurring of boundaries between different 
segments of the financial industry. The reforms were primarily a response 
to perceived regulatory inefficiencies resulting from the changing structure 
of the financial industry – most notably the emergence of financial 
conglomerates and functional despecialisation. However, in part because of 
the circumstances in which reform took place, comparatively little attention 
was given at the time to crisis management arrangements. To the extent 
that these issues were considered there was an attempt to draw a sharp and 
precise boundary between banking regulation on the one hand and the central 
bank’s role in promoting financial stability on the other. The Northern Rock 
episode has illustrated that the new boundary that was erected under the 
post-1997 arrangements is sub-optimal in crisis management. This paper will 
argue that it is now this boundary that needs to be blurred. 
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and should not be attributed to 
the Central Bank of Bahrain118
2.  Justification for regulatory consolidation
The chief argument advanced in favour of the regulatory consolidation 
represented by the FSA was that the financial sector had experienced 
a “blurring of boundaries” between banking, securities, and insurance. It was 
most succinctly stated by Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer in his speech 
to Parliament of 20
th May 1997, in which Gordon Brown argued that 
[I]t is clear that the distinctions between different types of financial 
institution - banks, securities firms and insurance companies - are 
becoming increasingly blurred. Many of today’s financial institutions are 
regulated by a plethora of different supervisors. This increases the cost and 
reduces the effectiveness of supervision.
One manifestation of the blurring of boundaries was the emergence of 
financial conglomerates, a trend that rose to prominence in the first half 
of the 1990s. Group structures were starting to become more complex, 
involving a diversity of institutions operating in a range of different sectors 
and geographical locations and subject to different supervisory regimes. 
Banks were becoming increasingly involved in asset management and 
broker-dealing activities, while securities houses had increasingly taken on 
bank-type financial risks. Banking/insurance linkages were also becoming 
commonplace, usually under a common holding company structure. Given 
these developments the Tripartite Group of G10 banking, securities, and 
insurance supervisors argued in a 1995 report that a “group-wide” perspective 
was required to obtain an adequate supervisory overview of these financial 
conglomerates. (Tripartite Group, (1995)) 
A second manifestation of the blurring of boundaries was what might be termed 
“functional despecialisation”. Different financial institutions were increasingly 
carrying out the same functions or types of operations. Technological 
innovation had also created products which could not be easily accommodated 
within the traditional contractual forms (debt, equity, and insurance) - an 
example being the emergence of credit derivatives. Financial innovation had 
increased the marketability and standardisation of financial products while, at 
the same time, it had allowed the creation of more complex products and the 
unbundling of certain types of risk into their separate components. In addition, 119 Justification for regulatory consolidation
contract standardisation and the unbundling of risks had permitted different 
financial institutions to take on exposure to risk which were previously outside 
their sectoral domain. Securitisation was an example of this trend. As a result, 
securities houses had increasingly become exposed to the type of risk that is 
typical of traditional banking business, as their assets came to include, for 
example, mortgage-backed securities or securitized bank loans. Similarly, 
bank balance sheets – previously characterised by their stability – were subject 
to much greater volatility, as assets could be securitized and sold, and trading 
activities came to account for a much larger share of profitability
2. 
The emergence of financial conglomerates and the process of functional 
despecialisation had undoubted implications for the structure and practice of 
regulation. As Borio and Filosa noted in an early attempt to assess this trend, 
“conglomeration and the blurring of distinctions between activities… raise 
the question of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between different 
supervisors.” (Borio and Filosa, (1994)). One possible conclusion was 
that since the boundary lines between financial sectors were being eroded, 
regulation itself should follow suit. (Financial System Inquiry (1996, 1997); 
Goodhart (1995); Taylor, (1995)). A single financial regulator seemed to be 
better adapted to the realities of modern financial markets than the traditional 
tripartite structure of regulation divided between banking, securities and 
insurance. It would have the advantage of being able to monitor the activities 
of a complex group in exactly the same way as the internal management of 
a conglomerate monitor its activities. As a result the regulatory process would 
be able to mirror the management process, an important reason why the 
industry fell so quickly behind the proposal to establish a single regulator.
A decade later, these arguments for establishing a single regulator remain 
powerful. Although there are some signs that the trend towards financial 
conglomerates has passed its peak and financial services firms are again 
focusing on core competencies, functional despecialisation has continued 
apace. Northern Rock’s business model was constructed around its ability 
to distribute in the form of securities the mortgages that it originated. The 
bank’s extraordinary growth, in which its balance sheet expanded from 
₤15.8 billion in 1997 to over ₤100 billion by the end of 2006, had been 
fuelled by wholesale funding and an active asset securitisation programme. 
As such, Northern Rock’s business model was constructed on functional 
despecialisation and hence was exactly the sort of financial innovation to 
which the FSA had been presented as the answer.
2 OECD  (1996)120
3.  The lender of last resort
Nonetheless, some critics of the FSA’s performance in its supervision of 
Northern Rock have argued that the episode illustrates the folly of removing 
banking supervision from the central bank. As Professor Willem Buiter 
argued in evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee:
The notion that the institution that has the knowledge of the individual 
banks that may or may not be in trouble would be a different institution 
from the one that has the money, the resources, to act upon the observation 
that a particular bank needs lender of last resort support is risky. It is 
possible, if you are lucky, to manage it, but it is an invitation to disaster, to 
delay, and to wrong decisions. The key implication of that is that the same 
institution—it could be the FSA or it could be the Bank of England—
should have both the individual, specific information and the money to do 
something about it.
3
This argument is essentially a reprise of the chief argument that was 
advanced in favour of retaining banking supervision within the central bank 
at the time the FSA was established. It was argued then that the information 
acquired in the capacity of the bank supervisor was essential to the central 
bank performing the lender of last resort (LoLR) function, and that therefore 
the best arrangement was for LoLR and banking supervision to be located 
in the same institution. A subsidiary argument was that the central bank 
needed to be concerned with the financial condition of the banking system 
as this was the conduit through which its monetary policy was transmitted 
to the wider economy. Against these arguments, proponents of separation 
argued that theoretical considerations and empirical evidence indicated that 
central banks with banking supervision responsibilities tended to err on the 
side of laxity in monetary policy; as Goodhart and Schoenmaker argued in 
a widely cited paper
4, monetary policy aimed to be countercyclical, whereas 
regulatory policy was pro-cyclical. Concerns were also expressed that 
banking supervision “failures” – which it was generally accepted were almost 
inevitable – would damage the reputation and credibility of the central bank 
as a monetary policy institution. Since the theoretical arguments were very 
finely balanced, ultimately it may have been the Bank of England’s rather 
3  Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence. 13
th November 2007, Q854. 
4  Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993)121 The lender of last resort
undistinguished performance as a bank supervisor, especially in relation to 
BCCI and Barings, which proved decisive.
In assessing Buiter’s criticisms of the post-1997 arrangements, the first point 
to note is that through much of its history the Bank of England did not have 
formal statutory responsibility for banking supervision; it was a relatively 
late addition to its functions that occurred only in 1979 (Schooner and Taylor, 
(1999)). Prior to that time the Bank of England had been able to perform its 
role as lender of last resort perfectly adequately without having any formal 
statutory powers or responsibilities. In its role as lender of last resort it had 
been able to exert significant moral suasion over the banking sector, and 
the Discount Office was able to obtain information from banks on a purely 
informal basis. Failure to provide the Bank with information, or failing to 
take heed of the Bank’s discretely phrased warnings, was tantamount to the 
institution putting itself in the position of being denied access to discount 
facilities when they were most needed. This was a powerful deterrent.
Moral suasion and the Governor’s eyebrows have long since ceased to be 
effective in a modern financial system. Nonetheless, the evidence from 
other jurisdictions is that even when the central bank does not have the 
formal statutory responsibility for banking supervision, it can still obtain the 
information it needs to act as lender of last resort. A variety of models are 
possible. In some jurisdictions with a banking or financial services regulator 
separate from the central bank, the relationship between the two institutions 
is particularly close with the regulatory agency staff being employees of the 
central bank and with many IT systems and platforms shared between them 
(Abrams and Taylor, (2002)). Typical examples include the relationship 
between the Banque de France and the Commission Bancaire and between 
the Bank of Finland and the Finnish Financial Services Commission. In 
other jurisdictions where the relationship between the central bank and the 
regulatory agency is more arms-length, the central bank is able to collect data 
and to conduct examinations of banks in its own right. The Bank of Japan 
continues to enjoy these powers despite the Financial Services Agency being 
the single unified regulator in Japan.
In short, the relationship between the Bank of England and the FSA was 
not flawed because there was a separation between lender of last resort and 
the formal statutory responsibility for banking supervision. The flaw was, 
rather, a consequence that the relationship between the two institutions was 
conceived in terms of a sharp and clear boundary between their respective 
responsibilities. Either the Bank of England was the bank supervisor, or 122
the FSA was. If the FSA was to be the banking supervisor, it followed that 
the Bank of England should have only a general role in relation to overall 
financial stability, and did not require the ability to gather institution-specific 
information. Perhaps because one stated objective of the 1997 reforms was 
to reduce regulatory duplication and overlap – a major selling point with 
the industry – only the FSA was given information-gathering powers. The 
examples both of history and of other jurisdictions should have shown that 
even without the formal statutory responsibility for banking supervision, the 
central bank still needed to have access to substantial amounts of institution-
specific information and ideally its own capacity to go about gathering that 
information.
4.  Monetary policy and financial stability
If the first boundary was drawn between the Bank and the FSA, the second 
appears to have been drawn within the Bank itself. Despite initially investing 
significant resources in its financial stability wing, and despite its work in 
developing a world-leading Financial Stability Report, the Bank’s financial 
stability role inevitably took on secondary importance when compared to 
its monetary policy responsibilities. This is hardly surprising given that the 
latter, but not the former, was a statutory responsibility, but it also appears to 
have arisen because the Bank may have neglected the aphorism that Charles 
Goodhart has said was oft repeated to him when he joined it in 1968: “The 
Bank is a bank and not a study group.” Goodhart has parsed this phrase to 
mean “that the heart of the Bank then lay in its operational links with financial 
markets and institutions, and not in its contribution to macroeconomic analysis 
and policy.” Alongside the other changes in the Bank’s role and mandate, it is 
these operational links that appear to have been relatively downgraded under 
the post-1997 dispensation, particularly given that the Bank now conducts 
its monetary policy operations through open market operations rather 
than through lending to specific institutions.
5 As a result the Bank seemed 
unprepared for a situation in which market rates (particularly LIBOR) started 
to diverge significantly from its policy rates due to the hoarding of liquidity 
and the virtual collapse of the interbank market. 
5 The Bank does, however, also provide standing facilities which allows banks to correct 
liquidity errors (either shortfalls or surpluses) on a daily basis.123
The resulting divergence of market and policy rates illustrated quite vividly 
how financial instability can have an impact on the central bank’s ability to 
implement its monetary policy. Those who have argued that a central bank 
should remain responsible for banking supervision as banks are the conduits 
through which policy is transmitted to the wider economy may believe that 
these events provide vindication for their position. However, as with its last 
resort lending, the central bank does not need to be the bank supervisor to 
ensure that a concern with financial stability is incorporated in its monetary 
policy mandate. Indeed, developments in the financial industry over the past 
decade have meant that a concern with financial stability cannot end with the 
banking sector – the central bank’s remit to monitor industry developments 
must go much wider, as is recognized in the US Treasury’s proposal to assign 
the Federal Reserve the role of the “market stability regulator.” The fallout 
from Northern Rock has provided a powerful reminder that monetary stability 
and financial stability are deeply intertwined and that even if the central bank 
is not the bank supervisor its conduct of monetary policy must be closely 
informed by its analysis of financial stability and its contacts with markets 
and institutions. A concern with financial stability is, in a phrase coined by 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, in the “genetic code” of central banks, and does 
not disappear along with the formal statutory responsibility for banking 
supervision. 
5. Policy  prescriptions
If the foregoing analysis is correct, there is a need to blur some of the 
boundaries that have been drawn under the post-1997 dispensation. The first 
policy response should be that the Bank of England must have a clear and 
unambiguous statutory responsibility for financial stability in parallel to its 
statutory responsibility for monetary stability (as the Banking Act 2009 now 
provides). Such a statutory responsibility will help ensure that this function 
is able to enjoy an appropriate profile both internally within the Bank and 
externally in its dealings with other stakeholders. It will be particularly 
valuable in underpinning the Bank’s future relationship with both the industry 
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with the financial industry – not just the banking industry – that it formerly 
enjoyed. It will also need to play a greater role in the assessment of individual 
banks, and other systemically important institutions, even if this results it 
encroaching on some of the FSA’s responsibilities. 
A second lesson is that the arrangements should not seek to replace one 
set of boundaries with a different set. This is particularly important when 
the boundary is redrawn between the responsibility for financial stability 
and for the supervision of individual institutions. At a purely intellectual 
level it is possible to conceive the distinction quite clearly: between risks 
which are idiosyncratic to a particular institution and those which arise from 
correlations between markets and institutions or from herding behaviour. At 
a practical level, however, the distinction is never quite so clear cut, and it is 
better to err on the side of caution by giving the Bank a broader remit rather 
than allowing gaps to appear in financial sector surveillance. Not only will 
this result in some duplication of effort between the Bank and the FSA, but it 
will inevitably increase the regulatory burden, especially for the larger firms 
in the industry. Given the costs of inadequate surveillance, this is a price that 
will need to be paid.
The third lesson is that the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding will 
need to be redrawn. It refers generically to “support operations” (paragraph 
14), without clearly distinguishing between those that relate to emergency 
liquidity assistance and those that would involve solvency support; in both 
cases the Treasury sits at the apex of a pyramid with both the Bank and FSA 
in subordinate roles. This contrasts with the practice of most other countries 
in crisis management which is to ensure that as long as the issue remains one 
of liquidity the central bank will be in the lead. It alone has (or should have) 
the information and the ability to react sufficiently promptly to emerging 
problems. In this case the FSA’s role would be clearly established as that of 
a handmaiden to the Bank, under an explicit obligation to provide it with any 
and all information required by for the discharge of its duties. Only in the 
event that the issue becomes one of providing solvency support should the 
Treasury take the lead, with both the Bank and the FSA in supporting roles.
The Norwegian Kredittilsynet was the first unified regulatory agency to 
be established and it provides an example of the place that a stand-alone 
regulatory agency should occupy in crisis management arrangements. 
(Taylor, (1997)). During the 1991 Norwegian banking crisis the leading 
role in crisis management was taken by the Ministry of Finance, the Central 
Bank of Norway, and ultimately by the parliament (as the source of supply.) 125 Policy prescriptions
The decision-making power, for example regarding public administration 
or ownership of a troubled institution resided with the Ministry of Finance, 
while the Central Bank of Norway was able to act as lender of last resort 
without MoF approval. The role of the Kredittilsynet during the crisis was 
to advise both the MoF and the Central Bank on the extent of the problem, 
and of the measures needed to restore troubled banks to an adequate level 
of capitalisation. Thus the Kredittilsynet participated in the crisis resolution 
process “as a factfinder and in an advisory capacity” which involved 
“ascertaining and assessing the actual situation and by advising the decision-
makers” (Selvig (1997)). It was not, however, a decision-maker itself and 
played an ancillary role as the provider of information and expert assessment. 
A revised MoU should clearly assign the FSA a similar role to avoid any 
confusion of responsibilities in future.
The final question concerns whether a MoU is really adequate to govern 
the relationship between the financial safety net players, or whether some 
deeper institutional connection needs to be forged. At the time that the FSA 
was established a great deal of emphasis was placed on the fact that many 
of its staff would be drawn from the Bank of England, thus creating a close 
working relationship between the two institutions. However, instead of being 
recognized as a temporary, short-term expedient that would work only as 
long as the same staff stayed in post, this became a substitute for constructing 
the institutional arrangements that would have ensured that the relationship 
remained a particularly close one on a continuing basis.
The Northern Rock experience has shown that if the bank regulator is not the 
central bank, the relationship between the two institutions must be a close 
one. This was potentially one of the merits of the so-called ‘Twin Peaks’ 
model that involves separate agencies for prudential and conduct of business 
regulation
6. Although it was rejected in Britain in favour of a single unified 
authority, it has been adopted elsewhere (notably in the Netherlands and 
Australia). Its critics have argued that a single unified regulator possess the 
advantage of avoiding duplication and overlap between the two agencies and 
reducing the potential for damaging turf disputes
7. However, the benefits 
of a single regulator are obvious mainly in the routine work of regulation, 
particularly where economies of scale benefits can be secured, rather than in 
the management of a financial crisis where the closeness of the relationship 
with the central bank becomes the key factor.
6  Goodhart (1995), Taylor (1995)
7 Briault  (1999)126 Policy prescriptions
Because of the circumstances in which the UK’s regulatory reforms took 
place – as a reaction to perceived regulatory failures in consumer protection 
– it was perhaps inevitable that this aspect of regulation should have been 
their main focus. The overarching desire on the part of policy-makers was to 
establish a strong consumer protection regulator that would be independent of 
the industry. One consequence was that the importance of ensuring effective 
crisis management arrangements did not receive the attention that it might 
otherwise have done. Fortunately, the Northern Rock episode has provided 
the impetus to restore some balance to the post-1997 arrangements. The 
Bank of England has now been given both formal statutory responsibility for 
financial stability and for handling bank resolutions under a much-overdue 
new legislative framework. These are both important steps in the right 
direction. The important issue will be to avoid attempting to draw any new 
sharp boundaries. Instead, the relationship between the safety net players is 
one that cries out for the traditional British art of compromise and muddling 
through. Sometimes tidiness is not a virtue.127
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1. Introduction
Northern Rock exposed the deficiencies of the UK regime to deal with banks 
in distress. Some of those deficiencies concern the workings of emergency 
liquidity assistance, some others the workings of deposit insurance and some 
others the insolvency and pre-insolvency arrangements. This paper deals with 
bank insolvency and bank crisis management in the light of the Northern 
Rock episode. Following a brief narrative of the events from September 2007 
(with the run on Northern Rock) to February 2008 (when the government 
announced its nationalization), the paper examines the legislative and 
regulatory responses in the UK, and assesses some features of the new Special 
Resolution Regime (SRR) introduced by the Banking Act (2009) to deal with 
banks in distress (including both pre-insolvency measures, as well as actual 
insolvency).
This paper also examines some of the international and European initiatives 
with regard to cross-border bank insolvency. Though financial markets and 
institutions have become international in recent years, regulation remains 
1 This paper substantially draws on an article, Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and 
Cross-Border Bank Insolvency, published in the Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 9, No. 3,
pp 939–955, May 2008.132 Introduction
constrained by the domain of domestic jurisdictions. This dichotomy poses 
challenges for regulators and policy makers. If at the national level, bank 
crisis management is complex (with the involvement of several authorities 
and the interests of many stakeholders), this complexity is far greater in the 
case of cross border bank crisis management. In any financial crisis, it is 
necessary to have a clear and predictable legal framework in place to govern 
how a financial institution would be reorganized or liquidated in an orderly 
fashion so as not to undermine financial stability. We do not have such 
a framework yet with regard to cross-border banks, neither at the European 
level nor at the international level. 
Banking crises are a recurrent phenomenon in the history of international 
finance. Bank crisis management comprises an array of official and private 
responses that extends beyond the insolvency proceedings that are the only 
tool typically available to deal with corporate bankruptcy in other industries. 
As regards the official responses, when confronted with failed or failing 
banks, public authorities have at their disposal: (1) the lender of last resort 
role of the central bank; (2) deposit insurance schemes; (3) government 
policies of implicit protection of depositors, banks (the ‘too-big-to-fail 
doctrine’) or the payment system; (4) insolvency laws (lex specialis vs lex 
generalis), (5) prompt corrective action, and other preventive measures 
(including supervision). A well-designed legal framework is important for the 
functioning of financial markets, particularly in times of trouble. 133
2.  Northern Rock, an English ‘bank run’ in 
the twenty-first century
Northern Rock, the UK mortgage lender, has become a household name 
which will forever be associated with old-fashioned bank runs, following the 
events of September 2007. Northern Rock was not a major bank (i.e., it was 
not systemically important nor too-big-to-fail) nor an international bank (i.e., 
it had no significant cross-border operations). 
The announcement of the emergency liquidity assistance by the Bank of 
England on 13 September 2007 (revealed by the BBC),
2 coupled with an 
ill-designed and insufficiently publicized deposit insurance scheme, led to 
a ‘bank run’ from September 14 to September 17, with queues of anxious 
depositors wishing to withdraw their money forming outside Northern Rock 
branches around the country. This bank run brought headlines not only in the 
Financial Times or in the Times, but in all tabloids and TV stations around 
the world. It was claimed that the UK had not witnessed such an event since 
Overend, Gurney & Co. in 1866. Certainly the UK had never witnessed 
such a publicized bank run, one in which the media played a magnifying 
role. It was embarrassing for the City and embarrassing for the Government. 
The tripartite arrangement (an otherwise sound structure when supervision 
is transferred from the central bank to a supervisory agency) involving the 
Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England
3 did not 
function smoothly nor promptly nor efficiently. On 17 September 2007, the 
Chancellor, Alistair Darling, agreed to guarantee all deposits held by Northern 
Rock, bringing the bank run to a halt. 
The Northern Rock bank run caught the authorities by surprise. Political 
considerations always come into play in a banking crisis. The authorities 
are keen to stop problems in one bank from spreading to other parts of the 
banking system, acknowledging the real risk of contagion. The offer of 
2  On 14 September, Northern Rock announced that ‘extreme conditions’ in financial markets 
had forced it to approach the Bank of England for assistance. The bank’s website collapsed under 
the strain. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2007/09/friday_14_september_2007.html, 
Accessed 24
th April 2008.
3 See Memorandum of Understanding of 1996 revised in 2006 between HM Treasury, 
Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/
financial_services/regulating_financial_services/fin_rfs_mou.cfm, Accessed 20
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guarantees (in itself a distortion of competition) is sometimes warranted on 
the basis of public interest considerations.
Northern Rock was offered all sorts of public assistance since September 
2007: emergency liquidity assistance, guarantee of all deposits (including 
new deposits made after September 19), and eventually nationalization. This 
despite the fact that a private market solution was the preferred solution from 
the beginning by the bank and by the government.
On 17 February 2008 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling 
announced that nationalization of Northern Rock, bringing forward legislation 
‘to take Northern Rock into a period of temporary public ownership’. The 
Banking (Special Provisions) Bill was summarily introduced to the House of 
Commons on 19 February 2008 and received the Royal Assent on 21  February 
2008.
4 This culminated in the Banking Act 2009, which received Royal Assent 
on 12 February 2009 and came into force on 21 February 2009.
5
4 The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consultations_
and_legislation/banking/banking_specialprovision_bill.cfm 
5  Banking Act 2009: available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2009/pdf/ukpga_
20090001_en.pdf135
3.  The regulatory and legislative responses to Northern 
Rock
Parallel to the actions specific to Northern Rock the authorities embarked in 
a program of legislative reform which has lead to a major overhaul of banking 
law in the country including the introduction of a Special Resolution Regime 
(SRR).
Before the summer of 2007, the FSA’s “principle-based” approach to 
regulation was commended for attracting financial activity to London. This 
approach contrasts with the “rules-based” approach of US financial regulators 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, and others). The costs of 
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rules are cited as driving some 
foreign companies and investors away from US capital markets.
After the summer of 2007, in the light of the handling of Northern Rock 
(a banking crisis), the FSA has been the subject of criticism (together with 
the other two members of the tripartite arrangement, the Bank of England 
and the Treasury). The reputation of London as a sophisticated financial 
centre has become tarnished. Further comparisons between the US and the 
UK have been made to the detriment of the UK following the speedy rescue 
package the Federal Reserve Bank of New York arranged for Bear Stearns in 
March 2008,
6 which contrasts with the lengthy, slow and rather inefficient 
resolution procedure for Northern Rock.
A review of the regulatory responses that have been put forth in recent months 
is presented in the ensuing paragraphs.
On 1 October 2007, the FSA announced an increase in the coverage of 
deposits up to £ 35,000 equal to 100% of the loss incurred. Partial insurance 
was deemed to have been a major flaw in the design of deposit insurance in 
the UK and a contributor to the bank run. 
6 See www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Understanding_Fed_Lending.html See also ‘Actions 
by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets’, Testimony by 
Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington, 
D.C., 3 April 2008, http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/gei080403.html and 
Federal Reserve Announces Establishment of Primary Dealer Credit Facility, at http://www.ny.frb.
org/markets/pdcf.html 136 The regulatory and legislative responses to Northern Rock
A first discussion paper on Banking Reform: Protecting Depositors was 
published on 11 October 2007 by the Bank of England, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and HM Treasury.
7 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee published a report on 
26 January 2008 entitled “The Run on the Rock”
8, recommending that 
a single authority, akin to the US FDIC, be created (the Deputy Governor 
of the Bank of England and Head of Financial Stability and a corresponding 
Office), with powers for handling failing banks (chapter 5) as well as the 
Deposit Insurance Fund (Chapter 6). 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer launched on 30 January 2008, a consultation 
document outlining proposals to strengthen the current framework for 
financial stability and depositor framework.
9 This is a joint publication by 
HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England and 
the Government intends to follow this consultation (which ended 23 April 
2008) by introducing legislation into Parliament later in this session.
The objectives of the reform, according to the January 30 consultation 
document,  Financial stability and depositor protection: strengthening the 
framework, are: (1) to strengthen the financial system (risk management, 
liquidity management, functioning of securitized markets); (2) to reduce the 
likelihood of bank’s failing (by introducing ‘heightened supervision’ and 
strengthening the ability of the Bank of England to provide covert emergency 
liquidity assistance inter alia); (3) to reduce the impact of failing banks 
(by introducing a special resolution regime (SRR) and a sufficient range 
of tools within this SRR); (4) to create effective compensation schemes in 
which the consumers have confidence (designing such schemes in a way that 
foster credibility, introducing a one-week payout and increasing consumer 
awareness); (5) to strengthen the Bank of England (by anchoring in statute 
its responsibility for financial stability and by reforming and empowering the 
Court of the Bank of England) and (6) to improve coordination between the 
7  See Banking Reform - Protecting Depositors: a discussion paper, 11 October 2007 at http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consultations_and_legislation/bankingreform/consult_banking_reform.
cfm, Accessed 20
th April 2008. The consultation period for this paper ended on 5 December 2008.
8 The Treasury Committee published its fifth report of Session 2007-08, ‘The run on the 
Rock’ (HC 56-I) on 26 January 2008. See http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/
cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/5602.htm Accessed 20
th April 2008.
9 ‘Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Strengthening the Framework’, Bank of 
England, HM Treasury and Financial Services Authority, Cm 7309, 30 January 2008, http://www.
hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/financial_stability_framework.cfm, Accessed 
20
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authorities in the tripartite arrangement on the one hand, and between national 
and supra-national and international authorities on the other hand.
On July 1st, 2008, HM Treasury, Bank of England and FSA published a further 
consultation document on financial stability and depositor protection.
10 This 
consultation paper provides feedback on the January consultation exercise and 
sets out more clearly the UK proposals for the new framework. It also seeks 
views on some key outstanding questions. The Authorities (HM Treasury, 
Bank of England and FSA) will publish detailed draft clauses for the special 
resolution regime before the summer Parliamentary recess. Subject to the 
outcome of these consultations, the Government intends to bring forward 
legislation later in 2008. 
The salient features of the proposed new framework are the introduction of 
a special resolution regime for banks (SRR), the granting of new powers to 
the Bank of England as well as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and 
the reform of the compensation arrangements for depositors. Improvements 
are to be made to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to 
facilitate faster pay-out in the event that a bank becomes insolvent. 
A credible deposit insurance system requires inter alia prompt payment 
of depositors (next business day as in the US is ideal, though a one-week 
payout may be more feasible in the UK in the light of international practice) 
and a reasonable amount of coverage (neither too meagre to be non-credible 
nor too generous to incur into moral hazard incentives). As part of the plans 
to increase depositor confidence in the banking system, the July 1
st, 2008 
document states that there will be an increase in the compensation limit for 
protected depositors from £ 35,000 to £ 50,000 on a per person per bank basis. 
In my opinion, only deposits ought to be covered. The Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS), set up under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) as the UK’s compensation fund for customers of 
financial services according to the Directives on Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
and Investor Compensation Schemes, also covers insurance policies and 
investment business. (FSCS has no real ‘powers’ as opposed to FDIC in the 
US insurer, supervisor and receiver of failed or failing institutions).  Now 
that co-insurance has been abandoned in the UK, market discipline can be 
enhanced by having a system that is at least partially pre-funded. However, the 
10 The document is available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/jointcp_stability.pdf and at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/E/1/consult_depositorprotection010708.pdf
Comments on the proposed framework outlined in the consultation document are welcome by 
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July 1st document does not require banks to pre-fund the new compensation 
arrangements. The document states that it could still introduce pre-funding in 
the future but it has reservations because of the adverse conditions banks have 
been experiencing lately. This is regrettable since banks and their clients are 
the main beneficiaries of deposit protection schemes.
Subject to parliamentary approval, the legislation will give new powers and 
responsibilities to the Bank of England with regard to a financial stability 
statutory objective and the introduction of a special resolution regime for 
banks. The Bank will also gain new powers for covert liquidity support. So as 
to ensure proper governance and accountability, the government will legislate 
for the Bank of England’s financial stability role to be the oversight of the 
Bank’s court. A financial stability committee (FSC) will be established as 
a committee of the court, chaired by the governor.
The Chancellor recognized in a letter to the Treasury Committee on June 
19, 2008 that for the Bank to exercise its responsibilities for financial stability, 
it needs appropriate tools and powers, including an improved framework for 
the provision of liquidity, the oversight of systemically important payment 
systems and, most importantly, a leading role in the implementation of the 
new special resolution regime. Though the Bank will oversee the SRR, the 
FSA will be the authority in charge of triggering such SRR, in line with its 
supervisory role. The July 1 document defines the responsibilities of the 
authorities involved in bank crisis management: the FSA will be responsible 
for the ongoing supervision of any firm while it continues to operate in the 
SRR, the Bank of England will be responsible for liquidity support and for 
the operation of the SRR, the Treasury will be responsible for public finances 
and the overall public interest and the FSCS will also be involved in the 
assessment of the readiness of a bank for payout of its depositors.
 Supervision and crisis management are a seamless process. Supervision 
of healthy institutions can quickly become supervision of troubled or even 
failing institutions, thus leading to crisis management. The FSA published 
details of a supervisory enhancement program in March 2008 in response 
to the weaknesses identified in the supervision of Northern Rock.
11 The 
axiom of assisting on rainy days but monitoring on sunny days ought to be 
remembered. 
11 See FSA Internal Audit Review, 26 March 2008, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/
Communication/PR/2008/028.shtml, Accessed 20
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The SRR enables the authorities (Bank of England and Treasury) to take 
decisive action to resolve a failing bank in a more orderly manner than 
previously possible. It allows people to have continued access to banking 
functions and a faster and more orderly deposit payment.
The Banking Act 2009 – briefly analyzed with regard to the SRR in the ensuing 
section - culminates the reform process in the United Kingdom.
The SRR according to the new UK Banking Act 2009
The last eighteen months have shown how important a functioning banking 
system (access to credit, continuity and integrity of payments and depositor 
protection) is for the well-being of the nation. Like in the case of public 
utilities, the government must step in to ensure their continuous provision.
In the United Kingdom, the new Banking Act 2009
12, which was introduced by 
the government into parliament on 7 October 2008, received Royal Assent on 
12 February 2009 and came into force on 21 February 2009. Acknowledging 
that the UK authorities were ill-equipped to deal with bank failures, the Act 
establishes for the first time a permanent statutory regime for dealing with failing 
banks. One of the most significant features of the new Act is the establishment of 
a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) for banks, which gives the Authorities (the 
Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury) the powers 
to adopt early intervention measures (pre insolvency), referred to as 'stabilization 
options' in the new Act, comprising transfer to a private sector purchaser (section 
11) and bridge bank (section 12), as well as temporary public ownership (section 
13). The first two options can be exercised by the Bank of England (transfer to 
a private sector purchaser and bridge bank), while the Treasury has the power to 
take a bank into temporary public ownership. The Act also introduces a new bank 
administration procedure and a bank insolvency procedure.
The objectives of the SRR (section 4) are the stability of the financial system 
(and, in particular, the continuity of banking services), the protection of depositors 
and public funds, and avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of 
a Convention right (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998).
From the point of view of insolvency law, the move towards lex specialis for banks 
in the United Kingdom is a significant development. Yet, some commentators 
argue that not only banks need lex specialis, but also systemically important 
12 See  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf140 The regulatory and legislative responses to Northern Rock
financial institutions (an issue which was considered during the consultation 
process). In the United States, under the Financial Stability Plan announced 
by the Secretary of the Treasury on 10 February 2009, the FDIC’s powers are 
expected to be expanded with regard to non deposit taking troubled financial 
institutions. A legislative amendment to establish a receivership and liquidation 
process for systemically significant non-bank troubled financial institutions 
similar to the system for banks is likely in the near future.
The Banking Act 2009 gives also for the first time a statutory mandate for 
financial stability to the Bank of England. The tripartite authorities will continue 
to have a relevant role in crisis management: the FSA will continue to supervise 
financial institutions (the term micro-supervision has become fashionable in 
this context), the Bank of England will continue to provide liquidity assistance 
and play a key role in the SRR and the Treasury will be involved whenever 
public funds are at stake. The extension of the powers of the Bank of England 
with regard to financial stability, oversight of inter-bank payment systems, and 
the Special Resolution Regime, are in my opinion, an implicit recognition that 
the transfer of supervision from the Bank to the FSA had gone too far and that 
the Bank of England, by having monetary policy powers (monetary stability 
mandate), is the best institution to undertake macro prudential supervision 
(financial stability mandate). However, it remains questionable whether the 
Bank of England is the best institutions to be in charge of the SRR.
The Act also introduces changes to deposit insurance (increases in the amount 
covered, a faster pay-out period) and introduces some changes to the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme.
A safe and sound banking system is essential for the health of the economy. The 
new Banking Act is a step in the right direction. However, banking law reform 
needs to be accompanied by financial institutions' corporate governance reform 
and needs to be aligned with European and international efforts. The boundaries 
between the role of the state and the role of markets have been redrawn. And yet 
only a recovery in markets can help bring the economy back to health. The danger 
of stifling market innovation is always present and should be avoided. Legislators 
and policy-makers should keep this in mind and not rush in their decisions.141
4.  The case for Lex Specialis
Banks are still special as the current credit turmoil amply evidences. They 
are special given their unique role as providers of credit, deposit takers and 
payments intermediaries (no chain is stronger than its weakest link). Bank 
failures are also special, since they create externalities (contagion to other 
healthy institutions; under a fractional reserve system a bank will be unable 
at any time to honour the convertibility guarantee) and affect the stability 
and integrity of the payment system. They often become a matter of public 
interest. Bank resolution procedures ought to take into account the specialty 
of banks and the specialty of bank failures. This is the background behind the 
case for a special resolution regime.
The case for lex specialis with regard to bank insolvency can be further 
supported by the existence of specific goals. Corporate insolvency laws 
typically seek to fulfil two principal objectives: fair and predictable treatment 
of creditors and maximisation of assets of the debtor in the interests of 
creditors. However, the main goals in a bank insolvency proceeding are the 
safety and soundness of the financial system at large and the integrity of the 
payment systems. Furthermore, the prompt payment to depositors as well as 
minimising the costs to the insurance funds, are also mentioned as important 
considerations (certainly in the USA
13). 
The role of creditors is more active in general insolvency (see Eva Hüpkes, 
2003)
14. They can initiate the insolvency proceeding and can act individually 
(right to be heard) or collectively (creditor committees). Bank supervisors 
typically have the powers to commence the insolvency proceedings.
In banking, the definition of insolvency (the trigger point for an insolvency 
proceeding) is sometimes a matter of controversy. As acknowledged, there 
are two traditional definitions of insolvency in commercial bankruptcy laws: 
failure to pay obligations as they fall due (equitable insolvency) and the 
condition when liabilities exceed assets (balance sheet insolvency). As stated 
above, in banking the line of demarcation between illiquidity (lack of liquid 
funds) and insolvency is not always clear (indeed, a situation of illiquidity can 
13  FDICIA Section 131 on PCA says, “The purpose of this section is to resolve the problems of 
insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund.”
14  See Hüpkes, E. (2003), ‘Insolvency – Why a Special Regime for Banks’, in Current 
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.142 The case for Lex Specialis
quickly turn into insolvency). An economically insolvent bank is not always 
declared legally insolvent by the responsible authorities and may be offered 
instead financial assistance.
A bank is considered to have failed when the competent authorities order the 
cessation in its operations and activities. However, the authorities are often 
wary of liquidating a bank (in part because an ‘orderly liquidation of assets’ is 
not always easy, due to the possible contagion effect on other institutions) and 
therefore choose instead to rehabilitate the bank. As a matter of ‘good policy’, 
the bank should be closed as soon as the market value of its net worth reaches 
zero, because at this moment, direct losses are only suffered by shareholders. 
If the bank is declared legally insolvent when the market value of its net worth 
is already negative, losses will accrue not only to shareholders, but also to 
uninsured creditors and/or to the insurance fund/the government.
In recent years PCA (prompt corrective action) rules, including SEIR (structured 
early intervention and resolution) have been advocated. In the USA, these 
rules (including the trigger ratios) are mandatory and legally binding since the 
enactment of FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act) in 1991. PCA rules are only effective if they are enshrined in the law, in 
particular the mandate to initiate early closure when the bank still has capital 
(even if it is critically undercapitalized). As Goodhart (2004) points out, ‘the 
window of opportunity between closing a bank so early that the owners may sue 
and so late that the depositors may sue may have become vanishingly small’.
15
Insolvency proceedings typically imply liquidation or reorganization (some 
times they are carried sequentially, that is liquidation proceedings will only run 
their course if reorganization is unlikely to be successful or if reorganization 
efforts have failed). Since the failure of a bank is often a matter of public 
interest and can cause a disruption in the payment system if not properly 
handled, and since the bank supervisor has the power to initiate insolvency, 
bank insolvency proceedings exhibit idiosyncratic features.
Though liquidation is the simplest resolution procedure, it is not necessarily 
the least costly, as a valuable depositor base gets dissipated, vital banking 
services in a community may be disrupted, and confidence in the banking 
system may be seriously damaged. In banking, liquidation some times entails 
a system of depositor preference, i.e., depositors’ claims are typically paid 
15 See Goodhart, C., “Multiple Regulators and Resolutions” paper presented at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank 
Insolvencies, 30 September – 1 October 2004.143 The case for Lex Specialis
before those of general creditors. If the country has a deposit guarantee 
scheme, the insured depositors are paid off up to the insurance limit; uninsured 
depositors and other creditors are likely to suffer losses in their claims. 
In the case of bank rehabilitation, reorganisation or restructuring, the laws 
and the terminology vary widely from country to country. Sometimes, failed 
banks may be placed under special administration, in the form of bridge 
banks, new banks, special funds or other arrangements. This is often meant to 
be a temporary solution in order to take over the operations of a failed bank 
and preserve its going-concern value while the government fiduciary seeks 
a more permanent solution to the problems or until an acquirer is found. 
In some cases an implicit or explicit ‘too big to fail’ policy is applied. That was 
the case in Continental Illinois in the USA and in Credit Lyonnais in France. 
Government-led rescue packages may not only induce moral hazard behaviour, 
but may also pose questions of fair competition, particularly when the 
too-big-to-fail doctrine is applied, as other smaller or less troubled institutions 
may have to navigate through crises or problems on their own. In the US, 
FDICIA (1991) requires the resolution of bank failures on a ‘least cost basis’ to 
the insurance fund, unless it threatens to trigger a payment system breakdown or 
serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability (systemic 
risk exception, Section 141 FDICIA) in which case FDIC and Fed may 
recommend a more costly solution (FDICIA, 12 USC 1823 (c)(4).
In the recent case of Bear Stearns in the US (and leaving aside the fact that 
Bear Stearns was an investment bank rather than a commercial bank), the 
test applied by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was not ‘too big to 
fail’ but ‘too inter-connected’ to be allowed to fail suddenly at a time when 
markets are fragile. This ‘new’ test brings about important considerations 
for European and international policy-makers and regulators working on 
cross-border issues in a single market in financial services.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision acknowledges that in 
a market economy, failures are part of risk-taking and that a prompt and 
orderly liquidation of institutions that are no longer able to meet supervisory 
requirements is a necessary part of an efficient financial system, as 
forbearance normally leads to worsening problems and higher resolution 
costs. However, the Committee explicitly states that “in some cases the best 
interests of depositors may be served by some form of restructuring, possibly 
takeover by a stronger institution or injection of new capital or shareholder. 
Supervisors may be able to facilitate such outcomes. It is essential that the end 144
result fully meets all supervisory requirements that are realistically achievable 
in a short and determinate timeframe and, that, in the interim, depositors are 
protected”.
 16
5.  Who is to blame for the Northern Rock episode?
To apportion blame, one needs to look at the general credit turmoil on the one 
hand and to the specific problems of Northern Rock (or specific problems of 
other institutions) on the other hand. With regard to the former, some economists 
say that the mis-pricing of risk (Greenspan put) is the causa remota. Others 
would point to macro-economic imbalances. The credit turmoil, though 
certainly related to under-pricing of risk and macro-economic considerations, 
is also the result of the folly and greed of bankers and the impotence (and 
some times incompetence) of regulators. This of course, becomes aggravated 
in a general downturn of the business and economic cycle, when a banking 
crisis is not an isolated event, but becomes a generalised credit crisis.
5.1. The Bank of England
Mervyn King in his testimony in front of the Treasury Select Committee 
(20 September 2007) cited a number of legal obstacles that had made it 
impossible for the Bank to act as lender of last resort in the way the Bank 
would have preferred. In particular, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
and the 2004 Market Abuse Directive (as implemented under section 118 of 
the FSMA) were cited as significant reasons why the Bank had been unable 
to avert the run on Northern Rock.
17 The governor said that he would have 
16  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(Basel Core Principles), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc102.pdf, Accessed 20
th April 2008.
17 See  The Times, 21 September 2007 pages 6– 7. The claim that the assistance could not be 
covert is questionable in my opinion. A different interpretation of the Market Abuse Directive (in 
particular Article 6) and a dispensation of its more stringent implementation in the UK would have 
rendered the covert assistance possible in my opinion an in the opinion of other commentators, 
such as Charles Proctor. As Proctor (mimeo, 2008) points out: “The core provisions of the 
Directive have been transposed into UK law by the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules 
(“DTR”) of the FSA’s Handbook. (…) It should be emphasised that the disclosure requirements 
do not directly apply to the Bank of England; they only apply to publicly listed entities – such 
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preferred to give covert aid to Northern Rock, without the public being aware 
of the Bank’s intervention, but that would have been illegal. He pointed to 
Article 6 of MAD, which states that “an issuer [such as Northern Rock] may 
under his own responsibility delay the public disclosure of inside information 
[such as support from the Bank of England] ... such as not to prejudice his 
legitimate interests provided that such omission would not be likely to mislead 
the public and provided that the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of 
that information”. Legitimate interests include “the event that the financial 
viability of the issuer is in grave and imminent danger”. ‘In any event, and 
whatever the merits of the competing views on the Directive, it is singularly 
unfortunate that a measure designed to promote investor confidence has 
apparently helped to precipitate blind panic and the first run on a UK bank 
for over a century’. (Charles Proctor).
With regard to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), it is important to 
differentiate between market liquidity and lending to individual institutions 
(collateralized credit lines at penalty rates for illiquid but solvent banks, 
‘lender of last resort’).
18 Back in August-September 2007 the Bank of 
England was somehow more reluctant than the Federal Reserve System and 
the European Central Bank to extend liquidity to the markets and to widen 
the range of collateral acceptable in its lending policies. However, with 
the announcement by the Bank of England of a Special Liquidity Scheme 
on 21 April 2008
19, offering to swap mortgage-backed and other securities 
(around £  50Bn) for UK Treasury Bills, the Bank has arguably gone further 
than the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank in extending liquidity 
to the markets. The swaps represent purchases of the assets from banks with 
a legally-binding commitment from the banks to buy them back after one 
year, extendable by the Bank to three years.
20
therefore directly inhibit the Bank of England in the conduct of its “lender of last resort” function. 
Nevertheless, the point would clearly have been a concern to the Board of Northern Rock. The 
difficulty here is that, whilst the FSA’s guidance allows an issuer to delay release of information 
about negotiations to restructure its debt, it does not allow it to defer disclosure of the fact that it is 
in financial difficulties. If this distinction appears curious, it must be recalled that the spirit of the 
rules is to promote early disclosure. The FSA has power to modify the disclosure rules in particular 
cases, and it may well be that a short-term dispensation could have been granted on the basis that 
a run on Northern Rock might have wider consequences for the financial system. It is not clear 
whether this option was considered or could have been used in this particular situation’. 
18 See Lastra, R. (1999), Lender of Last Resort, an International Perspective”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 48, pp. 340–361 and Lastra (2006), Legal Foundations 
of International Monetary Stability, Oxford University Press, pp 304–307 and 117–120.
19  See Bank of England, News Release, Special Liquidity Scheme, 21 April 2008 http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2008/029.htm , Accessed 20th April 2008.
20 See Financial Times, 22 April 2008. However, it is worth pondering about the following 
warning: ‘Public liquidity is an imperfect substitute for private liquidity’, that Federal Reserve 146 Who is to blame for the Northern Rock episode?
5.2. The FSA 
In its report, the Run on the Rock, the Treasury Committee says the 
Financial Services Authority was guilty of a ‘systematic failure of duty’ 
over the Northern Rock crisis and that the FSA should have spotted the 
bank’s ‘reckless’ business plan.
In its own internal audit of 26 March 2008, the Financial Services Authority 
admits failures in its supervision of Northern Rock (mea culpa). The Internal 
Audit review identifies the following four key failings specifically in the case 
of Northern Rock: (1) a lack of sufficient supervisory engagement with the 
firm, in particular the failure of the supervisory team to follow up rigorously 
with the management of the firm on the business model vulnerability arising 
from changing market conditions; (2) a lack of adequate oversight and 
review by FSA line management of the quality, intensity and rigour of the 
firm’s supervision; (3) inadequate specific resource directly supervising the 
firm, and (4) a lack of intensity by the FSA in ensuring that all available risk 
information was properly utilized to inform its supervisory actions’.
21
An operational review will address these weaknesses, The main features of 
the FSA’s supervisory enhancement program are the following: (1) A new 
group of supervisory specialists will regularly review the supervision of 
all high-impact firms to ensure procedures are being rigorously adhered to; 
(2) The numbers of supervisory staff engaged with high-impact firms will be 
increased, with a mandated minimum level of staffing for each firm; (3) The 
existing specialist prudential risk department of the FSA will be expanded 
following its upgrading to divisional status, as will the resource of the relevant 
sector teams; (4) The current supervisory training and competency framework 
for FSA staff will be upgraded. (5) The degree of FSA senior management 
involvement in direct supervision and contact with high-impact firms will 
be increased. (5) There will be more focus on liquidity, particularly in the 
supervision of high-impact retail firms. (6) There will be raised emphasis on 
assessing the competence of firms’ senior management.
22 
Governor Kevin Warsh was quoted saying. See Financial Times of 15 April 2008, ‘Fed warns of 
slow healing for fragile markets’. 
21 See FSA Internal Audit Review, 26 March 2008, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/ 
Communication/PR/2008/028.shtml, Accessed 20
th April 2008.
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5.3. Northern Rock 
In its Report, the Run on the Rock, the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee stated that the directors of Northern Rock were ‘the principal 
authors of the difficulties’ that Northern Rock has faced since August 2007. 
‘The high-risk, reckless business strategy of Northern Rock, with its reliance 
on short and medium-term wholesale funding and an absence of sufficient 
insurance and a failure to (…) cover that risk, meant that it was unable to cope 
with the liquidity pressures placed upon it by the freezing of international 
capital markets in August 2007’.
23 
Northern Rock was not a victim of the subprime crisis but of its own funding 
structure. The credit squeeze in August 2007 following the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the United States
24, caused serious liquidity problems in 
many banks that had come to rely on wholesale capital markets (markets for 
securitized assets) for their funding needs. Northern Rock suffered more than 
others because it was heavily reliant on such markets at a time when they 
were drying out.
5.4. Tripartite arrangement 
Why did the Tripartite arrangement fail in Northern Rock? Certainly the 
three authorities involved should share the blame. The lack of effective 
and timely communication, the apparent lack of a clear leadership structure 
(shared power leading to muddled policy), together with the uncertainties 
surrounding the resolution procedures (questions of EU law, timing etc) and 
an ill-designed deposit insurance system contributed to the debacle.
The Tripartite arrangement is a good structure to respond to the problems of 
transferring supervision from the central bank (Bank of England) to a separate 
supervisory agency (FSA), while keeping the Treasury involved. However, the 
23 See  The Run on the Rock, above note 7, paragraph 31, pp. 19–20.
24 It can be argued that the relaxation of the clear boundaries between commercial banking 
and investment banking that the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall (via the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act) in the US, paved the way for banks to engage in a broader range of activities in the capital 
markets. See Randall Wray, L., ‘Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown’, 2008 at www.levy.org/
pubs.wp_522.pdf 
Securitisation allowed banks to earn income on the mortgage loans they originated, by moving 
these [some times risky] mortgages off their balance sheets to their affiliated investment banks 
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wisdom of separating the monetary and supervisory responsibility of the central 
bank remains a matter of controversy. Given that supervision is a key instrument 
in the maintenance of financial stability, depriving the central bank of this 
instrument, makes the pursuit of the goal of financial stability more difficult.
5.5. International Rules on Insolvency
25
Though there is no international treaty on insolvency law, there have however 
been some attempts at reaching some commonly agreed international rules 
(mostly ‘soft law’). The Basle Committee has addressed throughout its 
33 years of existence various issues concerning the allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities (home-host), capital regulation and other principles for the 
effective supervision of international banks. However, the Basel Committee 
provides little guidance concerning bank exit policies and the problems 
involved in the resolution of cross-border banking crises. 
26
UNCITRAL (the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) 
adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in Vienna in May 
1997. However, this model law contains an optional clause whereby special 
insolvency regimes applicable to banks may be excluded from its scope.
27 
The Model law deals with the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, 
the co-operation between judicial authorities and administrators and other 
issues concerning the coordination of concurrent insolvency proceedings in 
multiple jurisdictions.
In 1999, UNCITRAL commenced work on the Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law, considering corporate insolvency. Work proceeded through 
a joint colloquium with INSOL (a world-wide federation of national 
associations for accountants and lawyers who specialize in insolvency) and 
the IBA. The Legislative Guide was completed in 2004 and adopted by the 
United National General Assembly on 2 December 2004.
28
25 See generally Lastra, R., Cross Border Resolution of Banking Crises’ in Evanoff, D., 
LaBrosse, R., and Kaufman, G., International Financial Instability: Global Banking and National 
Regulation, Vol. 2, published by World Scientific Publishing Company Pte Ltd, Singapore in 2007, 
pp. 311–330.
26 In 1992, the Basel Committee published a document on The Insolvency Liquidation of 
a Multinational Bank. 
27 Article 1(2) of the Uncitral Model Law.
28 The text of UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law is available at http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html. 149 Who is to blame for the Northern Rock episode?
The World Bank has coordinated the effort of the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide with its own Global Bank Insolvency Initiative to articulate a set of 
standards on insolvency and creditor rights for the purposes of the Bank/
Fund initiative on Standards and Codes. Accordingly, the World Bank, 
in collaboration with staff of the Fund and UNCITRAL (United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law) and other experts, has prepared 
a document, setting out a unified Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard 
(the “ICR Standard”), which integrates the World Bank Principles for 
Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems (one of the twelve areas 
under the joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund initiative on 
standards and codes) and the UNCITRAL Recommendations (included in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency). This document was published 
on 21 December 2005. 
UNCITRAL Working Group V on insolvency has started working on the 
treatment of corporate groups in insolvency in 2006, examining both domestic 
and cross border issues. This could be the right forum to develop common 
principles concerning bank insolvency.
A recent welcome development is the establishment of a new Basel 
Working Group – set up in December 2007 – and co-chaired by Michael 
Krimminger and Eva Hüpkes to study the resolution of cross-border banks. 
This group working together with UNCITRAL could provide a degree of 
harmonization (legislative convergence) with regard to some key issues such 
as: the definition of triggers for commencement of proceedings, the role of 
supervisors, minimum rights and obligations of debtors and creditors, right 
to set-off, netting, treatment of financial contract and the protection of the 
payment system.150
6.  Regional rules: The EU Insolvency Regime
The EU insolvency regime consists of one regulation on insolvency 
proceedings (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000) 
and of two directives: a directive on the reorganisation and winding up of 
credit institutions (Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001), and a directive 
concerning the reorganisation and winding-up of insurance undertakings 
(Directive 2001/17/EC of 19 March 2001).
The EU insolvency regime is binding for all EU Member States. As such, 
the EU regime is the clearest example of binding supranational/regional 
rules in the field of insolvency law in general and of bank insolvency law 
in particular. However, the EU rules are mainly of a private international 
law character. They introduce the principles of unity and universality of 
bankruptcy, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the home Member State, 
but they do not seek to harmonise in a substantive way national legislation 
concerning insolvency proceedings, which remain different across the 
Member States of the EU. 
Under Directive 2001/24/EC, where a credit institution with branches in other 
Member States is wound up or reorganised, the winding up or reorganisation 
is initiated and carried out under a single procedure by the authorities of 
the Member State where the credit institution has been authorised (known 
as the home Member State). This procedure is governed by the law of the 
home Member State. This approach is consistent with the principle of home 
Member State supervision pursuant to the EU Banking Directives. 
The Directive does not aim at harmonising national legislation, but at ensuring 
mutual recognition of Member States’ reorganisation measures and winding 
up proceedings as well as the necessary cooperation between authorities. 
Due to the mere coordinating nature of the Directive, Member States have 
different reorganisation measures and winding up proceedings. Consequently, 
insolvency proceedings for credit institutions differ. Some Member States 
use the same general company and insolvency law for the reorganisation and 
winding up of credit institutions as for other businesses, while others have 
special reorganisation proceedings for credit institutions.151 Regional rules: The EU Insolvency Regime
The Directive covers only the insolvency of branches of credit institutions in 
other Member States, but does not cover subsidiaries of banking groups in 
other Member States.
Directive 2001/24/EC is limited to procedural aspects concerning each legal 
entity within a cross border banking group. This limited scope does not 
allow taking into account synergies within such a group, which may benefit 
all creditors in case of reorganisation. This lack of group-wide approach to 
winding up and reorganisation could lead to the failure of subsidiaries or 
even the group, which could otherwise have been reorganised and remained 
solvent in whole or part.
The October 2007 ECOFIN conclusions called for an enhancement of the 
arrangements for financial stability in the EU and a review of the tools 
for crisis prevention, management and resolution, including a revision of 
the Directive reorganization and winding up of credit institutions
29 and 
a clarification of the Deposit Guarantee Directive. The aim of the ongoing 
public consultation launched by the Commission with regard to the Winding 
Up Directive for credit institutions is to examine whether the Directive 
completely fulfils its objectives, whether it could be extended to cross border 
banking groups, and how obstacles related to asset transferability within such 
groups can be addressed.
Given the differences in bankruptcy laws in the Member States of the EU, 
large banking institutions and financial conglomerates could be incorporated 
as Societas Europeae (as Nordea proposed) and a special insolvency regime 
could apply to them.
29 Consultation on the re-organisation and winding-up of credit institutions http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/bank/windingup/index_en.htm, Accessed 20
th April 2008152
7.  Recent International Initiatives
A number of international initiatives have addressed the current credit 
crisis. The Financial Stability Forum published a report on 12 April 2008 
on actions to enhance market and institutional resilience,
30 including the 
use of international colleges of supervisors for each of the largest global 
financial institutions. The IIF (Institute of International Finance) released on 
9 April 2008 a Report of its Special Committee on Market Best Practices, an 
effort in self-regulation.
31 The Basel Committee announced on 16 April 2008 
a number of steps to strengthen the resilience of the banking system.
32 
Other efforts stem from the USA (the cradle of the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis), such as the [US] President’s Working Group, a committee of US 
regulators and financial officials that recently issued a policy statement with 
recommendations to improve future state of financial markets.
33 US Treasury 
Secretary Tim Geithner has outlined in recent months a number of supervisory 
and regulatory reforms. The G-20 in its meetings in November 2008 and April 
2009, proposed reforms of the International Monetary Fund and Financial 
Stability Forum (renamed after the G-20 London meeting as Financial 
Stability Board) in response to the crisis. These proposals were all published 
after this contribution was substantially completed and, thus, they will not be 
analysed further here. The author of this paper has been acting as Specialist 
Adviser to the House of Lords Sub-Committee A of the European Union 
Committee since November 2008 with regard to its inquiry into EU financial 
regulation and supervision and responses to the financial crisis. The report 
to be published in June 2009 covers the most relevant EU and international 
initiatives over the last months (including M de Larosière Report).
All these initiatives are commendable. They should lead to an overhaul of the 
regulatory system. A final note of caution, though, against the temptation to 
over-regulate. It is important to establish a system of incentives that corrects 
30  Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, 
7 April 2008 http://www.fsforum.org/publications/FSF_Report_to_G7_11_April.pdf, Accessed 
28
th April 2008.
31  IIF Committee on Market Best Practices Interim Report, 9 April 2008 http://www.iif.com/ 
Accessed 28
th April 2008.
32 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BCBS press release on steps to strengthen the 
resilience of the banking system, BIS Press Releases 16 April 2008, http://www.bis.org/press/
p080416.htm, Accessed 28
th April 2008. 
33 President’s Working Group Issues Policy Statement To Improve Future State of Financial 
Markets, 13 March 2008 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp871.htm , Accessed 28
th April 2008.153 Recent International Initiatives
the excesses of the last years (in a system in which gains were privatized 
while losses have become socialized
34). However, it is also important to 
preserve innovation and flexibility.
8. Postscript
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) published on 18 March 2009 the 
Turner Review of global banking regulation. Lord Turner, chairman of the 
FSA, was asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the events that 
led to the financial crisis and to recommend reforms. The Review identifies 
three underlying causes of the crisis - macro-economic imbalances, financial 
innovation of little social value and important deficiencies in key bank capital 
and liquidity regulations. These were underpinned by an exaggerated faith in 
rational and self correcting markets. It stresses the importance of regulation 
and supervision being based on a system-wide “macro-prudential” approach 
rather than focusing solely on specific firms. It recommends fundamental 
changes to bank capital and liquidity regulations and to bank published 
accounts; more and higher quality bank capital, with several times as much 
capital required to support risky trading activity; counter-cyclical capital 
buffers, building up in good economic times so that they can be drawn 
on in downturns, and reflected in published account estimates of future 
potential losses; much tighter regulation of liquidity; regulation of “shadow 
banking” activities and increased reporting requirements for unregulated 
financial institutions such as hedge funds, and regulator powers to extend 
capital regulation; regulation of Credit Rating Agencies to limit conflicts 
of interest and inappropriate application of rating techniques; national and 
international action to ensure that remuneration policies are designed to 
discourage excessive risk-taking. Though the Review largely endorses most 
of the recommendations of the De Larosière Report, it proposes one authority 
instead of three to exercise pan-European supervisory duties.
35
On 30 March 2009, the Bank of England announced that core parts of 
Dunfermline Building Society were being transferred to Nationwide Building 
Society. Dunfermline’s retail and wholesale deposits, branches, head office 
34  See Martin Wolf, ‘Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed’, Financial Times, 16 January 2008.
35 See  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf154 Postscript
and originated residential mortgages (other than social housing loans and 
related deposits) had all been transferred to Nationwide. This followed a sale 
process conducted by the Bank of England over the weekend of 28-29 March 
under the Special Resolution Regime provisions of the Banking Act 2009.
36
36 See  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/030.htm157
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1. Introduction
In this paper I shall take the causes, developments and economic consequences of 
the financial dislocations of the last six months as given and generally understood, 
having already written extensively on this subject, in a more academic vein in the 
Journal of International Economics and Economic Policy and in a more popular 
format in the February, 2008, issue of Prospect. Instead I want to turn to the 
regulatory implications, and official responses, of this continuing event. Being 
British, this inevitably focuses primarily on issues pertaining to the UK.
Anyhow, I reckon that there are at least seven fields of regulatory concern where 
the recent turmoil has thrown up major issues for discussion. These are:
•  Deposit Insurance;
•  Bank Insolvency Regimes, a.k.a. ‘prompt corrective action’;
•  Money market operations by Central Banks;
•  Liquidity Risk Management;
•  Procyclicality in CARs, i.e. Basel II, and general lack of counter-cyclical 
instruments;
•  Boundaries of regulation, Conduits, SIVs and reputational risk;
•  Crisis management:
o within countries, Tripartite Committee
o cross-border
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2. Deposit  Insurance
A question that is too rarely asked is “What is the purpose of deposit 
insurance?” In fact there are two quite distinct purposes. The first is to allow 
an insured institution (a bank) to be closed by the authorities with less social 
hardship and less consequential political fuss. This can, it is widely thought, 
be done by insuring all small deposits 100%, and medium-sized deposits with 
some partial co-insurance up to some limit, or cap. The second is to prevent 
(politically-embarrassing) runs by depositors. This latter requires both 100% 
deposit insurance, and a very rapid pay-out, preferably next working day, to 
succeed.
If a deposit insurance scheme of the second kind is introduced, it will also 
serve to meet the objectives, i.e. facilitating closure, of the first type of 
insurance. But it also carries with it an extra disadvantage, in that it makes 
the character and conduct of her bank of no consequence whatsoever to 
the depositor. Any such 100% insured bank, irrespective of how awful its 
reputation may become, can always meet its bills and stay in business, simply 
by paying marginally over the odds for extra deposits. The moral hazard 
becomes enormous, whereas the partial co-insurance system does not suffer, 
at any rate, to nowhere like the same extent, from that serious disadvantage. 
And it is a serious disadvantage as experience in the USA during the S&L 
crisis and empirical studies from the World Bank have clearly shown, see 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2004), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002).
Anyhow the UK system was clearly of the first kind. It was first introduced 
in 1982, and then revised in 1995 in the aftermath of the BCCI crisis of 1991, 
a bank which clearly had to be shut, but for which the political and legal 
reverberations continued for many years. It was never intended, nor expected, 
to prevent runs, since that was not its purpose. Indeed the likelihood of a bank 
run occurring in this country was not then perceived as a realistic possibility. 
When, nevertheless, such a run occurred, the current deposit insurance 
scheme was immediately dismissed as faulty and insufficient, and the plan 
now is to jump directly to the second kind of scheme, 100% insurance, though 
issues remain on the coverage and possible cap of the scheme. 
There are two problems with this. The first is that the question of what kind of 
DI scheme to have, and its coverage, cap and speed of pay-out, really ought 159
to be European, if not world wide, in answer and resolution. Yet the UK has 
been rushing towards a unilateral conclusion for itself. Apart from being, 
typically, non-communautaire, this is likely to cause grief in the context of an 
increasingly cross-border banking system.
The second is that the, seriously disturbing, impetus to moral hazard that the 
switch from type 1 to type 2 DI scheme brings with it makes it absolutely 
imperative to introduce at the same time arrangements to allow the authorities 
to close ‘bad banks’ before they can pile up potentially huge losses and 
debts to the insurance fund, that is early closure schemes which go under the 
generic name of ‘prompt corrective action’.
Particularly in view of the switch in the category of DI scheme, but even 
without that, Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank has stated, see House 
of Commons Treasury Committee (January 2008, p. 81, Q1608), that the 
introduction of such an early closure, prompt corrective action, scheme is the 
most important reform that needs to be introduced now, and it is to that that 
I now turn.
3.  Bank Insolvency Regimes
Bank insolvency is commonly, perhaps usually, triggered by illiquidity, when 
it fails to meet some contractual payment obligation. But a bank with 100% 
DI can always raise more funding, and only needs to offer a slight premium 
to do so. Alternatively banks, as any other company, become bankrupt when 
an auditor proclaims its liabilities to be in excess of its assets. But before that 
happens, (and a bust, and/or a crooked, bank can defer that lethal audit for 
some considerable time), such a bank will have considerable scope to gamble 
for resurrection, so much so that if the gamble fails – as it usually does – it will 
become a shell, or zombie, bank, and a huge drain on the insurance fund.
But even if the information on such a bank’s failed gambles and woeful state 
should become public knowledge, the equity value of the shares, subject to 
limited liability, must remain positive. There is always some, however small, 
upside potential, and the downside is fixed at zero. In the past our ancestors 
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that all bank shareholders accept an obligation for an extra call equivalent 
to the par value of their shares. Quite why such historical precedents have 
been totally ignored now is not entirely clear to me, but the fact that a large 
proportion by number of Northern Rock shareholders were either bank 
employees or bank clients, or both, suggests that this route would not be 
politically propitious.
This means that a key feature of any bank insolvency regime must involve 
some expropriation of shareholder rights, and, whatever the compensation 
arrangement for shareholders, it is bound to generate either a claim that they 
were robbed of their property, or that the taxpayers were bilked, or, quite 
often, both at the same time. So the key for closure, and the treatment of 
shareholders, is a central issue.
It is, surely, hardly fair to close a bank by fiat without giving those in charge 
an opportunity to rectify the bad state of affairs. In the USA, whose PCA 
system we are largely copying, the trigger is a decline in the capital ratio, on 
a simple leverage basis, below 2%. Under the FDICIA Act of 1991, the bank 
is then allowed a fairly short space of time to recapitalise itself before the 
curtain is brought down.
2
Since the European representatives on the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision have consistently denigrated the use of simple leverage ratios, 
in favour of more risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, the UK could hardly 
import that feature of American practice as the trigger. But the example of 
Northern Rock unfortunately underlines just how poorly the Basel II CAR 
would function as a sole trigger. Instead the joint, (Treasury, Bank, FSA) White 
Paper (Cm 7308, January 2008), proposes a more subjective test (Paragraph 
4.10), covering enhanced risk of failure, exhaustion of earlier attempts at 
rectification, and present danger to the financial system and depositors.
2  “In the extreme, once a bank’s tangible equity ratio falls to 2% or less, they are considered 
to be critically undercapitalized and face not only more stringent restrictions on activities → 
than other undercapitalized banks, but also the appointment of a conservator (receiver) within 
90 days.” (From Aggarwal and Jacques, (2001) p.1142)
“Regulators have even less latitude in dealing with critically undercapitalized (Group 5) 
institutions. The appropriate agency must appoint a receiver or conservator for such firms 
within 90 days, unless that agency and the FDIC decide that prompt corrective action would 
be better served by other means. Institutions cannot make any interest or capital payments on 
their subordinated debt beginning 60 days after being designated critically undercapitalized. 
Furthermore, regulators can prohibit Group 5 entities from opening new lines of business.” (in 
Pike and Thomson, (1992))161 Bank Insolvency Regimes
While such a subjective test is surely sensible, it does carry with it on the 
one hand dangers of forebearance, especially if shareholder litigation is 
an ever-present threat, and on the other concern that bank managers and 
shareholders need to be protected against the uncertain deployment of 
subjective tests. This latter danger is, however, capable of being met by the 
application of FSA Own Initiative Variation of Permission powers as set out 
in Sections 3.3 – 3.13 of the White Paper, whenever the bank’s decline is 
perceived in advance and relatively slow-moving. There may well, however, 
remain a difficulty if, and when, a sudden change in a bank’s condition, caused 
for example by an abrupt adverse shift in markets or by some major fraud, 
causes that bank to move suddenly from ‘alright’ to becoming a systemic risk, 
without having passed through a period of escalating concern. This possibility 
is partly addressed in Sections 3.17 – 3.22, but these relate primarily to 
the FSA obtaining extra urgent information, rather than to the question of 
respective managerial/shareholder rights in such circumstances. 
The more that the judgment to remove the management, and take control 
away from the shareholders, has to be subjective, the greater must be the 
concern about due process and judicial review. It is certainly right that the 
basic decision should be taken by the FSA, but only after consultation with 
the Bank and the Treasury, (Section 4.9), and that there are satisfactory 
appeal mechanisms (Section 4.18). That same latter Section states that the 
Government would “also provide the arrangements to ensure the fundamental 
rights of shareholders – including the shareholders and counterparties of the 
failing bank – [would be] protected”, but how this might be done is not yet 
spelt out. My own recipe would be to require the authorities to auction off 
any such bank within five years, or less, and then allocate the proceedings 
to stake holders in order of seniority. If circumstances plausibly prevented 
such an auction, the government would be required to pay debt holders in 
full and shareholders the value of their equity as of the day of the transfer of 
ownership.
There are some consequential operational issues. Thus, under most 
circumstances, such a failing bank will not be liquidated and closed, but will 
rather continue and live on in a government-recapitalised bridge bank format. 
This raises the issues of how the authorities can set up such a successor 
bridge bank, and obtain appropriate management for it, quickly enough to 
provide continuity of essential banking functions. Sections 4.20 – 4.32 of 
the January White Paper contain some interesting proposals. Both US and 
Scandinavian experience, in the latter’s crisis in the early 1990s, suggest that 
such operational problems should be manageable. 162
There is also the tricky question of running such a, government-owned, 
bridge bank efficiently and profitably, but without triggering accusations 
of public-sector subsidy or of taking unfair competitive advantage from its 
default risk-free status. On this topic, I welcome the proposal “to consult with 
the European Commission and the Competition Commission to ensure that 
any new [special] resolution [regime] proposals are compliant with state aid 
rules and competition law”.
Finally there are some administrative issues. In the USA bank closure is 
handled by a separate institution, the FDIC, but this has no counterpart in 
the UK, with the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) being 
a post-box rather than an administrative body. The question then arises 
whether a new institution to manage such bank restructuring should be 
established, perhaps by building up the FSCS, or whether such extra tasks 
should be allocated either to the FSA or the Bank. In the event the government 
has decided to choose the FSA for this responsibility, and that strikes me as 
the obvious solution within the UK context.
4.  Money Market Operations
The retail depositors’ run on Northern Rock was specific to the UK, and 
hence has led to an immediate regulatory response here, on deposit insurance 
and bank insolvency regimes. But the drying-up, in some extreme cases the 
closure, of inter-bank and other wholesale funding markets has been common 
amongst virtually all developed countries. Particularly given the erosion, 
almost evaporation, of bank holdings of easily saleable assets, notably public 
sector assets, this rapidly forced the banking system into the arms of their 
respective central banks to obtain the liquidity, previously provided by the 
wholesale markets.
This led to several difficulties. First, the closure of the wholesale markets 
impacted differentially on banks, depending on whether they were intrinsic net 
borrowers or net lenders on such markets. The standard mechanism of Central 
Bank liquidity injection had them using open market operations of various 
kinds to provide sufficient cash on average to maintain the short-term policy 
rate of interest. Thereafter banks still short of cash could obtain additional 163 Money Market Operations
funds at the upper band of the corridor, the discount window, or standing 
facility, typically 1% above the policy rate, (while banks replete with cash 
could deposit with their Central Bank at a rate typically 1% below the policy 
rate). The problem that arose, though more so in some monetary areas than 
others, was that in these circumstances such borrowing at the upper bound, 
if and when perceived, was taken by commentators as a serious signal of 
weakness, and thereby carried a stigma of reputational risk. Such reputational 
risk was even greater when using Emergency Liquidity Assistance or Lender 
of Last Resort actions.
This stigma effect has serious consequences for the continuing conduct both 
of the corridor system, and for individual ELA/LOLR actions. The suggestion 
that the Bank of England’s support exercises be made less transparent (White 
Paper Sections 3.36 – 3.49) is hardly consistent with the temper of the times, 
and is anyhow of uncertain success. The question of how to neutralise this 
stigma effect remains largely unanswered at present. Since it is of international 
concern it is being considered, I believe, by the Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS) at the BIS in Basel.
The next problem was that the main shortage of funding occurred at the one 
to three month horizon. The authorities’ usual task is to provide enough cash 
to meet immediate needs, and this, with a few hiccups, they did throughout. 
On average overnight rates were kept below the policy rate. Indeed, at times 
the banking systems were characterised as being ‘awash with cash’. Instead, 
the main problem was that banks could see additional funding requirements 
falling on them in coming months, e.g. the need to replace withdrawals of 
asset-backed commercial paper, at a time when they could not raise such 
term-lending in wholesale markets. This meant that banks wanted to borrow 
from Central Banks at such longer maturities; this was a novel situation. After 
a short learning period, the Central Banks responded by offering some version 
of longer-term auction facility (TAF). Another wrinkle was that the banks’ 
wishes for such term lending often exceeded the cash requirement to keep 
overnight rates in line with the policy rate. So the term lending injection of 
cash had to be combined by mopping-up, withdrawing cash at the very short 
end, an ‘Operation Twist’ indeed. Since the main Central Banks intervened in 
somewhat different ways in this respect, we can look forward to analysis of 
what worked and what did so less well.
In my view a more serious issue is what collateral a Central Bank should 
accept? During the crisis several such Central Banks were pressured by 
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their holdings of public sector debt in recent decades, into accepting private 
sector assets, such as residential mortgages, of somewhat lower quality as 
collateral. Does this matter? What limits the collateral that a Central Bank 
should accept? Commercial banks benefit from liquidity transformation; is it 
proper for commercial banks to take all the upside benefit from such liquidity 
transformation leaving the Central Bank to protect against all downside 
liquidity risks?
One aspect of liquidity is the extent of price impact arising from sales of that 
asset on its secondary market. One reason why public sector debt is liquid 
is because their secondary markets are resilient with little price impact. In 
so far as secondary markets for property-based assets, whether underlying 
or derivative, exist at all, they are less liquid is because the potential price 
impact is much greater. This raises the question of what extent of hair-cut, or 
discount, a Central Bank should require in order to accept such lower-grade 
private sector assets as collateral. If the hair cut would need to be massive, 
in order to protect a Central Bank from any credit risk, then either a Central 
Bank has to assume some such risk or be able to offer relatively less assistance 
when such paper is proffered as collateral.
Anyhow the financial turmoil was initially perceived as almost entirely 
a function of illiquidity, though illiquidity and insolvency are always 
intertwined, usually inextricably so. The conclusion that has been widely 
drawn, and which I share, is that commercial bank liquidity has been run 
down too far. A problem here is that regulatory requirements to hold more 
liquid assets, especially with the designation of minimum standards, are 
largely self-defeating, since assets which are required to be held, and cannot 
be run down in a crisis, are not liquid. A minimum required liquid assets ratio 
is an oxymoron. What we need instead is incentives for banks to hold more 
liquid assets in good times so that they can be run down in bad times. But 
how do you organise that?
Overall, as I have noted elsewhere, this crisis was fairly well forecast. For 
various reasons systemic liquidity had been excessive for most years, since 
about 2002, allowing a credit pyramid to develop. At some point an abrupt 
reversal was likely. Central Banks and international financial intermediaries, 
such as the BIS, issued warnings, but were, or felt, otherwise unable to do 
anything about it. What we do not need is more early warning systems, more 
or alternative institutions to the existing Financial Stability Forum (FSF) at 
the BIS. What we do need is contra-cyclical control mechanisms, instruments, 165
that allow the monetary authorities to do something about fluctuations in 
liquidity conditions.
The policy interest rate is predicated to the control of goods and services 
prices in the medium run. A feature of the years 2002-6 was that such goods 
and services prices remained restrained, at a time when liquidity was seen to 
be becoming excessive. In the euro-zone the monetary aggregates, the much 
derided Pillar 2, did perhaps provide a measure of that in the years 2004-6, but 
not so in the USA. Anyhow the short-term idiosyncrasies of the demand for 
money function are too great for comfort. Meanwhile risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirements, i.e. Basel II, are, as I shall remark next, pro, not 
contra, cyclical. So neither interest rates, nor Pillar 2, nor Basel II, provides us 
with a contra-cyclical instrument for offsetting major fluctuations in liquidity 
conditions. I have myself tried my hand at devising such an instrument. It is 
perhaps too wacky and idiosyncratic to be discussed here, but something like 
it, only much better, is badly needed.
5.  Procyclicality in CARs
Several of the main trends in the regulatory and accounting systems of the last 
decade have served to exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of our financial system. 
The risk of default undeniably worsens in a recession. More companies and 
mortgages will go bust in 2008 than in 2006. Credit ratings, whether internal or 
set by ratings agencies, will become downgraded, and rightly so. Meanwhile 
asset prices fall, both on primary and secondary markets. Where no such 
market exists, auditors, scared of future legal challenge, may feel forced 
to take a more conservative view. The combination of more risk-sensitive 
methods of applying CARs and mark-to-market valuations are imparting 
a strong upwards ratchet to the procyclicality of our system. Attempts to 
mitigate this syndrome, e.g. by proposing that credit ratings be made on 
a through-the-cycle basis, are unlikely to help much, if only because during 
the boom years it is to everyone’s current benefit to adopt a point-in-time 
approach, and competition will ensure that that happens. Of course, for some 
time stress tests, re-running the 2007/8 experience, will prevent an exact 
re-run of that occurrence, but the range of potential self-amplifying financial 166 Procyclicality in CARs
crises is not only beyond the range of imagination, but if extended indefinitely 
in multitudes of stress tests could stifle financial intermediation.
These current developments, Basel II and mark-to-market accounting, have 
many eminent virtues. They clearly give each bank a much clearer, and better 
defined, picture of its own individual risk position. They will serve, and have 
served, to make banks more conscious of risk analysis. The problem is that the 
purpose of regulation should be to contain the systemic risks, the possibility 
of contagion, the externalities of the system as a whole, not so much to make 
each individual bank address risk more sensibly. The systemic problem is 
that the actions of each individual bank impinges on all other banks. For 
reasons that Keynes expounded, there is a natural tendency anyhow towards 
herd-like behaviour, and this is now only further encouraged by regulatory 
requirements. My colleagues here at the Financial Market Group, Jon 
Danielsson and Hyun Shin, have coined the phrase ‘endogenous risk’ to 
cover the self-amplifying nature of interactions amongst banks, investment 
houses and other intermediaries. Our warning is that these recent regulatory 
and accounting measures have, despite having the very best of intentions, 
inadvertently but significantly reinforced such endogenous risk.
The need is to make the system as a whole more stable, not so much to 
enhance risk awareness amongst individual banks. As you may have read in 
the FT in early February, the proposal that Avinash Persaud and I put forward 
was to switch the basis of CARs more from levels of risk-weighted assets to 
their rates of growth. Thus our aim is to lean against both the bubble and the 
bust, both of the system and of individual institutions, by requiring additional 
capital and liquidity when bank lending and asset prices were rising fast, and 
relaxing such requirements in the downturn.
That proposal certainly has numerous technical problems, for example over 
what periods should such applicable growth rates be calculated. But there is 
one immediate issue that I want to consider now. This is that our proposal 
would significantly raise the capital charge on banks for keeping assets 
on their own books during periods of confidence, perhaps even euphoria, 
and during asset price bubbles. Thus it could greatly reinforce the present, 
somewhat pernicious, tendency towards bank disintermediation during 
upturns and re-intermediation during downturns.167
6.  The Boundaries of the Banking System
We should, however, ask ourselves why that tendency has been so pernicious. 
My own answer to that is that the banking business strategy known as 
‘originate and distribute’ should have been better re-entitled as ‘originate 
and pretend to distribute’. What surprised, and should have shocked, most of 
us was the extent to which banks transferred their assets to vehicles closely 
related to themselves, conduits and SIVs of various kinds, to which they 
were bound, either by legal commitment or by reputational risk, to support 
whenever funding, or other, financial conditions become adverse.
The larger problem, however, is that a key role of banks is to provide a whole 
raft of contingent commitments to clients, in the form of unused overdraft 
facilities, and contingent obligations to capital markets more generally, which 
work on the basis of bank back-up lines. What should be the treatment of such 
contingent commitments, ranging all the way from those to off-balance-sheet 
subsidiaries to rather general commitments to the market as a whole? In 
short what are the boundaries between bank-connected tight relationships 
and more general, looser, commitments to help, always remembering that the 
correlations between calls on such contingent obligations will rise sharply in 
adverse conditions.
It is a large question. One useful approach would be to examine in great 
detail the extent to which legal and reputational requirements did actually 
force certain banks into support actions during the recent turmoil, and what 
happened in other cases. Let me end this Section, however, by noting that, 
whether, or not, our suggestions about applying CARs to growth rates, rather 
than levels, should find favour, the questions of the boundaries of the banking 
system and of the application of CARs to contingent commitments needs 
careful reconsideration in any case.168
7. Crisis  Management
7.1. The UK
Let me end with a few thoughts on the administrative conduct of the 
management of this crisis, turning first to the UK. There is a rather 
unfortunate tendency to assume that if something goes wrong it must involve 
a design fault in the administrative machinery set up to prevent such failure. 
Lack of foresight, lack of information, and human error can overwhelm any 
administrative design, however excellent. Many of the criticisms levelled 
at the UK’s Tripartite Committee seem to me to be unwarranted. Since the 
burden of any recapitalisation has to fall on the Treasury, it must be in charge. 
The idea that this somehow might reduce the independence of the Monetary 
Policy Committee in setting interest rates is ludicrous.
The original establishment of the Tripartite Committee appeared to me to 
be based on the notion that the main danger to be avoided was excessive 
forbearance and an undue willingness to rescue, or bail out. So, as the 
Committee was originally structured, it seemed that each player, FSA, Bank 
and Treasury, was given a separate, individual veto against bail-out. What 
may have happened, though I do not know, was that the Bank was more 
reluctant to assist Northern Rock than the FSA or HMT, but that under the 
existing arrangements the latter two had no clear power to force the Bank 
to adopt their viewpoint. In these kinds of cases it is clear that the elected 
politicians should have ultimate control, but that the action of over-ruling the 
independent technical expert should be constrained by checks and balances.
In Canada there once was such a dispute between Governor Coyne of the 
Bank of Canada and the Treasurer. This was eventually resolved by a new 
legal clause empowering the Treasurer to write a public, open letter to the 
Governor requiring some such, previously disputed, action to be done as the 
Treasurer wishes. On receipt of that letter, the Bank does as it is told, and the 
Governor would be expected to resign immediately. In fact, however, no such 
letter has ever been written. Given the damage it would do to both sides, the 
process serves as an incentive to reach agreement, while nevertheless leaving 
ultimate power to the politicians. That strikes me as a good idea.
The Treasury Select Committee (op. cit, 2008) has put the major blame for 
recent regulatory short-comings on the FSA, for failing to assess the funding/169 Crisis Management
liquidity risks in the Rock’s business plan. That did not surprise me. Any 
primarily supervisory body, like the FSA, is bound to find that the bulk of its 
work involves conduct of business issues, and the dominant professions on 
its staff will be lawyers and accountants. The key issue, however, in systemic, 
contagious externalities will be the interactions via financial markets of the 
banks, the process of endogenous risk. Here the need is for market expertise 
and professional economists, which the Bank has, and partly because of its 
stingy funding base, which the FSA does not, increasingly so as those Bank 
of England staff originally transferred to the FSA retire.
The Treasury appears minded, in the January White Paper, to give the bulk of 
the new proposed powers to the FSA. In the light of the above institutional 
considerations, I wonder if this is wise. I also wonder whether it is sensible to 
put so much emphasis on efficiency in the use of human resources in a field, 
such as systemic financial dislocation, where the costs of getting it wrong can 
be so enormous. Two heads can be better than one. In the USA and in Japan, 
there are overlaps between the supervisory roles of the Central Bank and of 
the specialised supervisory agency. How about the idea of having the major 
banks and investment houses supervised both by the FSA and the Bank, with 
the former concentrating on conduct of business and the latter focussing on 
systemic issues? It might not be tidy, but it could be more effective, perhaps 
especially because it could add some wholesome competition into the scene.
7.2. Cross-Border Issues
The developed world, and especially its financial regulators, have been 
fortunate that there has been no failure of a bank, nor other financial 
institution, involving significant cross-border consequences, at least so far. 
Northern Rock, IKB and Sachsen were all primarily domestic. Since the 
only funding available for recapitalisation remains domestic, no one knows 
how the loss burden arising from the failure of an international, cross-border 
financial institution might be handled. ‘War games’ have led us to believe that 
the exercise could be difficult, messy and protracted, and in a crisis speed is 
usually essential.
It is in this particular field, the treatment and resolution of cross-border failure, 
that we need political understanding and momentum, not in additional early 
warning systems, or further rearrangements of the international administrative 
entities such as the FSF and IMF. Exactly what more could these latter have 
done in the recent turmoil?170 Crisis Management
The problem of how to handle cross-border financial failures in a world of 
national fiscal and legal competences is understood, but not resolved. Dirk 
Schoenmaker and I put forward the idea of countries committing in advance, 
ex ante, to some particular scheme of burden sharing. Some have found that 
too difficult to accept. Again within the European context, in the early 1990s, 
I took part in an exercise to expand the EU’s federal fiscal resources, one use 
of which could have been for the purpose of financing crisis management. 
But that too was turned down flat by several large member countries. I have 
done my best to provide answers to this conundrum; and it has not been good 
enough. Are there other potential answers, or do we have to wait for a bad 
experience to teach us better?171
8. References
Aggarwal, R. and K. T. Jacques, (2001) “The impact of FDICIA and prompt corrective 
action on bank capital and risk: Estimates using a simultaneous equations model”, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 25(6) , pp. 1139–1160. 
Bank of England, H.M. Treasury, FSA, (2008), Financial stability and depositor protection: 
Strengthening the framework, (London: H.M. Treasury Cm 7308), January. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, (2002), ‘Does deposit insurance increase banking 
system stability? An empirical investigation’ Journal of Monetary Economics, 49 
pp.1373–1406.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga, (2004), ‘Market discipline and deposit insurance’ 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 51 pp. 375–399. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E.J. Kane, (2002), ‘Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where 
Does It Work? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2), pp.175–195. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, (2008), The run on the Rock, (London: The 
Stationery Office Ltd.), HC 56–1, Fifth Report of Session 2007–8, January. 
Pike, C. J. and J. B. Thomson, (1992) “FDICIA’s prompt corrective action provisions,” 
Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Sep 1.175
CAN CENTRAL BANK PROVISION OF MARKET LIQUIDITY 
CREATE A PROBLEM OF MORAL HAZARD?
1
Alistair Milne





Tel: +44 20 7040 8738




Public authorities from the US, the UK and Germany provided or coordinated 
support to a number of financial institutions, since the eruption of the credit 
crisis that erupted in August of 2007. The major central banks, the Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have also all 
in various ways extended their provision of market liquidity, for example 
by widening the range of assets accepted as repo collateral for secured 
central bank lending, reducing the cost of standing borrowing facilities, and 
increasing the available stock of reserves. This essay explores the relationship 
between a central bank’s provision of market liquidity to the market as whole 
during a financial crisis and incentives for banks to manage their own risk 
and liquidity.
The emergency liquidity support provided to Northern Rock was a loan to 
an individual institution, not a loan open to any bank at a market determined 
price. But episodes such as that of Northern Rock, and the subsequent support 
1 The argument developed in this paper draws on Alistair Milne The Fall of the House of 
Credit, Cambridge University Press (2009), Chapters 9 and 10, and on Perry Mehrling and Alistair 
Milne (2008) The Government’s role as credit insurer of last resort and how it can be fulfilled 
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/cbs/activities /bankingcrisis.html176 Introduction
given to many banks around the world on an even greater scale that followed 
in October of 2008, are associated with considerable liquidity strains in 
banks and money markets and require central banks to provide a great deal 
of additional market liquidity. Therefore the authorities, in coping with such 
episodes, need to be aware of any potential problem of moral hazard that the 
provision of such market liquidity might create.
The central bank certainly has a responsibility to provide market liquidity 
during a financial crisis. This was recognized in the doctrine of ‘lender of 
last resort’, as conceived by Thornton and promulgated by Bagehot, drawing 
on the experience of 19
th century London banking markets.
2 This doctrine 
was designed to stem a banking liquidity panic, when bank customers lost 
confidence in the banking system and sought to exchange bank liabilities, 
either deposits or notes, for non-bank liabilities, coin or central bank 
notes. London’s experience of that time confirms that such panics could be 
prevented as long as the central bank stood ready to lend to banks at penal 
rates of interest against good collateral.
In modern markets retail customers have no practical alternative to bank 
liabilities and the main alternative to bank liabilities for wholesale customers 
are government liabilities such as T-bills or short term bonds. In this context 
the traditional function of lender of lender of last resort is to a substantial 
degree subsumed by the central bank’s routine procedures for the conduct of 
open monetary operations and for automatic provision of credit to individual 
banks through ‘standing facilities’. However in times of financial stress, such 
have recurred since the summer of 2007 and intensified in the autumn of 
2008, the central bank may need to take additional actions to provide liquidity 
to the market as a whole.
It is better not to describe the emergency facility provided to Northern Rock as 
‘lender of last resort’. In modern discussions the usage of this phrase has been 
extended so far as to make it almost meaningless, having been applied also to 
discretionary provision of central bank secured credit to individual institutions, 
in order to prevent their failure, and sometimes even to discretionary loans by 
government to individual institutions for the same purpose.
Such discretionary loans to individual institutions are ignored here. The scope 
of this essay is the provision of liquidity to the market as a whole during 
a financial crisis and the question of whether this can have an adverse impact 
2 Much of the key literature on lender of last resort, going back to the late 18th century, is 
collected in Forrest H. Capie and Geoffrey E. Wood The Lender of Last Resort, Routledge, 2007177 Introduction
on the incentives of private institutions to manage their own risk. Section 
2 refers to some prominent views on this question. Section 3 describes the 
routine provision of liquidity to the market in the ‘orthodox’ implementation 
of monetary policy and how this is altered when central banks shift as they 
are now doing to ‘unorthodox’ monetary implementation. The following two 
sections look at the current crisis, section 4 describing the dislocation of 
money markets, and section 5 the steps taken in response to the intensification 
of the crisis in September and October 2008.
The final section considers the adequacy of these measures and their impact 
on incentives, arguing that the risk of a systemic liquidity crisis involves an 
externality that cannot be fully internalized by individual banks determining 
their own liquidity decisions in their own interests. There is a moral hazard but 
it needs to be dealt with through an appropriate charge for this systemic risk, not 
by limiting the provision of market liquidity when a systemic crisis unfolds178
2.  Are incentives an issue when providing liquidity to 
markets?
The incentive impact of interventions to support individual institutions is 
well understood. There is a concern over ‘moral hazard’ whenever public 
support is given to an individual institution. This applies not just in the 
emergency loan and eventual nationalization of Northern Rock, but in all the 
other recent examples of public support to private institutions, for example 
the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the effective 
nationalization of the insurance giant AIG. If such intervention to support 
a financial institution is anticipated then these institutions have much weaker 
incentives to manage their own risks. In all these cases the public authorities 
have provided new capital, at the same time imposing substantial losses on 
shareholders. Shareholder losses help improve incentives, but even when 
shareholders interests are written down to zero there is still a moral hazard 
because institutions protected by such a financial safety net can borrow at low 
rates of interest that do not fully reflect the risks they are taking.
This concern applies even in those cases, such as the recent loans by the system 
of Federal Home Loan Banks to many mortgage institutions in the United 
States, when lending is fully collateralized and the intention is to support 
a bank regarded as solvent but illiquid, i.e. fundamentally sound but no longer 
able to borrow enough from private sector counterparties to stay in business.
In practice this distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is never clear 
cut.
3 There are always some doubts both about the soundness of the institution 
and the value of the collateral available to the central bank, doubts that prevent 
the bank that is in difficulties obtaining private sector credit in the first place. 
Therefore any discretionary central bank loan to an individual institution 
always provides some degree of protection to private sector creditors and 
shareholders and creates moral hazard.
Interventions to support an individual institution can still be economically 
justified, even when taking account of moral hazard, if the wider systemic 
costs of each financial institution’s failure exceed the costs of public sector 
support. But the method used to provide support should minimize moral 
3  The classic statement of this view is Ralph Hawtrey (1932) The Art of Central Banking: The 
Lender of Last Resort, an except of which is reprinted in Capie and Wood (op. cit.).179 Are incentives an issue when providing liquidity to markets?
hazard and the assessment of costs should allow not just for the direct fiscal 
costs of support but also the additional costs arising because the expectation 
of public sector financial support changes the behaviour of banks and other 
systemically important institutions. 
There is another, related, moral hazard concerning monetary policy. If 
investors believe that monetary policy makers will respond to sharp falls 
in the prices of financial assets by an easing monetary policy which in turn 
limits investor losses, then they will invest more in risky assets than they 
otherwise would. This has come to be called the ‘Greenspan put’ because of 
a perception that the Federal Reserve has acted in this way under its previous 
chair Alan Greenspan.
4 Central banks, including the Federal Reserve under 
both Greenspan and his successor Bernanke, have gone to considerable 
lengths to emphasise that this is not the way that they operate and that there 
can be no central bank guarantee on asset returns, although it does appear that 
easy monetary policy in the wake of the dot.com crash and 9/11 contributed 
to the US housing bubble.
Do similar issues of incentives arise when central banks provide liquidity 
to markets? During the current credit crisis there has been a divergence of 
opinion amongst leading economists about the extent to which central banks 
should provide such liquidity, especially at longer than overnight maturity, and 
on whether such provision can have an undesirable impact on incentives. On 
the one hand Willem Buiter, of the London School of Economics, has argued 
that liquidity is a pure public good which can be provided at zero social cost, 
and that the central bank should therefore always be prepared to provide 
the maximum amount of liquidity that it can against a very wide range of 
collateral both to the commercial and investment banks, at all maturities and 
to the full range of financial markets not just in short term money markets. 
Buiter (2008) is a detailed statement of his views.
5 According to this analysis 
the only limitation on liquidity provision must be that it is provided against 
collateral in order that the central bank is not exposed to credit risk and at 
a penalty rate to ensure that there is no financial subsidy. Buiter further argues 
that the central bank should not only play such a role of ‘lender of last resort’, 
providing loans at penalty rates of interest against collateral in all maturities 
of money markets and to every type of financial institution, but should also 
act as ‘market maker of last resort’ in other financial markets. 
4 A lucid recent statement is George Cooper’s The Origin of Financial Crises (Vintage, 2008)
5  Willem Buiter (2008), Central Banks and Financial Crises, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City Symposium on Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, Jackson Hole, August180 Are incentives an issue when providing liquidity to markets?
These views can be contrasted with the widely reported statements of 
Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, who argued that central 
banks needed to be concerned about the incentive implications of providing 
liquidity to markets.
6 On 12th September 2007 he wrote “... is there a case 
for the provision of additional central bank liquidity against a wider range 
of collateral and over longer periods in order to reduce market interest rates 
at longer maturities? This is the most difficult issue facing central banks at 
present and requires a balancing act between two different considerations. 
On the one hand, the provision of greater short-term liquidity against illiquid 
collateral might ease the process of taking the assets of vehicles back onto 
bank balance sheets and so reduce term market interest rates. But, on the other 
hand, the provision of such liquidity support undermines the efficient pricing 
of risk by providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour.” 
In a later speech on 9th October, 2007, in Belfast he stated “Nothing would 
have been easier than for the Bank of England to lend freely without a penalty 
rate. Almost every actor in this drama saw advantage in cheap money and 
plenty of it. The role of the central bank is to ensure that the appropriate 
incentives are in place to discourage excessive risk-taking and the under-
pricing of risk, and in so doing to avoid sowing the seeds of an even greater 
crisis in future. That we have done in each action we have taken – by 
maintaining the principle of the penalty rate.”
He seems to have been concerned that a promise by central banks to lend 
against a wide range of collateral, in large amounts at all maturities, might 
weaken the incentives for commercial banks to manage their own risk and 
liquidity efficiently.
Who then was right, Buiter who has no concern about moral hazard in 
provision of market liquidity, or King who has taken this concern seriously?
7 
Or is some more intermediate position appropriate?
6 King’s views are documented in three places: his letter dated 12
th September, 2007 to the 
Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee; the uncorrected evidence he gave to the select 
committee on 20
th September, in the immediate aftermath of the failure of Northern Rock, and 
finally a more considered assessment, after Northern Rock, in a speech to the Northern Ireland 
Chamber of Commerce on 9
th October 2007. These documents are all available on the Bank of 
England and TCSSC webpages.
7 A further discussion of this point, including a contribution by Buiter, can be found in the 
discussion of an article by Lawrence Summers, posted in Martin Wolf’s economics forum on 
www.ft.com, dated 24th September 2007181
3.  Liquidity provision and monetary policy 
implementation
In recent years, right up to the end of 2008, central banks in the major 
economies have implemented monetary policy in much the same ‘orthodox’ 
way. Monetary policy is conducted by making decisions over a short term 
policy rate of interest (for example the Federal Funds rate set by the Federal 
Reserve, the Bank Rate set by the Bank of England and the rather clumsily 
named Main Refinancing Operations Minimum Bid rate of the European 
Central Bank) with the level of this policy rate adjusted from time to time, 
normally at regularly scheduled meetings.
Central banks also all use a fairly similar framework for implementing 
these monetary policy decisions.
8 First they establish a regime of reserve 
requirements on commercial banks with financial incentives to maintain 
reserves, averaged over period of time, close to a target level (so banks are 
paid a relatively low rate of interest on reserves if average reserves differ too 
much from the required level).
This then leaves the central bank with the tasks of controlling the aggregate 
supply of bank reserves and to do so in a way which keeps short term market 
interest rates, both overnight rates and rates at other short-term maturities up 
to and including the next monetary policy decision, as close as possible to the 
monetary policy rate. There are practical complications, for example monetary 
policy operations must respond to variations in the circulating stock of notes 
issued by the central bank, since these notes are issued on demand and their 
issue reduces central bank reserves. Reserves must also be adjusted to offset the 
impact of payments flows from banks within the reserves scheme to financial 
institutions outside of the reserves scheme holding accounts with the central 
bank (e.g. foreign central banks) and, most importantly, for draw down in any 
government borrowing facilities from the central bank (since such expenditure 
has the effect of increasing reserves held by the banking system).
Since there is a whole yield curve of these short term money market rates, 
running from overnight up to one month, it can use more than policy instrument 
8 Monetary operations in the UK and the Euro area are documented in the Bank of England 
Red Book http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/ publications/redbookjan08.pdf and 
in the ECB general documentation on Eurosystem monetary operation and procedures http://www.
ecb.int/mopo/ implement/intro/html/index.en.html. Documentation of Federal Reserve procedures 
are more scattered, but most information can be found via http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ and 
from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.182 Liquidity provision and monetary policy implementation
for these tasks. Central banks use three forms of intervention in the market as 
a whole, which together are described as ‘open market operations’:
1.  used to control the aggregate level of reserves, are outright open market sales 
or purchase of securities, usually government bonds, in order to maintain 
aggregate reserves with the central bank in line with that commercial banks 
are required to hold. A purchase paid for with central bank money increases 
aggregate reserves while a sale decreases aggregate reserves.
2.   used to fine tune the aggregate stock of reserves, are medium term secured 
loans to banks, using “sale and repurchase agreements” or repo contracts. 
A central bank repo increases the reserves of the commercial bank 
counterparty, against securities such as bonds or equities which are offered 
as collateral for the loan. These medium term repos are offered to the 
market on a fixed quantity basis, with banks tendering in order to borrow 
these reserves, and those willing to pay the highest interest rate successful 
in their tender.
3.    aimed at controlling market interest rates at very short maturities, are 
overnight repos offered at the policy rate of interest. The key difference 
here is that the volume of repo is price not quantity determined, giving the 
central bank effective control of overnight money market rates of interest.
There are also two further arrangements for loaning additional reserves on 
request to individual institutions, their crucial feature being that they are 
non-discretionary: provided a commercial bank’s request complies with the 
stated rules then the central bank must provide the additional reserves. First, 
as a technical tool to avoid gridlock in the payments system, central banks 
provide further intraday repo loans to individual banks without any interest 
rate being charged. Second, banks have access to standing borrowing and 
deposit facilities – such as the Federal Reserve discount window and the Bank 
of England standing facilities which they can use to borrow reserves against 
collateral at a penalty rate above the policy rate. In practice however the 
standing facilities of the Fed and the Bank of England have been little used, 
even in the crisis, because they are relatively expensive compared to market 
borrowing and because of a perceived ‘stigma’ i.e. potential damage to the 
reputations of banks that use them. Only in the Euro area are these standing 
facilities used to any large degree, because they are anonymous and because 
the alternatives of market borrowing are relatively underdeveloped.183 Liquidity provision and monetary policy implementation
There are many further technical details to monetary policy implementation and 
these differ from one central bank to another. One of these differences is that 
the Bank of England, unlike other central banks, asks the commercial banks 
operating in sterling money markets, to choose their own preferred level of 
excess reserves at the beginning of each ‘maintenance period’ i.e. the period 
from one meeting of its monetary policy committee to the next (these chosen 
reserves are excess to the very small unremunerated reserve requirements 
imposed on UK banks.). Commercial banks use central bank reserves in order 
to manage their payment flows. They therefore choose higher levels of reserves 
during periods when payments flows and liquidity needs are more uncertain. The 
Bank of England arrangements thus automatically inject much of the additional 
liquidity required in money markets during periods of market stress, while other 
central banks have to announce all such injections of additional reserves.
Since the end of 2008 in response to the current crisis central banks have 
moved away from this ‘orthodox’ approach to monetary policy, instead adopting 
unorthodox approaches with labels such as ‘quantitative easing’. The difference 
is that the central banks are no longer attempting to maintain overnight money 
market rate of interest at a target level, instead they have shifted to flooding the 
banks with reserves, causing money market interest rates to fall to their lowest 
possible levels, at or around zero (in theory central banks could drive rates 
even lower by applying interest rate charges to reserves held with the central 
banks, in practice they have not done so for fear that this would cause banks to 
disintermediate and no longer use central bank reserves for payments at all). 
There are different approaches to such unorthodox monetary policy. One, 
adopted by the Bank of Japan when they also operated monetary policy in 
this way between 2001 and 2005, is to set targets for aggregate bank reserves 
buying sufficient government bonds to meet this target (“quantitative easing”). 
A second approach, favoured by Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke 
is to flood the banks with reserves and use this purchasing power to provide 
liquidity to markets for credit risky assets such as mortgage backed securities or 
consumer ABS securities (“credit easing”). The debate on the relative merits of 
these two approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. But whichever approach 
is taken individual banks all more than enough liquidity.
9
 
9 For Bernanke’s views see his speech The Crisis and the Policy Response, January 2009, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ bernanke20090113a.htm184
4.  The credit crisis and the dislocation of money markets
Since August of 2007, central banks have taken several steps in order to limit 
the impact of the credit crisis on money market and bank liquidity. First they 
have made considerable use of their standard tool for responding to stress in 
money markets, an increase or ‘injection’ of additional reserves using overnight 
repo loans to banks and term loans. Secondly the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England have relaxed their requirements for collateral applied to term loans, 
accepting a range of securities such as MBS that were not previously acceptable 
(a change that was not necessary in the ECB because their rules always allowed 
lending against such collateral). Third, in the most intense phase of the crisis, in 
September and October of 2008 they radically increased the amount they lent 
to banks that could not fund themselves on the money markets.
Additional reserves are needed in times of uncertainty, because the demand for 
central bank reserves from commercial banks then rises sharply, banks preferring 
to hold more than they are required so they can more easily manage uncertain 
payment flows, for example an outflow of wholesale funding.
10 This increased 
demand for central bank reserves in turn leads to increases in the overnight 
lending rates at which banks borrow from each other and from other money market 
participants. This has occurred on several occasions, for example following the 
failure of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
It has also happened periodically during the current credit crisis, for example on 
August 9
th 2007 when there was first an impact on money markets, immediately 
prior to the takeover of Bear Sterns in March 2008, and following the government 
takeover of the insurance giant AIG in September of 2008. On all these occasions 
central banks have injected substantial amounts of additional reserves and 
overnight rates have been brought back close to policy rates fairly quickly.
Episodes of heightened levels of overnight interbank rates and the response 
by central banks, injecting additional reserves, are not surprising. This is 
has happened in all previous episodes of financial stress. What has been 
a major surprise is that this crisis has affected not just the immediate 
overnight market, but the entire short-term money market yield curve. This 
is reflected in unsecured and some secured borrowing rates. Over the period 
10 For a nicely written review of the injection of reserves required because of Y2K see 
Hampton (2000) Y2K and Banking System Liquidity www.rbnz.govt.nz/research/bulletin/1997_
2001/2000mar63_1Hampton.pdf.185 The credit crisis and the dislocation of money markets
August 2007 – September 2008, three month unsecured interbank rates, 
such as those recorded in the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), have 
risen substantially relative to market rates secured on the best collateral e.g. 
government bonds, whether borrowing in dollars or in sterling. Spreads 
between unsecured and secured three-month borrowing rates have averaged 
around 75 basis points in all the major currencies, compared to around 5 basis 
points before the crisis; and have, moreover, fluctuated substantially. Central 
bank reserve injections have done little to reduce these three month spreads. 
Rates for borrowing on a secured basis using structured credit assets such as 
mortgage backed securities as collateral have also risen, e.g. rates in asset 
backed commercial paper markets or for repo of mortgage backed securities.
The emergence of these large and fluctuating spreads between the rates 
on money market instruments and risk free three months securities such 
as treasury bills or loans collateralized on government bonds is a major 
concern to central banks, in both their conduct of monetary policy and their 
responsibilities for maintaining financial stability. It affects monetary policy 
because bank lending rates are an important channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Bank lending rates are set in line with those on money market 
instruments, the marginal source of bank funding, so bank lending rates are 
also increased relative monetary policy rates, again by about 75 basis points. 
This is a substantial tightening of monetary policy relative to where it would 
have been without liquidity problems in money markets.
Why this unprecedented shift in money market interest rates? Spreads between 
money market and monetary policy rates have risen because of concern 
amongst both banks and non-banks that some commercial banks could face 
difficulties in repaying three month money. This erosion of confidence has 
been a self-reinforcing consequence of the credit crisis. As long as banks had 
plenty of collateral which they could use for secured borrowing, then there 
was no reason to think that they might have difficulty in borrowing new funds 
to repay three month money. Both secured and unsecured rates then remained 
close to expected future monetary policy rates. 
The credit crisis changed this situation because of doubts about the valuation 
of the collateral. The most widely used collateral were mortgage backed and 
asset backed securities, collateral that the banks could easily manufacture 
themselves from their own loan books. As long as there was an open and 
liquid market for mortgage backed securities then short term borrowing was 
relatively easy for most banks. All they had to do was create new MBS and 
ABS, sell a few and use the rest as security for borrowing in money markets. 186 The credit crisis and the dislocation of money markets
But as soon as confidence evaporated and the market for issuing structured 
securities collapsed then many banks, not just Northern Rock, faced major 
problems of funding themselves short term.
This in turn created doubts about their ability to refinance and this raised 
money market rates relative to monetary policy rates, both the unsecured 
borrowing rates such as LIBOR and the rates for secured borrowing against 
the doubtful mortgage backed collateral. The rate of interest on secured 
borrowing collateralized by treasury securities was unaffected, but banks need 
to buy treasury securities before they can use them as collateral for borrowing, 
so this is of little help to banks when they have to refinance their lending.
Do these heightened money market rates imply that central banks had 
failed, by not providing sufficient liquidity to the market? No, this was not 
a failure of central bank liquidity provision. A market is liquid if individual 
transactions take place without a large price impact. The key responsibility 
of the central bank is to ensure that payment flows between banks, especially 
the large and unpredictable flows associated with securities and foreign 
exchange markets, have as small a price impact as possible i.e. do not affect 
overnight lending rates and do not trigger bank insolvency. It does so by 
providing almost unlimited quantities (but usually price rationed) overnight 
collateralized lending.
Central banks do not and never have provided similar liquidity to other 
financial markets (the only exception is the foreign exchange markets under 
a fixed exchange rate regime). While central banks provide further loans 
to the market at longer than overnight maturities, for example the routine 
conducted one week and one month repos and also addition discretionary 
‘injections’ of reserves during periods of financial stress, these actions do not 
and are not intended to remove the impact of payments flows on one week 
or one month money market rates of interest. These term loans are at fixed 
quantity, not fixed price, with the aim of guaranteeing additional aggregate 
reserves to the banking sector over the period of the facility, in turn making 
reserves management easier for individual banks.187
5.  Lender of last resort in the global bank run of 
September – October 2008
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, the 
dislocation of money markets became much more severe, forcing central 
banks to greatly increase their provision of liquidity to the market.
What happened was very simple. Doubts about the ability of individual banks 
to refinance their short term funding, and increasing concerns about bank 
solvency, meant that many banks could no longer borrower unsecured in the 
money markets even overnight. As a result these banks were forced to turn 
to central banks to replace their lost short term deposit funding. This was 
a systemic run on the entire global banking system.
One consequence was an increase in the spreads between unsecured and 
secured lending rates, to around 2 per cent for British sterling and the euro 
and even higher for the US dollar, where it peaked at over 3½ per cent 
before falling back to around 2 per cent. These spreads have gradually, since 
December, subsided but are still around 1 per cent.
Central banks had no choice. To refuse to offer funds in the market, freely 
and at a penalty rate, would have triggered insolvency in a large number 
of institutions. They therefore had to act as ‘lender of last’ resort on an 
unprecedented scale, pretty much exactly as Thornton and Bagehot would 
have recommended. They stood ready to lend to all banks who wanted to bid 
for reserves, relaxing collateral requirements as necessary, and thus replacing 
all lost money market funding.
These actions have produced some astonishing changes in central bank assets 
and liabilities.
11 At the beginning of August 2007, before the crisis broke, the 
assets of the Federal Reserve system were about USD 900 billion, of which 
nearly USD 800 billion were securities such as Treasury bonds. The main 
liability was greenbacks – a little over USD 800 billion of notes in circulation. 
Deposits by commercial banks with the Federal Reserve were relatively 
small, fluctuating around USD 13 billion. Until early September 2008, despite 
the many liquidity measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve, the overall 
balance sheet had not changed much. Although they were increasing their term 
11 All figures in this and following paragraphs taken from Federal Reserve release H.4.1188 Lender of last resort in the global bank run of September – October 2008
lending, in order to maintain control of overnight interest rates they were also 
draining reserves, taking away with one hand what they gave with the other.
But with the global bank run after September 15, there was an extraordinary 
expansion of the Fed balance sheet. As bank confidence in money market 
counterparties collapsed, banks took shelter in the safety of depositing with 
the central bank. By 5 November 2008 total currency in circulation remained 
about the same, but otherwise the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve was 
transformed. Total assets had more than doubled, to over USD 2,000 billion. 
The various liquidity facilities had expanded dramatically, including some 
USD 380 billion in short-term and term repo loans, and USD 590 billion 
in other credit of different kinds, including loans to broker dealers and the 
financing of the so called AMLF asset-backed commercial paper and CPFF 
commercial paper funding facilities.
How were all these facilities financed? Securities holdings had fallen by 
around USD 300 billion, to just under USD 500 billion, the Fed having sold 
off about USD 300 billion of Treasury securities in order to finance liquidity 
loans. Even bigger was an entirely new item: a USD 560 billion US Treasury 
supplementary financing facility, i.e. the Federal Reserve was borrowed 
much of this money directly from government. Finally, there was a very large 
increase of nearly USD 480 billion in bank deposits with the Federal Reserve, 
that is, banks were now placing short term funds as reserves with the central 
bank rather than with money markets. 
There has been a similar money market disintermediation and expansion of 
central bank balance sheets elsewhere. Over the same period balance sheet of 
the system of European Central Bank has almost doubled, from around EUR 
1 trillion to EUR 2 trillion.
12 The assets and liabilities of the Bank of England 
have risen an astonishing threefold, from around £80 billion in early August 
2007 to £240 billion in early November 2008, although the Bank of England 
weekly bank return gives rather little information about the composition of 
this expanded balance sheet.
13
This lending of last resort was needed to prevent bank failures. There 
is a puzzle. Even with this support, and the accompanying measures to 
recapitalise banks, confidence in the liquidity and solvency of bank money 
market counterparties has not been fully restored and money markets have 
remained dislocated. There has been some subsequent contraction of central 
12  ECB weekly balance sheet.
13  Bank of England weekly balance sheet.189
bank balance sheets and the spreads between unsecured 3-month Libor and 
secured lending rates have fallen back from their peaks. But central banks have 
continued to be the principal intermediaries of short term funds, replacing the 
dysfunctional money markets by taking deposits from banks with sufficient 
cash and then lending them out to the market to all those willing to pay and 
with collateral to borrow.
6.  Is there an incentive problem?
In light of these dramatic events, who was right, Willem Buiter who argues 
that liquidity is a pure public good and advocates that central banks should act 
not just as lender of last resort; or Mervyn King who has been concerned that 
overgenerous provision of liquidity can create a problem of moral hazard and 
encourage banks to adopt an excessive exposure to liquidity risk?
While not providing an explicit answer to this question, the actions of the central 
banks reveal that they accept that they must provide liquidity in the form of 
bank reserves as demanded by commercial banks. Despite the suggestion to 
the contrary by some media commentators, The Bank of England, the Federal 
Reserve, and the ECB have responded in a fairly similar way to stresses in 
money markets, providing large amounts of additional collateralized repo 
lending in order to increase the stock of central bank reserves and to respond 
to the virtual breakdown of money market intermediation in the global 
banking run of September and October of 2008. This lending has not just been 
overnight but also, in order to provide commercial banks with greater medium 
term control over their reserves, at longer maturities out to three months.
In the case of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England increasing 
reserves has also led them to extend the range of eligible collateral. These 
actions have substantially increased the stock of bank reserves and been 
successful in bringing back very short term (overnight) money market rates 
close to monetary policy rates.
But Buiter’s views go much further. He seems to be proposing a massive 
extension in the role of central banks, giving them responsibility for limiting 
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unclear how central banks could even begin to undertake this task and if they 
were to do so, for example by offering the Greenspan put option, then there 
clearly would be a major change in incentives facing private sector financial 
institutions.
King’s views, as summarized in this paper, at least as they were initially 
set out in his letter to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee of 
12
th September, 2007, can also be criticised. The central bank provision of 
liquidity in the overnight market does not itself create moral hazard, it is 
simply the implementation of the monetary policy decisions of the central 
banks. Monetary policy would create a moral hazard if were seen as be used to 
stabilize asset market returns and thus protect investors for the consequences 
of their own risk exposure, i.e. if the central bank did provide the Greenspan 
put option. But this is clearly not the case in the UK, where the inflation 
targeting regime of which Mervyn King himself was one of the principal 
architects, ensures that monetary policy is devoted only to price stability.
It is true that the central banks have shielded commercial banks from the 
consequence of the systemic liquidity problems since August of 2007 and 
especially from the impact of the global run on the banks in September and 
October of 2008. There is therefore some logic to Mervyn King’s arguments. 
The central banks could have made clear to individual banks that they would 
be allowed to fail in the event of systemic run and this would have given them 
much stronger incentives to hold more liquid assets and have more long term 
funding. Such a regime might have helped prevent Northern Rock getting into 
the difficulties in the way it did.
These incentive problems in the provision of liquidity can be reduced to 
some extent by providing liquidity at penalty rates of interest either when a 
bank makes use of the standing facilities or by imposing substantial penalties 
when a bank strays too far below its reserve average target. But penalty rates 
of interest cannot be imposed when the central bank provides liquidity by 
lending to the market because it then does so at a market determined rate.
The real problem, and the cause of the large spreads between money market 
and monetary policy rates, was the collapse of liquidity in the market for 
mortgage backed securities, a collapse in turn largely triggered by excessive 
maturity mismatch across the global banking system.
14 In recent years the issue 
of mortgage backed and other loan backed securities have been the principal 
14 Milne (2009) The Fall of the House of Credit, chapters 2 and 6 estimates that this global 
maturity mismatch amounted to around USD 3 trillion.191 Is there an incentive problem?
means by which banks in the US, the UK and many other countries have 
raised secured wholesale funding. With the disappearance of this formerly 
liquid market, banks have been forced to turn on a very much larger scale 
than before to relatively expensive unsecured funding, a development which 
ultimately undermined money market intermediation and led to the global 
bank run of the autumn of 2008.
This leads to a key point that can help resolve the difference in view of 
Buiter and King. Employing such maturity mismatch to hold what were at 
the time liquid mortgage backed and other structured securities involved an 
externality. The benefits were using relatively low cost short term funding 
and these benefits were captured entirely by the bank holding the securities. 
The cost was the risk of a systemic liquidity crisis, the cost of which fall on 
all banks that are short of retail funding and seeking to use wholesale funding 
from money markets to supplement loans and other portfolios. 
Buiter is right that liquidity is in effect a free public good, because by lending 
freely against collateral the central bank prevents short term self-fulfilling 
runs leading to bank failure. But King is also right that this creates an 
incentive problem, because short term funding – unlike long term funding – is 
then much less exposed than it otherwise would be to the underlying system 
wide credit and market risks of the bank portfolio.
In the event of a system wide shock, such as has occurred in this credit 
crisis, short term funds can be confident that they are likely to be repaid with 
the help of the central bank (the does not apply when an individual bank 
is exposed to specific risks such as a large sale operational failure or large 
exposure, since in this situation the central bank can allow a single bank to 
fail without creating systemic problems). As a result the return demanded by 
short term investors is relatively low and banks are incentivized to operate 
with substantial liquidity risk.
But the solution to this incentive problem is not, as King appears to suggest, to 
provide loans only reluctantly to banks suffering from deposit withdrawal in 
a systemic crisis. The better answer is instead to introduce a tax or charge that 
compensates for this externality. To avoid a similar crisis in future we need to 
have in place a charge per unit of short term wholesale funding set at a level 
that properly reflects the external liquidity costs of short term funding.
15
15 A related proposal appears in Perry Mehrling and Alistair Milne (2008) Government's role 
as credit insurer of last resort and how it can be fulfilled. http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/cbs/activities/
bankingcrisis.html192 Is there an incentive problem?
What are these costs and what should the level of this charge be? This is 
more difficult to say, although the answer is clearly greater than zero. An 
initial charge of perhaps 20 basis points per annum might be about right, 
this would be about the level needed to close off most of the ‘negative basis’ 
trading, such as that employed by UBS, the trade where banks held high 
yield structured securities financed using low cost repo borrowing, a trade 
that has played a big role in the current financial crisis. The recommendation 
of this paper is to begin with 20 basis points and then conduct the research to 
establish a more accurate figure.195
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1.  Introduction: Northern Rock’s ‘teaser rate’ strategy
Northern Rock’s rapid expansion from its de-mutualisation in 1997 to the 
summer of 2007 owed much to marketing, particularly the so-called ‘teaser 
rate’ strategy. According to The Daily Telegraph in an analysis in November 
2007, the strategy was devised by Mr. Adam Applegarth in its early years as 
a quoted PLC. Mr. Applegarth later became Northern Rock’s chief executive 
and was still in this position when the bank’s growth plans hit their nemesis 
in September 2007. The essence of the strategy was to offer mortgages at 
rates that appeared to be little different from banks’ cost of funds in order to 
take business from rival organizations, while charging fees and a number of 
other add-ons which gave Northern Rock a reasonable profit. It should be said 
that – even allowing for the fees and add-ons – Northern Rock’s loan margins 
were low compared with most of the competition. 
One of the issues raised by the Northern Rock affair is therefore ‘How are 
banks’ loan margins determined?’ The purpose of the current paper is to 
set out a framework which answers this question, but also relates it to the 
long-run evolution of banking systems. Specifically, a formula is derived 
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to assets, and a brief historical survey then shows that these well-known 
measures of liquidity and solvency are much lower in banking today than 
in the past. The discussion recognises the separate roles of ‘liquidity’ and 
‘solvency’ in two types of decision analysis. These are, first, the thinking of 
banks’ managements with their goal of profit-maximisation and, secondly, the 
agenda of financial regulation, as the regulators do their best to ensure that 
deposits always remain convertible into cash at par.
A fair generalisation is that the lower are cash-to-deposit and capital-to-asset 
ratios, the riskier are the banks’ operations and the greater should be 
regulatory concern about their ability to meet claims. On the other hand, an 
implication of the formula is that, for any given rate of return on capital in the 
banking industry, the lower are the ratios, the lower also is the cost of bank 
finance to non-banks. Banking therefore suffers from an inevitable tension. 
The competitive, low-margin and customer-oriented banking practiced 
by Northern Rock, while admirable in some respects, may be difficult to 
reconcile with the emphasis on depositor safety demanded by the media in 
the immediate aftermath of a crisis.197
2.  How are banks’ loan margins determined?
Bank loans are risky and costly to organize, and they are financed by deposits 
on at least part of which interest is payable. It is clear that revenues (i.e., net 
interest margin, fees and other income) must be sufficient at least to cover the 
following list of items,
–  An allowance for likely loan losses, 
–  The costs of organizing the loans and maintaining the money transmission 
infrastructure which enables banks to collect deposits, and 
–  The cost of funds to the lending bank, in terms of the interest rate paid on 
deposits or other finance.
Loan losses might not unreasonably be expected to be close to zero for 
a specialist mortgage bank, like Northern Rock, maintaining low loan-to-value 
ratios and requiring borrowers to buy mortgage indemnity cover
1. For 
simplicity, the rate of loan loss is ignored in the rest of this paper. In the real 
world the costs of organizing loans are substantial, but they are largely met or 
exceeded by arrangement fees. For banks with extensive branch networks and 
a major role in the payments mechanism, the costs of collecting and managing 
deposits are also substantial, but they are assumed here to be zero to ease the 
exposition. With the assumptions of nil loan losses and zero running costs, the 
average return on banks’ assets would still not be identical to the loan margin 
if assets included bonds and securities. Nevertheless, the concepts must be 
closely related in a world – such as that of today – in which banks’ assets are 
dominated by their loan portfolios. In the rest of this paper the phrases ‘return 
on bank assets’ and ‘loan margin’ are used interchangeably in order to facilitate 
the discussion, even though they are not the same in practice. Obviously, loan 
margins need to be adjusted upwards to deliver a particular ‘return on assets’ 
if allowance has to be made for loan losses and bank running costs.
The list of costs set out in the last paragraph applies to all types of credit 
institution. But many such institutions – including, for example, hire purchase 
companies and specialist leasing businesses – are not banks. Without 
entering too deeply into the vexed question ‘What is a bank?’, the distinctive 
1  A plethora of newspaper reports appeared in late 2007 about the irresponsibility of Northern 
Rock’s lending practices. The write-off rate on Northern Rock’s loan assets in the first half of 
2007 was in fact 0.01 per cent, although a larger charge (of almost 0.12 per cent of mean advances 
to customers) was made. See the section on ‘Loan loss impairment’ in Northern Rock’s Interim 
Results, published on 25
th July 2007.198 How are banks’ loan margins determined?
characteristics of banks may be understood to include the ability to take and 
repay cash deposits over the counter, and an obligation to maintain a cushion of 
capital against possible loan losses which further protects depositors’ interests. 
Historically cash reserves, both in the form of ‘vault cash’ and in a balance at 
the central bank, have not paid interest, but they are essential for retail deposit-
taking
2. It follows that, for any given loan margin (which may be measured as 
a percentage of loan assets), the rate of return on assets is a positive function 
of the ratio of non-cash, earning assets to total assets. Plainly the rate of return 
on capital depends on both the rate of return on assets and the ratio of ratio 
of capital to assets. The argument is easily statement in algebraic terms. Let 
a bank’s assets be split between cash, C, with c representing the ratio of cash 
to assets, and earning assets or loans, L. Then total assets A = C + L or A = 
c.A +L. So L = (1 – c).A. Profits (P) are equal to the loan margin or profit 
‘spread’ on assets, s, multiplied by the earning assets, L, or 
P = s.L = s.(1 - c).A, 
while the rate of return on capital (K) is P/K, which is 
P/K = s.(1 – c).A/K. 
So
s = P/K. (1/[1 – c]). K/A. 
It is clear that, if the loan margin is given, the rate of return on capital is 
inversely related to the cash/assets ratio (or indeed almost certainly the more 
conventional cash/deposits ratio) and the capital/assets ratio. As Phillips 
remarked in his 1921 classic on Bank Credit, ‘the essence’ of banking 
‘consists in the practice of extending loans far in excess of either the capital 
or the cash holding of the bank in question’
3.
By implication, bankers are likely to support any developments, in institutions 
or technology, which enable them to lower their cash/deposits ratio (i.e., their 
‘liquidity’) and their capital/assets ratio (i.e., their ‘solvency’). The next two 
sections discuss the long-run trends in banks’ liquidity and solvency, with 
a particular emphasis on the UK as background to the Northern Rock affair.
2 Following a precedent set by the European Central Bank, the Bank of England started to 
pay interest on reserve balances in 2006. While a system of remunerated reserves would require 
a radical restatement of the argument in this paper, in the UK’s case it was made so recently as 
not to affect the paper’s key points.
3 W.  Phillips,  Bank Credit (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 13.199
3.  Long-run trends in bank liquidity: an historical 
perspective
Banking evolved from the safekeeping of money. In the familiar accounts 
people left deposits of a widely-recognised monetary commodity (usually 
precious metals like gold) with a specialist in safekeeping, such as a goldsmith. 
Initially the deposit was backed 100 per cent by the assumedly safe ‘hard’ 
monetary asset. Over time the notes which acknowledged the deposits were 
used in transactions instead of gold, while bankers found that they could 
make loans in their note liabilities instead of gold. By issuing note liabilities 
without gold backing, the ratio of gold to total liabilities fell from 100 per cent 
or more to markedly lower levels. Nowadays the safe monetary asset – the 
so-called ‘monetary base’ – is no longer a precious metal, but the legal-tender 
notes issued by the central bank. But, like gold, legal-tender notes do not pay 
interest. Because notes are not earning assets, modern banks want to reduce 
the ratio of cash to their earning assets, in the same way as goldsmiths in 
embryonic banking. 
Early banks often had cash/asset ratios of over 50 per cent. (One example 
is provided by Scottish banking in the middle of the 18
th century, which is 
a favourite topic of the advocates of ‘free banking’).
4 By the start of the 
20
th century the UK’s so-called ‘joint-stock banks’, with their limited liability 
to shareholders and a sophisticated system of cheque-clearing, had cut the 
ratio to 11 per cent and continued to retain their customers’ confidence. 
This fall had been facilitated by two insights, first, that the convertibility of 
deposits into cash could be protected by holding interest-bearing assets which 
could be readily sold for cash as well as by the holding of cash itself, and, 
secondly, that a distinct institution with the prerogative to issue notes (i.e., 
a central bank, which was the Bank of England in the UK’s case) could lend 
to commercial banks if they ran out of cash.
5 Indeed, the key to maintaining 
4  Charles W. Munn, ‘The origins of the Scottish note exchange’, Three Banks Review (1975), 
no. 107, pp. 45–60. In February 1768 the Aberdeen Banking Co.’s ratio of specie to demand 
liabilities was 61.2 per cent. (See p. 51.)
5 A classic discussion of the factors influencing banks’ cash/asset ratios was provided by 
Francis Edgeworth in his 1888 paper in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (vol. LI, pp. 
113–27) on ‘The mathematical theory of banking’. But Edgeworth concentrated on the scale 
benefits of a large bank, because of ‘the law of large numbers’ acting on deposit withdrawals, and 
the advantages of establishing a clearing-house. He did not discuss the ability of a central bank 
to create cash at zero cost and the implications of its ability to lend such cash (i.e., the ability to 
make lender-of-last-resort loans) for banks’ own cash management practices.200 Long-run trends in bank liquidity: an historical perspective
deposit convertibility was not to have a large holding of idle vault cash, but 
to nurture a good relationship with the Bank of England and keep holdings 
of an assortment of ‘liquid assets’. It was understood that such assets could 
either be sold to the Bank (possibly on repurchase terms) or would serve as 
collateral for a loan.
During the 20
th century the Bank of England therefore paid close attention to 
both the cash ratio and ‘the liquidity ratio’ (i.e., ratio of explicitly defined liquid 
assets to a large balance sheet category, such as deposits held by non-banks) 
observed by the banks. In the first few years after the Second World War the 
cash ratio dropped to 8 per cent, while the liquidity ratio was 40 per cent and 
banks’ assets were dominated by claims on government. In such circumstances 
it was virtually inconceivable that a run would exhaust banks’ cash holdings. 
Over time both ratios fell dramatically. By the late 1950s the Bank of England 
has allowed the liquidity ratio to go down to about 30 per cent, although the 
institutions specifically charged to respect this ratio – the clearing banks – 
resented the competition they faced from other credit-granting organizations 
not subject to ratio control. In the Competition and Credit Control reforms 
of 1971 the discrimination against the clearers was largely remedied by the 
setting of a ‘reserve assets ratio’, applicable to all banks, at 12 ½ per cent of 
sterling deposits. The clearers had to keep a non-interest-bearing balance at the 
Bank of England, equal to 1 ½ per cent of deposits, on top of their required 
reserve assets, but this had an obvious functional rationale in their clearing 
activities and was not objectionable to them.
By now competition and risk-taking were intensifying, but British banking 
seemed to be working smoothly. In 1981 both the clearers’ 1 ½ per cent ratio 
and the 12 ½ per cent reserve assets ratio were scrapped. Instead all banks 
– whether involved in clearing or not – were to lodge a deposit in ‘special 
non-operational, non-interest-bearing accounts’ at the Bank of England equal 
to ½ per cent of so-called ‘eligible liabilities’ (i.e., non-equity liabilities to 
agents other than banks and the government). These accounts were seen as 
serving no purpose in either monetary control or financial supervision and 
regulation. Instead they existed to give the Bank of England funds which it 
re-invested in interest-bearing securities, generating an income sufficient to 
cover its costs. The clearers kept a separate balance, over and above the ½ per 
cent, to settle debit and credit balances at the end of each daily clearing, but 
it was now a very low ratio of their balance sheet totals. 
The Bank of England was still concerned about the degree of maturity 
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history and the reserve asset ratio had been abolished, but in July 1982 the 
Bank published a paper on ‘The measurement of liquidity’, showing how 
individual banks were to calculate (among other things) a ‘net cumulative 
mismatched position’. Bank officials continued to supervise all banks’ 
liquidity until 1998, when the job was transferred to the newly-created 
Financial Services Authority as part of an institutional upheaval at the start of 
the Blair government. This institutional upheaval led to the transfer of many 
officials from the Bank of England, with its decades of experience and a fund 
of central banking know-how, to the FSA which had yet to find its feet. Some 
officials at the FSA undoubtedly did appreciate that the structure of assets, 
and in particular the ratio of liquidity to total assets, was relevant to the 
integrity of the banking businesses under its supervision. But a fair comment 
is that official interest in UK banks’ ability to withstand a run was sharply less 
than had been the norm during the 20
th century.202
4.  Trends in bank liquidity: the run-up to the Northern 
Rock crisis
The  insouciance  towards banks’ vulnerability in a run was reflected in 
several developments in the decade leading up to the Northern Rock crisis. 
The traditional understanding had been that banks’ cash reserve with the 
Bank of England had a definite functional rationale for the depositing banks 
themselves. Their cash reserves were both the accounts in which the clearing 
banks themselves settled their end-of-day imbalances and a backstop for their 
vault cash, if their vault cash came under attack from a loss of confidence 
and a retail run. Further, by opening an account at the Bank of England 
a bank started a relationship with the UK’s central bank, which included the 
possibility of borrowing from it in the appropriate circumstances. Indeed, 
historically, building societies had not maintained accounts at the Bank of 
England. Instead they ‘banked’ via the clearing banks, while they had been 
regulated not by the Bank of England, but by the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies. 
But officialdom seems increasingly to have forgotten that banks’ cash 
reserves at the Bank of England had a functional purpose. Under the terms of 
the 1998 Bank of England Act and the 2000 Financial Services and Markets 
Act, UK banks were required to maintain a non-interest-bearing balance at 
the Bank of England of only 0.15 per cent of eligible liabilities. The Treasury 
subsequently published two consultative papers on what it come to term ‘the 
cash ratio deposit scheme’, in which the sole purpose of the scheme was seen 
as providing the Bank of England with non-interest-bearing balances.
6 These 
balances could be re-invested in interest-bearing securities to generate a profit, 
and so to cover its staff and other costs. The scheme was discussed solely and 
entirely as a mechanism for covering the Bank of England’s costs, and as 
having no wider value for the British banking system. The two documents 
seemed to be oblivious of the operational rationale of a cash reserve at the 
central bank from the commercial banks’ own point of view. 
6  The Treasury published the two documents – both called Review of the Cash Ratio Deposit 
Scheme: Consultation on proposed changes   – in August 2003 and August 2007. In qualification 
to the statement in the text, the Bank of England was fully aware of the significance of the cash 
ratio deposit scheme for bank’s liquidity management. See The Framework for the Bank of 
England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets (‘the Red Book’) (London: Bank of England, 
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Before its demutualisation in October 1997 Northern Rock had been 
a mutually-owned building society and its direct contacts with the Bank 
of England were negligible. Since 1998, like other quoted British banks, 
it has kept a non-interest-bearing deposit at the Bank of England. In May 
2006 the Bank of England changed the structure of its relationship with 
the UK’s commercial banks in wide-ranging reforms, notably by starting 
to pay interest on cash reserves separate from the 0.15 per cent cash ratio 
deposit scheme. The new terms of the Bank of England’s relationship with 
its customer banks were contained in a Red Book, which – in its own words 
– was ‘designed to provide flexible access to central bank money, including 
in unlimited size against eligible collateral at a penalty rate through’ the 
so-called ‘standing lending facility’.
7 In the summer of 2007 Northern Rock 
was a participant in the Bank of England’s reserve schemes and a member of 
the list of banks to which a standing facility might be granted. The phrases 
contained in the Red Book were apparently comforting, implying that – as 
a long as Northern Rock or any other British bank had good collateral – it 
could always meet a run by selling assets (probably on a repo basis) to the 
Bank of England. The events of August and September 2007 were to show 
that, in practice, no one in Northern Rock’s management or the Bank of 
England knew precisely what was supposed to happen if Northern Rock lost 
the confidence of its retail depositors. 
Nevertheless, for most of Northern Rock’s existence as a PLC the resilience 
of its defences against a retail run was not a big topic in its corporate strategy. 
Its regional roots and smallness handicapped it in the market for UK retail 
deposits. Here the clearers – with their national branch networks and the 
scale that allowed them to enjoy huge ‘network economy’ advantages in 
settlement business - were entrenched. Instead Northern Rock, like two other 
former building societies (Bradford & Bingley, and Alliance & Leicester), 
decided to fund their expansion in the wholesale markets, including the 
international markets in asset-backed securities (ABS) and collateralised 
mortgage obligations (CMO) which had started to grow rapidly in the 1990s. 
At demutualisation Northern Rock’s liabilities were dominated by its retail 
deposits, mostly in the north-east of England; by the end of June 2007 its 
retail liabilities of £  24.5bn were exceeded by wholesale money amounting 
to £ 26.7bn, securitisations of £ 45.7bn and covered bonds of £ 8.1bn
8 A fair 
comment is that by this stage Northern Rock’s management hoped to meet 
any funding problem by the issue of further securities. After all, in early 2007 
7  The Framework for the Bank of England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets 
(London: Bank of England, March 2008), p. 7.
8  See Northern Rock’s Interim Results, published on 25
th July 2007, p. 19 and p. 36.204 Trends in bank liquidity: the run-up to the Northern Rock crisis
it had been accorded a higher credit rating by the rating agencies and a large 
securitisation issue had been oversubscribed. 
With hindsight, Northern Rock’s business model and particularly its reliance 
on wholesale funding have been deemed imprudent or even irresponsible.
9 
But in truth by the early 21
st century the whole of the British banking system 
had economised on cash to a remarkable extent and, in this respect, taken 
a cavalier attitude towards funding risk. Cash as a fraction of total sterling 
liabilities, and even of sight sterling liabilities, had become nugatory by 2005. 
In January 2006 UK banks’ cash ratio deposits were £  1,953m. and other 
balances at the Bank of England (i.e., the balances actively used in settlement 
of payments business) were £ 839m., and their vault cash was £ 5,417m. Their 
total cash resources were therefore £  8,209m. At the same time their sight 
liabilities to UK non-banks were £ 629,892m and their total sterling liabilities 
£  2,534,494m. So the ratio of cash to sight liabilities held ‘by the British 
public’ was 1.3 per cent and the ratio of cash to all sterling liabilities was 
0.3 per cent.
10 In other words, the cash ratio of British banks had dropped to 
about a thirtieth of what it had been 80 years earlier! Perhaps it is unnecessary 
to add that the situation in summer 2007 – which had changed again because 
of the introduction of interest-earning reserves in May 2006 – remained a far 
cry from the 100 per cent cash reserve ratio found when the idea of banking 
had been conceived in the late middle ages.
How would UK banks’ managements have reacted if critics pointed out the 
apparently perilous degree of maturity transformation in their balance sheets? 
The answer might have had two parts. First, they might have mentioned that 
they kept deposits at other banks plus a cushion of ready-for-sale securities, 
often enjoying a triple-A credit rating and hence similar in quality to those 
that would have qualified as ‘liquid’ in the eyes of the Bank of England in 
the mid-20
th century, on top of cash itself. In fact, at the end of June 2007 
Northern Rock had deposits with other banks of £ 6,812m and ready-for-sale 
securities of £  8,000m., against a balance sheet total of £  113,506m.
11 So its 
‘liquid assets’, taken altogether, were more than 13 per cent of liabilities (and 
much more than 13 per cent of retail deposits), not out of line with the norms 
9 See, for example, the evidence of Mervyn King and Professor Willem Buiter to the 
Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, as summarized on p. 18 of volume one of 
the Treasury Committee’s The run on the Rock: 5
th report of the session 2007/8 (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2008).
10  The apparently extreme vulnerability of the British banking system to a system-wide retail 
run was discussed by the author in Tim Congdon ‘Short of cash’, p. 41, in the July/August 2008 
issue of Financial World (London: IFS School of Finance in association with the Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation).
11 Again see Northern Rock’s Interim Results, published on 25
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of the late 20
th century. Secondly, banks’ executives might have noted that 
they had inter-bank ‘lines’ (i.e., borrowing facilities), which could be used 
if – for any reason – they could not find buyers for their supposedly ‘ready-
for-sale’ securities.
Chart 1: The Changing Composition of the UK Banking System’s Assets
The trouble here was that, while any individual bank could regard an 
inter-bank line from other banks as enabling it quickly to add to its cash, for 
all banks together the inter-bank lines cancelled out. If the banks either ceased 
to trust each other or found that they needed cash for their own businesses, 
the likelihood was that banks would cut their lines to each other. Inter-bank 
finance would prove illusory as a source of liquidity. Further, if the market in 
allegedly ‘ready-for-sale’ securities became constipated by excess supply (of, 
for example, the ABSs and CMOs which had been issued in vast quantities in 
2005 and 2006), the only ultimate source of cash was the central bank, which 
in the UK context of course meant the Bank of England. As is well-known, the 
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a by-product of a crisis in sub-prime mortgage lending in the USA. When 
a number of British banks approached the Bank of England for an easing of its 
collateral requirements for central bank credit, they received a dusty answer. 
For many years they had cut back drastically on their cash holdings, taking for 
granted that the Bank of England would always help them out as long as they 
had adequate capital and good-quality assets. This assumption was shattered 
by the insistence of Mervyn King, the Bank’s Governor, that only government 
securities constituted the right kind of collateral for central bank loans. In 
mid-2007 the British banking system had extremely low cash relative to 
deposit liabilities by past standards, while the availability of new cash from 
its ultimate source (i.e., the Bank of England) was thrown into doubt.
12 For 
reasons not discussed here, British banks’ net claims on government were also 
tiny by the early 21
st century. (See Chart 1 above.) 
12 A growing problem from mid-2007 was that many of the securities believed to be ‘ready-
for-sale’ had been conceived in the structured finance boom of the previous few years. Despite 
having triple-A credit ratings, they became illiquid and for several quarters could be sold only at 
prices well beneath their par value. In the past – including the quite recent past – British banks’ 
transactions with the Bank of England had been conducted largely in ‘eligible’ commercial bills, 
with eligibility for sale to the Bank being established by the acceptance of the default risk by two 
good banking names. The arrangements were brought to an end in 2003, largely at the instigation 
of Mr. Paul Tucker, one of the Bank’s executive directors. One of the virtues of the eligibility 
system was that it dispensed with the need for outside credit ratings, since the credit assessment 
has to be done by the banks ‘accepting’ the default risk.207
5.  Long-run trends in bank solvency
For many decades writers on monetary theory – and particularly writers on 
the theory of monetary policy-making – paid considerable attention to the 
ratios of cash and liquidity to banks’ overall balance sheet size. By contrast, 
the ratio of capital to assets was neglected until the 1980s. One reason is that 
central banks did not always publicise their views on the desirable level of 
banks’ cash/assets ratio. In the first edition of The British Financial System, 
published in 1973, Revell noted that building societies were subject to 
regulations on their capital reserves set by the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
but for the banks matters were somewhat different. To quote, 
The Bank of England keeps a close watch on the reserve ratios of the 
bodies under its direct surveillance in the banking system – deposit banks, 
accepting houses, other secondary banks and discount houses. In all cases 
it works to certain minimum ratios, although nobody outside the Bank 
knows what these ratios are.
13
Of course banks’ management were cognisant of their capital ratios from 
internal records and they had to keep shareholders informed in their audited 
accounts. So – despite the apparent regulatory neglect of the capital side of 
banks’ balance sheets until the last 25 years – researchers have been able to 
compile data on the long-run behaviour of capital ratios. As with the cash and 
liquidity ratios, the trend is clear. Whereas in the embryonic phase of banking 
capital/asset ratios put heavy emphasis on safety and were often over 30 per 
cent, in the 20
th century and the opening years of the 21
st century the ratios fell 
substantially and with only occasional interruptions to the long-run pattern.
14
This is not the place for a systematic treatment, but some generalisations can 
be offered. (See Table 1 for some relevant data.)
15 In the late 19
th century 
a capital/assets ratio of over 15 per cent was normal even in the UK, the 
13 Jack Revell The British Financial System (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1973), p. 105.
14 The subject is of course vast, but – for example – see p. 124 of Howard Bodenhorn 
A History of Banking in Antebellum America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.) 
At end-June 1840 the Bank of Charleston had an equity-to-assets ratio of 60.6 per cent and 
a contingency fund of over 5 per cent of assets as well! It nevertheless earned a return on equity 
of about 10 per cent.
15  The data used in the table come from p. 149 of M. K. Lewis and K. T. Davis Domestic and 
International Banking (Oxford: Phillip Allan, 1987).208 Long-run trends in bank solvency
most advanced financial power of the time. By contrast, in the first half of 
the 20
th century the leading British banks regarded an appropriate capital/
asset ratio as between 7 per cent to 10 per cent. In the second half of the 
20
th century the figure had fallen to 5 to 6 per cent. By the end of the century 
banks in the USA and Europe – which had historically operated on higher 
capital/asset ratios than their British counterparts – increasingly had the same 
attitude towards capital adequacy, but bank managements and regulators in 
these areas were dismayed by the very low capital/asset ratios in Japanese 
banking. Indeed, the view that Japanese banks’ skimpiness on capital allowed 
them to undercut their rivals in the offshore banking markets provoked the 
Anglo-American ‘convergence accord’ on bank capital in January 1987. The 
accord developed into the Basle capital rules which were enforced in all the 
participating countries, including Japan, to establish a ‘level playing field’. 
As is well-known, the central principle of the first set of Basle guidelines was 
that capital should be not less than 8 per cent of assets, with equity capital 
equal to at least half of total capital. The similarity of this principle to British 
banks’ own preferred capital/assets ratio of about 5 per cent is striking. Given 
the pattern of the preceding international negotiations in which UK officials 
had been so active, the setting of a 4 per cent minimum may not have been 
entirely accidental.
Table 1: Equity capital to total assets of UK and US banks, 1880–1985











* UK deposit banks 1880–1966, UK clearing bank groups 1980 and 1985
+ All member banks of the Federal Reserve system
The low value of the UK ratio in 1950 reflected the high ratio of low-risk government paper in banks’ 
assets after the Second World War.
Source: Jack Revell, The British Financial System (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
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Northern Rock became subject to the Basle rules at its de-mutualisation. 
Indeed, references to compliance with the latest developments in the Basle 
regulatory framework were included in its last published accounts as a quoted 
PLC.
16 Perhaps it is premature to pass judgement on international banks’ 
manipulation of asset and liability structures over the last decade or so, as 
they attempted to bypass the Basle constraints. Nevertheless, even a cursory 
examination of banks’ annual reports shows that in the last few years actual 
ratios of equity capital to assets have often been under 3 per cent for a very 
large number of institutions. They nevertheless met the Basle rules because 
those rules allow a zero weight (in terms of capital usage) for inter-bank 
exposures and claims on government, as well as other technical exemptions. 
Not the least of the adjustment problems created by the paralysis in the 
wholesale banking markets from August 2007 was that, whatever the Basle 
rules said, responsible banks decided in their own interests to allocate capital 
against the risk that other banks might fail. Contrary to the intention of 
international bank regulation since the late 1980s, banks ceased to trust each 
other in the crisis of 2007. Equilibrium capital/asset ratios rose sharply across 
the whole international system. The risks of defaults on claims on other banks 
were given new urgency by the collapse of Northern Rock, even though – in 
strict legal terms – by the end of the year it continued to have positive capital 
and had met all its obligations. 
To conclude this section, in the early phase of modern industrialism banks 
typically had capital/asset ratios of over 30 per cent, but in the middle years 
of the present decade the effective ratio was little more than 3 per cent. 
A significant rise in the ratio, probably to about 5 per cent, and a fall in the 
ratio of inter-bank claims to total assets are likely to be two medium-term 
responses to the current crisis. 
16  See Northern Rock’s Interim Results, published on 25
th July 2007, p. 13.210
6 .  What do the trends in liquidity and solvency imply for 
loan margins?
It is now time to bring together the strands of the argument by setting out 
a matrix which shows how, with a particular return on equity targeted, the 
average return on bank assets varies with different ratios of cash and capital 
to assets. The matrix – set out in Table 2 below – uses the formula developed 
earlier for the determination of banks’ average return on assets. A reminder 
may usefully be inserted that the implicit assumptions in preparing the matrix 
are the same as they have been throughout this paper. They are that banks 
have no loan losses, and that banks’ fee revenues cover the costs of organizing 
the loans and running any deposit collection and money transmission 
infrastructure.
17
17 Also neglected – as mentioned in the text – are the complications arising from banks’ issue 
of bonds and preference capital. Liabilities are deemed, for simplicity, to consist solely of equity 
capital and deposits. The text assumptions may seem unrealistic, but in the case of Northern 
Rock they are far from silly. In the five years leading up to the crisis of mid-2007 its loan losses 
were negligible, while its wholesale funding model minimised the costs of collecting deposits 
and arrangements fees covered the costs of organizing loans. Could Northern Rock have been 
‘reckless’ in its asset selection, if its loan losses had been negligible over such a sustained period? 
In the years to 31
st December of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, pre-tax profits were £ 390m., £ 435m., 
£ 494m. and £ 627m. respectively, compared with shareholder funds at 31
st December of 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2005 of £ 1,210m., £ 1,388m., £ 1,538m. and £ 1,576m. respectively. The implied rates 
of return on shareholder funds (on a preceding year basis) were therefore 32.2 per cent, 31.3 per 
cent, 32.1 per cent and 39.8 per cent. (Data taken from August 2007 issue of Company Refs: Fully 
Listed Companies [London: HS Financial Publishing].) No doubt Northern Rock’s management 
and auditors made mistakes, as do those of any commercial organization. But – given the record of 
consistent profitability and the relative simplicity of Northern Rock’s business – the claim that its 
operations were systematically ‘reckless’ seems implausible, to say the least. On 12
th May 2008, 
under new management, Northern Rock issued a trading statement which included a change in its 
policy towards arrears accounting. To quote from the next sentence, ‘the change…does not reflect 
any change in the underlying quality of Northern Rock’s mortgage portfolio, as demonstrated by 
the low level of realised losses which the company has experienced on its mortgage portfolio over 
many years’.211 What do the trends in liquidity and solvency imply for loan margins?
Table 2: How banks’ loan margins vary with their cash and solvency ratios
P/K c K/A rb
Rate of return on 
capital Cash ratio Capital/assets 
ratio “Loan margin”
14 80 45 31.5
14 40 20 4.7
14 12 15 2.4
14 5 8 2.2
14 1 5 0.8
14 1 3 0.5
Table 2 shows, with a given target rate of return on capital, how a reduction in banks’ average return on 
assets (i.e., their ‘loan margin’, more or less) becomes possible as their cash/asset and capital/asset ratios 
decline.
A target rate of return on capital of 14 per cent has been chosen, as this 
sort of number would be regarded as modest by contemporary UK banks in 
their internal strategy documents and serves as a reasonable benchmark for 
discussion.
18 In the very early days of banking – when banking was indeed 
little different from risky and avaricious money-lending, and the cash ratio 
was perhaps 80 per cent and the capital/assets ratio 45 per cent – the loan 
margin had to exceed 30 per cent. In the opening decades of the industrial 
revolution, in such countries as England, Scotland and the USA, a cash 
ratio of 40 per cent and a capital/asset ratio of 20 per cent would have been 
commonplace in the banking industry. A loan margin of almost 5 per cent 
(i.e., 500 basis points) would achieve a return on capital of 14 per cent. In 
the early decades of the post-war world, with a cash ratio of 5 per cent and 
a capital/assets ratio of 8 per cent, a loan margin of about 200 basis points 
would have been consistent with that return on capital. But in the low-ratio 
banking of the last 15 years or so, loan margins of 100 basis points or less 
were compatible – assuming all went well with asset selection and cost 
control – with high bank profitability. Admittedly, the teaser rates offered 
by Northern Rock may have taken the logic of these developments to an 
unsustainable extreme. But that does not necessarily mean that the Northern 
Rock management was irresponsible and foolish. Northern Rock’s activities 
18 As demonstrated by the previous footnote, Northern Rock exceeded the 14 per cent figure 
by a wide margin, until its funding – and so the business itself – collapsed in late 2007. The chief 
economic commentator of the Financial Times, Martin Wolf, protested about the high profitability 
of banking in a column on 28
th November 2007, attributing it to ‘sundry explicit and implicit 
guarantees’ from the state. Later in his column he endorsed ‘higher capital requirements’. The 
argument of this paper is that the likely result of imposing higher capital requirements is that banks 
will widen their margins. A widening of banks’ loan margins has indeed occurred in early 2008. 
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certainly intensified competition within the UK housing finance industry and, 
to that extent, benefited the British public.
Chart 2: The rise and Fall of “The Teaser Rate”
Chart refers to monthly data. Note that the scale has been inverted, so that the lowest values of the 
mortgage margin (in 1999) appear to be the highest
The regulatory sequel to the Northern Rock crisis has included a drive 
towards the raising of capital/asset ratios in UK banking as part of a wider 
campaign to improve the safety of deposits. Since the contretemps of August 
2007 the Bank of England has continued to equivocate about the type of 
assets it would readily purchase from the banks, even if it has to some degree 
relented on King’s initial insistence that only government paper constituted 
valid collateral.
19 Meanwhile banks have cut back on inter-bank exposures 
and tried to improve the quality of the securities in their portfolios. So the 
long-run pattern for banks to economise on cash and low-yielding liquid 
assets, and to increase their leverage, have been reversed. This reversal may 
19 A Special Liquidity Scheme was introduced in April 2008, to enable banks to swap 
mortgage debt into gilt-edged securities (on a repo basis for as long as a year, if desired), so that 
the gilts could be used as collateral in the inter-bank market. King’s insistence on government 
paper as collateral for a loan from the Bank of England, or as the assets purchased by the Bank 
in open market operations, is remarkable by historical standards. For most of the 19
th century 
the Bank’s assets were dominated by commercial bills, not government securities. As recently as 
the 1980s the Bank’s holdings of commercial bills were several times larger than its holding of 
claims on the government. Indeed, in 1984 and 1985 a veritable ‘bill mountain’ resulted from the 
Bank’s operations in the gilt-edged and money markets, and – according to the Prime Minister 
of the day – the Bank’s excessively large holdings of commercial bills (i.e., claims on the private 
sector) constituted a policy problem. (Margaret Thatcher The Downing Street Years [London: 
HarperCollins, 1993], pp. 695–6.)213 What do the trends in liquidity and solvency imply for loan margins?
be merely cyclical, but sooner or later the secular trend towards low-ratio 
banking had to end. The Northern Rock crisis demonstrated yet again that, in 
banking, ‘convulsion’ can follow all too quickly after ‘overtrading’.
20 At any 
rate, for Northern Rock’s customers, and the many other British households 
servicing mortgages or considering house purchase, the effect of the reversal 
in the long-run trend towards low-ratio banking has been a rise in the cost of 
mortgage finance.
21 (See Chart 2 above).
20 This is of course a reference to Overstone’s account of the 19
th century trade cycle which, 
in his view, consisted of successive states of ‘quiescence, improvement, growing confidence, 
prosperity, excitement, overtrading, convulsion, pressure, stagnation and distress’, before starting 
up again with ‘quiescence’. For a discussion, see Joseph A. Schumpeter History of Economic 
Analysis (London: George Allen &Unwin, 12
th printing of 1954 edition, 1981), p. 744.
21 ‘The death knell was sounded for the cheap fixed mortgage last night as Britain’s biggest 
lender raised rates by up to 0.5 per cent. Halifax – which provides one in five new mortgages 
– pushed up the cost of more than half of its fixed-rate deals.’ The quotation is from a story 




Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was 
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together 
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who 
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, 
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other 
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of 
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and 
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises 
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several 
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat 
located at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual 
corporate, personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate 
membership currently includes major European financial institutions and 
Central Banks. SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe 
and its membership comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (including the 
Bank for International Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, 
other financial institutions and academics.215
SUERF STUDIES
1997– 2005
For details of SUERF Studies published prior to 2006 (Nos. 1 to 22 and 
2003/1-2005/5) please consult the SUERF website at www.suerf.org.
2006
2006/1 Fiscal Issues in the New EU Member Countries – Prospects and 
Challenges, by Helmut Wagner, Vienna, 2006, ISBN 978-3-902109-31-6
2006/2 Visions about the Future of Banking, by Hans J. Blommestein, 
Vienna, 2006, ISBN 978-3-902109-32-3
2006/3 Measuring Scale Economies in a Heterogeneous Industry: The Case 
of European Settlement Institutions, by Patrick van Cayseele and 
Christophe Wuyts, Vienna, 2006, ISBN 978-3-902109-33-0
2006/4 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States, by 
Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Traistaru-Siedschlag, Vienna, 2006, ISBN 
978-3-902109-34-7
2006/5  The Adoption of the Euro, Choice of Currency Regime and Integration 
of Payment Systems (three papers), by Michael C. Bonello, George 
M.  von Furstenberg, Kari Kemppainnen and Sinikka Salo, introduction 
by Morten Balling, Vienna, 2006, ISBN 978-3-902109-35-4
2007
2007/1 Information and Uncertainty in the Theory of Monetary Policy, by 
Helmut Wagner, Vienna, 2007, ISBN 978-3-902109-36-X
2007/2 Economic Convergence in South-Eastern Europe: Will the Financial 
Sector Deliver? by Valerie Herzberg and Max Watson, Vienna, 2007, 
ISBN 978-3-902109-38- 5
2007/3 Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions, (four papers) by 
Spiros G. Stavrinakis, Christian Harm, David T. Llewellyn, and 
Bridget Gandy, Peter Shaw, Peter Tebbutt and Mark Young, Vienna, 
2007, ISBN 978-3-902109-39-2216
2007/4 Governance of financial Supervisors and its Effects – a Stocktaking 
Exercise, by Marc Quintyn. A joint publication with the Central Bank of 
Cyprus, Vienna, 2007, ISBN 978-3-902109-40-8
2008
2008/1  Monetary Policy Transmission in Poland: A Study of the Importance 
of Interest Rate and Credit Channels, by Tomasz Łyziak, Jan Przystupa 
and Ewa Wróbel, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-41-5
2008/2 Commodities, Energy and Finance, edited by Ernest Gnan and 
Már Gudmundsson, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-42-2
2008/3 Macroeconomic Differentials and Adjustment in the Euro Area, by 
Iulia Siedschlag, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-43-9
2008/4 Monetary Policy, Regulation and Volatile Markets (six papers), 
by  John P. Calverley, Fernando Restoy, Jesper Ulriksen Thuesen, 
Andrea Vivoli, Sushil Wadhwani and Axel A. Weber, Vienna, 20008, 
ISBN 978-3-902109-44-6
2008/5 Asset Management in Volatile Markets (four papers), by Robert 
C. Merton; Martin Gartner, Otto Loistl, Danijela Mladinovic and 
Stephan Zellner; Peter Haiss and Bernhard Sammer and Kryzsztof 
Rybinski and Ursula Sowa, Vienna, 2008, ISBN 978-3-902109-45-3
Order Form: www.suerf.org217
SUERF COLLOQUIUM VOLUME
“Money, Finance and Demography: The Consequences of Ageing” edited 
by Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan and Frank Lierman, SUERF, Vienna, 
December 2007, ISBN 978-3-902109-37-8
A significant ageing trend can be observed in Europe and in other parts of 
the world. Fertility is decreasing and life expectancy increasing. The impact 
of migration is growing. The book deals with the implications for financial 
markets of these demographic trends. Leading economists and financial experts 
from Europe and the United States evaluate the challenges to public pension 
systems and the private pension industry. Based on long-term projections of 
productivity and employment they look at potential growth in GDP per capita 
and implications for savings and wealth. Pension fund portfolio management 
is discussed together with the ability of capital markets to serve retirement-
financing purposes. Fiscal as well as financial sustainability are analysed in 
depth. The roles of global imbalances and international capital movements 
are included. Most chapters also discuss policy implications – in particular 
with regard to how pension saving incentives and rules and incentives for 
retirement should be in order to ensure fiscal and financial sustainability. 
All contributions in the book are based on presentations at the 26
th SUERF 
Colloquium on “Money, Finance and Demography – the Consequences of 
Ageing” held on 12–14 October, 2006 in Lisbon sponsored by Banco de 
Portugal and Millennium bcp and in cooperation with the Universidade Nova 
de Lisboa.
Price: €50 (€25 for SUERF Members)
To order the book, please contact the SUERF Secretariat or visit the SUERF 
Website at www.suerf.org